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Abstract
This dissertation studies poverty, labor markets, and policy. Integral to this eﬀort are
innovative methods for using Census data to study these topics. The dissertation consists
of three chapters. The first chapter studies year-to-year poverty transitions in the United
States. The second chapter measures the extent to which individuals’ union membership
status aﬀects the levels of taxes they pay and the cost of public benefits they receive.
The third chapter analyzes how the electronic employment verification system, known as
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This dissertation is focused on developing innovative methods for using commonly used
data sources to analyze policy regarding labor markets. In particular, this dissertation
substantively studies the factors associated with poverty transitions, the role of labor unions
on taxes paid and benefits received, and the eﬀect of immigration policy on labor market
outcomes. To do so, this dissertation develops new methods for using Census Bureau data,
namely the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the American Community Survey (ACS).
This introduction gives an overview of the three chapters that constitute this dissertation.
The first chapter studies year-to-year poverty transitions in the United States. This
chapter provides the foundation for studying poverty transitions using linked Annual Social
and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS-ASEC) data. By doing
so, the chapter shows that poverty transitions are sensitive to the definition of poverty. For
example, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) demonstrates a higher level of people
entering and exiting poverty than the Oﬃcial Poverty Measure (OPM). Focusing on the
SPM, in order to measure the relative importance of particular household resource compo-
nents, a simple framework is developed to test the degree to which poverty transitions can
be explained by one resource. Income from wages/salaries are the most influential resource
component for poverty transitions but it is shown that other resources are important in
explaining poverty transitions. Finally, this framework is used in four real-life contexts
with the following main results. First, consider families who have a householder aged 69
1
2or older and who exit poverty. More than 50 percent of these families exit poverty be-
cause of an increase in the Social Security benefits they receive. Second, large increases
in medical expenditures ($20,000 or more) are not a common occurrence in the data but
are important predictors of families entering poverty. Third, consider families that had a
householder working full-time year-round in one year but became unemployed in the next
year. One-third of these families will enter poverty and the majority of these families fall
into poverty solely because of the loss in wages/salaries. Fourth, when a male adult leaves
the household, about 20 percent of those families will enter poverty while only about 10
percent of families enter poverty when a female leaves the family.
The second chapter, co-authored with Aaron Sojourner (Associate Professor, Depart-
ment of Work and Organizations), measures the extent to which individuals’ union member-
ship status aﬀects the levels of taxes they pay and the cost of public benefits they receive.
A positive eﬀect of unions on individual wages and employer-provided fringe benefit levels
has been well-established, especially at the low-end of the wage distribution. If hours do
not fall much, this should raise labor income. This positive eﬀect might have a positive
impact on individual net fiscal impact (NFI), i.e. taxes paid less the cost of public benefits
received. On the other hand, union membership may reduce net fiscal impact by raising
receipt of earned income tax credits, unemployment insurance, and workers compensation.
This chapter uses CPS data between 1994 and 2015 to study the eﬀect of union membership
on net fiscal impact overall and give evidence on the importance of various channels. Us-
ing both pooled cross-sections and individual first-diﬀerences, the chapter documents that
union members pay more in taxes and receive less in public benefits, implying a a positive
net fiscal impact through the worker-level channels studied here. Other channels by which
union membership aﬀects NFI, such as by decreasing firm profits or aﬀecting policy, are
described in the context of available, relevant evidence.
The third chapter analyzes how the electronic employment verification system, known
as E-Verify, aﬀects the labor market outcomes of unauthorized immigrants. E-Verify, is
widely considered an important component of immigration reform. Lacking federal action,
various states have passed laws requiring the use of E-Verify to certain employers. As
the measurement of unauthorized immigrants is a critical component of assessing these
3eﬀects, this chapter uses “logical edits” micro-data which is widely considered the most re-
liable data on unauthorized immigrants. Exploiting the variation in policy implementation
across states, this paper uses diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation with CPS-ASEC data to
estimate the eﬀect of universal E-Verify on the employment levels of unauthorized immi-
grants, naturalized Hispanics, and US-born non-Hispanics. Results suggest that universal
E-Verify lowers the likelihood of employment for all groups though the eﬀect is largest for
unauthorized immigrants and naturalized Hispanics. Furthermore, using the ACS and a
similar diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation, it is shown that universal E-Verify also reduces
the population size of unauthorized immigrants in E-Verify states.
Chapter 2
More than just a job?:
Characterizing poverty transitions in
the U.S.
2.1 Introduction
Poverty is a human condition that, when boiled down to a single number, we fail to describe
in human terms. For example, a common description of poverty in policy circles may be:
“In 2015, the oﬃcial poverty rate had one of its highest one-year drops in decades; the 13.5
percent poverty rate represented a drop of nearly 3.5 million people from the 14.8 percent of
2014” (Proctor, Semega and Kollar, 2016). This reductiveness is inevitable in statistics but
need not be in the construction of the statistic itself. The oﬃcial poverty measure (OPM)
highlights this point. In the simplest terms, the measure adds the total cash a family brings
in throughout one year and compares that to a poverty line. But how does the family who
suﬀers a medical emergency and must pay thousands of dollars in medical bills fit into
this equation? How do we account for the single mother who loses her job and relies on
food stamps for her family’s livelihood? There have been extensive eﬀorts to expand the
definition of poverty for decades, most notably the National Academy of Sciences eﬀorts in
the 1990s that culminated in what is known today as the Supplemental Poverty Measure
(SPM). This measure provides a solid framework for analyzing poverty but, to date, it
4
5has mainly been studied in a cross-sectional framework. Events such as death, divorce, or
even large increases in medical expenditures, are identifiable in a longitudinal setting that
are not in a cross-sectional setting. This paper’s aim is to leverage the data available to
describe poverty in relation to life events and to move poverty statistics beyond such black
and white terms.
For over fifty years, the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS-ASEC) has been the source of the oﬃcial poverty statistics for the U.S.
Although sampling methodology of the CPS is a rotating panel covering 16 months, the
CPS has rarely been used to study household-level poverty transitions. Indeed, the CPS
is typically disregarded in the poverty dynamic literature because of its 16-month panel
duration, although no documentation exists to prove such a dismissal is warranted. By
leveraging the longitudinal component of the survey, this paper provides the foundation
and justification for using the CPS-ASEC to study poverty transitions. Using the CPS-
ASEC in this setting is desirable for three reasons. First, it is important to characterize
these transitions using the CPS-ASEC because the dataset is the oﬃcial source of income
and poverty data in the US. Second, the CPS-ASEC is the only dataset that includes the
SPM and thus must be used to study the SPM. And third, because the CPS-ASEC dates
back to the 1960s, establishing a framework for studying poverty transitions can ultimately
be extended back in time and be useful for the historical analysis of poverty transitions.
Therefore, this paper demonstrates how to leverage diﬀerent definitions of poverty, such as
the SPM, to more fully characterize poverty transitions using the CPS-ASEC.
In doing so, it makes six contributions to the literature. First, by linking the CPS-ASEC
across two year periods, poverty rates are decomposed into families entering, exiting or re-
maining in poverty. (i.e. the dynamics of poverty). Quantifying the churn gives new insight
into the most vulnerable populations. Second, this paper analyzes how changes in family
composition aﬀect poverty rates and, by doing so, provides a more general framework for
analyzing family composition changes in the CPS. Third, since the OPM and SPM are both
measured using the CPS-ASEC, this paper looks at how poverty transitions and economic
vulnerability are diﬀerent across the two measures. Fourth, focusing primarily on the SPM,
the paper characterizes how changes in resource components influence poverty transitions.
By leveraging the panel of the CPS, the paper is the first to document the distribution of
6resource component changes for poverty transitions. Fifth, this paper develops a simple
methodology for measuring the relative importance of resource changes to poverty tran-
sitions. And finally, having established the foundation for using the CPS-ASEC to study
poverty transitions, the paper looks at how life-events, like divorce or increases in medical
expenditures, are associated with entering poverty or, in the case of government subsidies,
keeping families out of poverty.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant
literature on poverty dynamics and highlights the lack of work using the CPS-ASEC. The
section also gives an overview of how the OPM and SPM are constructed with particular
emphasis on the key diﬀerences between the two definitions. Section 2.3 provides a general
overview of the CPS-ASEC and how the panel nature of the CPS-ASEC allows for year-to-
year linking for family-level analysis. Section 2.4 demonstrates the reliability of using linked
CPS-ASECs to analyze poverty transitions by looking at the patterns of poverty transitions
across both OPM and SPM. Section 2.5 then looks at how family composition changes can
be studied in this framework. Section 2.6 decomposes the poverty transitions into its
resource component changes and provides a method for analyzing the relative influence
of resource component changes on poverty transitions. Section 2.7 demonstrate how this
methodology can be leveraged to quantify the role real-life events (such as job loss, death,
divorce, retirement, receipt of government subsidies) have in pushing people in and out of
poverty. Section 2.8 considers the role of imputations and attrition on the findings of this
paper. Section 2.9 gives an overall discussion of the findings, areas for future research and
concludes.
2.2 Review of literature and definitions
2.2.1 Literature review
The literature on poverty dynamics highlights three important points that are relevant for
the present study. First, the literature focuses on how certain events aﬀect the probabilities
of entering or exiting poverty as defined by the OPM. Since the OPM is based on cash
income, most of the literature finds that employment status and earnings are strongly
associated with transitions into and out of poverty. Second, research on poverty dynamics
7has been conducted primarily with more traditional longitudinal datasets such as the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). Little research has been conducted exploring the longitudinal nature of the CPS-
ASEC as it relates to poverty transitions. Third, the literature emphasizes the limitations
of the OPM, further showing the need to conduct longitudinal research using the SPM.
A first-order issue in the poverty dynamics literature is estimating the overall probability
of entering and exiting poverty in a given year. This literature is most in line with what
is done in this study. Mainly researched with data from the 1990s, the literature tends to
find a likelihood for the U.S. population of about 4 percent. That is, the unconditional
likelihood of any family entering poverty is about 4 percent (Eller, 1996; Naifeh, 1998).
Specifically, two studies using SIPP data from the 1980s find annual entry rates of about
3 percent while McKernan and Ratcliﬀe (2005) find that this rate increased to about 4
percent using PSID from the 1990s. From a poverty exit perspective, Eller (1996) and
Naifeh (1998) find that about 23 percent of people in poverty exit poverty on an annual
basis in the 1980s, while McKernan and Ratcliﬀe (2005) find this to be closer to 35 percent
during the 1990s. Importantly, the studies use longitudinal surveys with longer timeframes
and therefore provide a good benchmark for the results using the CPS-ASEC.
Leveraging the full time frame of these longitudinal survey such as SIPP and PSID, a
large part of the literature also focuses on the probability of experiencing poverty across the
lifecycle. In particular, the literature shows that, although the unconditional probability of
entering poverty is about 4 percent, the likelihood of experiencing poverty at some point
in one’s lifetime is much higher. Rank and Hirschl (2001) show that the likelihood of
experiencing poverty increases significantly with age. Specifically, they find that nearly 30
percent of adults experience poverty by age 30, about 40 percent by age 50, and nearly
half of adults by age 65. Moreover, studies find that the likelihood of entering poverty is
highest for those under the age of 25 (McKernan and Ratcliﬀe, 2005; Ribar and Hamrick,
2003; Rank and Hirschl, 2001). Because the CPS captures only a 16-month window, these
sorts of transitions are not studied in this study.
Focusing in on the events that are associated with poverty entries and exits, various
studies have confirmed that labor supply and earnings changes are the events most com-
monly associated with poverty entries and exits. McKernan and Ratcliﬀe (2005) point out
8that the most important factor leading to poverty entries is loss of employment by house-
hold heads as corroborated by various studies (Bane and Ellwood, 1983; Blank and Holzer,
1997). While changes in household composition can also increase or decrease the likelihood
of entering poverty, the overwhelming evidence shows that employment is the leading event
leading to poverty. Cellini, McKernan and Ratcliﬀe (2008) provide a thorough review of the
poverty dynamics literature and corroborate the finding that employment changes are the
most important factor explaining poverty entry and exits. They write, “descriptive analyses
using both the SIPP and PSID find that changes in labor supply and earnings are more
commonly associated with poverty exits than changes in household structure and compo-
sition.” The findings of this paper corroborate these findings but extend the literature by
quantifying the number of families that fall into poverty because of these household em-
ployment and composition change. That is, rather than focusing on changes in likelihood,
this paper focuses on describing the actual proportion of families that enter or exit poverty.
Cellini, McKernan and Ratcliﬀe (2008) make it evident that most work on poverty
transitions has been done using the SIPP and PSID. Of the 21 papers they reviewed, only
four use datasets outside of the SIPP and PSID, two of them using the CPS-ASEC and two
of them using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979). Taking advantage of the
panel nature of the CPS-ASEC is typically dismissed; as Cellini, McKernan and Ratcliﬀe
(2008) note: “with a maximum of two years of annual poverty status on individuals, the
CPS-ASEC is generally not well-suited for these types of studies.” This paper argues
that the CPS-ASEC is in fact useful for studying year-to-year transitions. Since the CPS-
ASEC is the source of the oﬃcial poverty rate for the U.S., it is particularly important to
understand how the CPS-ASEC can be used to study year-to-year transitions in poverty
status. Moreover, without a thorough analysis of poverty transitions in the CPS-ASEC, it
is unclear exactly what can be learned from using the CPS-ASEC.
Using the longitudinal aspect of the CPS-ASEC is common, particularly in studies of
labor status transitions, but these are more commonly conducted using the monthly-to-
monthly transitions with Basic Monthly CPS samples. Using the CPS-ASEC to analyze
transitions is less common though a few studies are relevant in this study. Feng (2013)
links CPS-ASECs and speaks to the identification and statistical inference issues regarding
a linked CPS with an application to poverty dynamics. While the focus is not on the
9factors influencing poverty transitions, Feng shows that CPS-ASEC can be used for poverty
transition analyses. Hokayem and Heggeness (2014) analyze how people move into and out
of near poverty which they define as individuals between 100 and 125 percent of the oﬃcial
poverty threshold. By creating two-year panels of the CPS-ASEC, they find that education
levels, labor force status, homeownership and marriage are important factors explaining
entrance and exits into near poverty. In sum, though not typically used for the study of
poverty transitions, there is some precedence for using the CPS-ASEC to study poverty
transitions.
Lastly, the literature continually points out the need to analyze transitions using al-
ternative measures such as the SPM. For example, McKernan and Ratcliﬀe (2005) argue
that “future research needs to leverage alternative definitions of poverty as they can address
limitations of the current oﬃcial poverty measure by accounting for in-kind transfers, taxes,
medical expenditures, owner-occupied housing, geographic variation in the cost of living,
and cohabitation.” Hokayem and Heggeness (2014) also point out that future work should
look at the SPM directly.
2.2.2 Defining OPM and SPM
Central to the analysis in this paper are the definitional diﬀerences between the OPM and
SPM. This section covers the main diﬀerences between the two poverty measures (for a
detailed review refer to Fox et al. (2015) and Renwick and Fox (2016)).
At its core, the SPM is a series of extensions to the OPM. As explained by the U.S.
Census Bureau:
Concerns about the adequacy of the oﬃcial measure culminated in a congres-
sional appropriation in 1990 for an independent scientific study of the con-
cepts, measurement methods, and information needed for a poverty measure.
In response, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) established the Panel on
Poverty and Family Assistance, which released its report, “Measuring Poverty:
A New Approach,” in the spring of 1995. In March of 2010, an Interagency Tech-
nical Working Group on Developing a Supplemental Poverty Measure (ITWG)
listed suggestions for a new measure that would supplement the current oﬃcial
measure of poverty (Renwick and Fox, 2016).
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Three main concepts define both poverty measures. First, there are a series of thresholds
that define the minimum level of income needed for a family and these depend on family
size and family composition. Second, families are defined to capture units of people who
share resources. Third, resources for a family are then compared to the poverty threshold
to define the poverty status of a given family.
Thresholds
Developed in the early 1960s by Mollie Orshansky, the OPM is an absolute poverty measure
that compares the resources of a family to a poverty threshold. When they were developed,
the OPM thresholds looked to monetize the minimum yet adequate level of family con-
sumption. The key insight in the process was a finding from the 1955 Household Food
Consumption Survey which estimated that the average expenditure on food for families,
regardless of income level, accounted for one third of their total family income after taxes.
With this, Orshansky then derived the cost of a minimum yet adequate diet for a family of
four (2 parents and 2 children) from food plans developed by the Department of Agricul-
ture. Multiplying this cost by three then gave the poverty threshold for a family of four.
Adjustments for family characteristics were then made, varying on the family composition
(number of adults versus number of children) and family size. Since 1963, for all intents
and purposes, these thresholds have only been adjusted annually to account for inflation
which today is done using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).1
The poverty thresholds for 2016 are presented in Table 2.1. The poverty thresholds are
a function of the number of people in the family crossed with the number of related children
under 18 which is, in essence, the number of dependents in the family. As the family size
increases, the poverty threshold increases. And, within a given family size, as the number of
children increases, the poverty threshold decreases. The logic here is that younger children
tend to need less food than older children or adults. Finally, for families of one or two
people, the number of people over 65 decreases the threshold. The assumption here is that
these people tend to be retired and thus need less energy for their daily activities. The
underlying logic of the table demonstrates the outdated assumptions about workforce; that
1 For a complete history, see The Development of the Orshansky Poverty Thresholds and Their Subse-
quent History as the Oﬃcial U.S. Poverty Measure by Gordon M. Fisher.
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is, today there tends to be less physical labor on average than fifty years ago.
On the other hand, the SPM estimates a threshold based on the 33rd percentile of
expenditures on food, clothing, shelter and utilities calculated from the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey (CE) for the U.S.. By doing so, the SPM thresholds more accurately capture
the costs of living of the typical U.S. household. As with the OPM, the thresholds are
adjusted for family size and composition. Most importantly, these SPM thresholds are
adjusted geographically while the OPM thresholds are the same throughout the US. The
SPM thresholds are adjusted using 5-year estimates of median gross rents for diﬀerent
metropolitan statistical areas and non-metro areas for a total of 358 adjustment factors.2
Family units
The two poverty definitions diﬀer in their treatment of families, or more specifically, family
units. It is necessary here to distinguish a few technical definitions. In the CPS-ASEC,
households consist of the people within a housing unit or dwelling. A household can consist
of one or more families. Family units are individuals who self-report to living within the
same household and are related by birth, marriage, or adoption (Renwick and Fox, 2016).
All other individuals within a household who are not members of a family are considered
unrelated individuals.
The goal of defining a family unit is to capture a group of people that share resources.
The OPM considers two distinct resource-sharing units: families and unrelated individuals.
Treating families as a resource-sharing unit is uncontroversial. However, one of the criticisms
of the OPM is that excluding unrelated individuals from families excludes people who are
arguably sharing resources with the rest of the family. The most noticeable omission of the
OPM family definition are unmarried partners (or cohabiting couples). The SPM adapts
the OPM definition to account for diﬀerent possible resource arrangements. Specifically,
SPM families include unmarried partners and their relatives, co-residing unrelated children,
and foster children. In essence, the SPM takes people considered to be unrelated individuals
under the OPM and classifies them as a resource-sharing unit when appropriate. All other
unrelated individuals in a household are considered as their own resource-sharing unit.
2 These thresholds are available at https://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/methodology/supplemental/
overview.html.
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For example, a renter living within someone’s household would be considered an unrelated
individual under both the OPM and SPM.3
In this paper, the unit of observation will be the family as defined by the OPM and the
SPM. Eﬀectively, the sample will consist of families of two or more people and individuals
(families of one). Moreover, to be complete with the terminology, households will refer to
the group of people residing together while the term dwelling will refer to the physical unit
in which people live (i.e. households are people while dwellings are the homes in which
those people live).
Resources
The definition of resources of a family also vary across OPM and SPM, though the OPM-
defined resources are completely encompassed in the SPM. Back to the history of the OPM,
when Orshansky was looking to measure the total resources of a family, the CPS was the
only reliable source of nationally representative data on income. At the time, and to this
day, the CPS asks individuals about their before-tax cash income from various sources in
the previous calendar year. In large part, it was the availability of data that led to the
OPM adopting a definition of total resources that used before-tax income. While the major
component of most families’ total resources are wages/salaries, the CPS-ASEC also asks
about 19 other components. In this paper, wages/salaries income will be analyzed sepa-
rately from "other cash income" which will be the catch-all term for all other components.
On average, the largest components of other cash income are pension/retirement income
and Social Security income. Table 2.2 presents the complete accounting of the cash income
resources used in SPM resource definition. The “total cash income” in Table 2.2 are the
components used in OPM’s definition of total resources.
As is clear in Table 2.2, resources for the SPM attempt to measure a more complete
picture of the resources that a family actually has at their disposal, taking the OPM re-
sources as its starting point. The goal of the SPM resource measure is to monetize all
the resources that a family has to spend on food, clothing, shelter and utilities. Therefore,
SPM resources add non-cash public benefit recipiency to the total cash income of the OPM.
3 Arguably, even renters may be sharing resources, to an extent, with the rest of the household which
is why many researchers choose to use households as the unit of analysis (McKernan and Ratcliﬀe, 2005).
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The CPS collects information on the yearly receipt amount of the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), and the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LI-
HEAP). For Supplementary Nutrition Program for Women Infants and Children (WIC),
National School Lunch Program and housing subsidies, the CPS asks about the receipt of
the subsidy but imputes the amount.
From these resources, the SPM subtracts resources that are not available for a family’s
consumption on food, clothing, shelter and utilities. The first, and perhaps the most
obvious, are taxes. The Census Bureau imputes various diﬀerent tax components using
a model that simulates the tax liability of each family. Tax liabilities include federal and
state income taxes, property taxes, Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes (FICA) and
federal retirement payroll deductions. To these liabilities, tax credits are subtracted out:
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Child Tax Credit (CTC) and Additional Child Tax
Credit (ACTC). In other words, these credits are added into a family’s total resources.
The second set of components that are subtracted from SPM total resources are neces-
sary expenses. The SPM accounts for three in particular. The first set are work expenses.
Using data from the SIPP, the SPM takes a national estimate of the reported expenses on
commuting and work-related expenses (for example, uniform purchases).4 Second, child
care expenses are directly asked in the CPS and subtracted from the total resources. The
third set of expenses are child support paid which are also collected in the CPS.
The last set of expenses that are subtracted from SPM total resources are medical
expenditures. Medical expenditures have been acknowledged as a significant part of a
family’s budget and therefore were added as a question to the CPS. The CPS collects the
amount a family pays for health insurance premiums and other medical expenditures not
covered by insurance (i.e. prescription drugs and copayments). Medicare Part B premiums
are subtracted for those reporting recipiency of Medicare. As Table 2.2 shows, there are
nearly 40 components that constitute total resources under the SPM.
As a result of these definitional diﬀerences, the OPM and SPM exhibit diﬀerent patterns
of overall poverty in a cross-sectional context. The most obvious is that the SPM rate is
typically about half a percentage point higher than the OPM rate. In 2015, the SPM
rate was 14.3 percent while the OPM rate was 13.5 percent which amounts to around 2
4 Specifically, the SPM uses a value of 85 percent of median weekly expenses multiplied by the number
of weeks respondents in the CPS reported working in the year.
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million more people in poverty under the SPM (Renwick and Fox, 2016). Children and
elderly populations (65+) are the groups with the most pronounced diﬀerence across the
definitions. SPM rates for children are about 4 percentage points lower than OPM rates,
mainly due to the inclusion of non-cash benefits and tax credits that aid families with young
children (Renwick and Fox, 2016). Meanwhile, SPM rates are higher for elders by about
five percentage points due mainly to the inclusion of medical expenditures (Renwick and
Fox, 2016). To date, these patterns have only been analyzed in a cross-sectional manner




The CPS has been the oﬃcial source of employment statistics since 1940 and the source
of the oﬃcial poverty rate since the 1950s. While the poverty rate is published once a
year, unemployment rates are released on a monthly basis. Underlying this diﬀerence is the
CPS sampling methodology which is central to understanding the data used in this paper.
The CPS is a rotating panel representative of the civilian, household-based population of
the U.S. The monthly CPS samples, which are the basis of the employment statistics, are
known as the Basic Monthly CPS. Various topical supplements are fielded throughout the
year that encompass a diverse set of topics from child support and tobacco usage to food
security and voting. For a more complete overview of these supplements, see Flood and
Pacas (2016).
The most well-known of these supplements is the Annual Social and Economic Supple-
ment. Fielded primarily in March, the CPS-ASEC includes a large set of income questions
that provides the basis of the measure of family income used in developing the oﬃcial
poverty rate of the U.S. In order to construct the panels necessary for this analysis, linking
keys are provided by the Census Bureau that longitudinally identify people and dwellings
in the CPS. The procedure used here generally follows that outlined in Rivera Drew, Flood
and Warren (2014). Since the linking process is well-documented, the process is not covered
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in depth here. More important for this analysis is that there are two main issues with link-
ing that aﬀect the analysis of poverty transitions. First, the rotation pattern of the CPS
allows for a given respondent to be found in at most two CPS-ASECs. Respondents for the
CPS are selected at the dwelling-level in a given month; more specifically, it is the physical
dwelling that is selected and not the set of people living at that dwelling. Once a dwelling is
selected for participation, the entire household roster is interviewed (typically one respon-
dent responds for the entire household). The CPS is administered to this dwelling the next
three months for a total of four interviews in a given year. After these four months, the
dwelling is out of the CPS for eight months at which point the CPS is given to the dwelling
another four times for the same calendar months. For example, a dwelling selected for the
CPS in January of 2017 will be interviewed in February, March and April of 2017 and then
January through April of 2018. Thus, a dwelling will only participate in the CPS-ASEC
twice. Second, attrition in the CPS aﬀects poverty analysis. The CPS follows a physical
dwelling as opposed to a particular set of individuals therefore, when people move away
from the dwelling, those people are lost from the sample. The common issue with attrition
in the CPS is that it is non-random and is further explored below.
A simple approach to merging CPS-ASECs across years is to use the individual linking
keys described above to find an individual across the two years. Once a link has been made,
a researcher typically validates the link on typical time invariant characteristics such as sex
and race/ethnicity5 or characteristics that change in predictable ways such as age (i.e.
age in t2 = age + 1 in t1). Two reasons lead a researcher to drop a linked observation.
First, the characteristics of the person are not the same across the two time periods and
therefore the link is likely a false-positive. Second, there is no data on the person for one
of the two time periods so no corroboration can be made. By dropping these observations,
a researcher ensures a valid linked-sample.
5 In the CPS-ASEC, sex and race are asked in the first interview and typically do not change across
subsequent interviews. Field representatives do ask about household roster changes but not about changes
to an individual’s sex or race. Survey redesign periods are the only instances where these questions are
re-asked to respondents outside of their first interview.
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2.3.2 Linking families
For person-level analysis, this methodology is sound. In order to properly identify family-
level changes, however, one needs to refine this methodology. Family composition changes
necessarily imply the arrival or departure of a person and thus there will necessarily be
missing data from one time period. Typical linking validation techniques will result in the
masking of real family composition changes. Consider the example in Table 2.3. The arrival
of a newborn would be missing data in the first time period for the child born between time
period t1 and t2. If the researcher remains unaware of the error then the poverty threshold
will be assigned to an incorrect family type. Specifically, in the first time period, the family
has 3 people with 1 child and a corresponding poverty threshold of $19,078. In the second
time period, the addition of a newborn results in a family type of 4 people with 2 children
with a corresponding threshold of $24,339. However, if the newborn is not included because
it has been dropped in the linking process, the data will show a family of 3 people with 1
child that has been assigned a poverty threshold of $24,339 which corresponds to a family
of 4 people with 2 children.
A slightly more complicated example is considered with the death of a family member.
Consider an elderly couple where the elder male householder dies between t1 and t2. In
the second time period, the widow is still in the dwelling (and now the householder) but
now her adult child has moved into the dwelling. In this example, a simple validation rule
of dropping any person with missing data in either time period would overlook the death
of the elder householder and the arrival of the adult child. Indeed, that approach would
treat the family as having only one person (the elder spouse turned widowed householder)
in both time periods. Once again, the correct poverty thresholds should correspond to
2 people (with householder over 65) which is around $14,500 in both years. Instead the
erroneously linked sample would show a 1 person household with the incorrect threshold.
The researcher at this point must choose one of two suboptimal solutions. The first
option is to leave the data with the erroneous family sizes and poverty thresholds. In
this case, analysis correlating family types to any outcome will be unreliable given the
inclusion of these erroneous family types. The second option is to adjust the family types
and thresholds; that is, give the families the correct poverty thresholds for the erroneous
family sizes. This option is less optimal still. Consider the two examples in Table 2.3.
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For the arrival of a newborn, the erroneous family size is 3 people with 1 child which
would have a poverty threshold in 2016 of $19,318. For the purpose of highlighting the
error, consider that a family has a total family income of $19,000 in t1 and $19,500 in
t2. Because of the addition of the newborn, that family should remain in poverty in both
time periods. But, given the erroneous family size and an updated poverty threshold, that
family exits poverty in t2. Similarly, in the second example, the correct family types and
thresholds would classify the family as poor in both time periods. On the other hand, the
erroneous family type with an updated threshold would be classified as nonpoor in both
time periods. Overall, these examples illustrate the potential errors that can be easily
overlooked in linking CPS-ASECs across years. These errors are more pronounced when
conducting analysis at the family-level as in the case of poverty measurement. In order to
fully utilize the potential of a linked CPS, these family composition changes should be kept
as part of the final sample.6 In this paper, family composition changes are preserved.
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics - Poverty transitions reveal new dispropor-
tionalities
This paper links consecutive CPS-ASECs from 1996 through 2016, maintaining the family
composition changes noted in the section above.7 However, when studying the SPM, the
analysis uses only 2010 through 2016. The simple reason for this is that, as noted above,
the SPM was first made available in 2010. The resulting sample size is 127,146 families
for the 2010-2016 SPM sample and 127,404 for the 2010-2016 OPM sample (see Table 2.4
and Appendix Table A.1).8 The OPM analysis conducted for 1996-2016 includes 412,743
families.
To clarify terminology, the first year a family is observed in the data will be referred to
as t1 and the second year will be denoted by t2. Thus, the sample ends with a t1 of 2015
6 The two papers that link CPS-ASECs to study poverty transitions (Feng (2013) and Hokayem and
Heggeness (2014)) make no explicit reference to the issue of linking families. Indeed, most papers that link
CPS-ASECs do not explicitly speak to this issue. However, most of these studies are not concerned with
family-level transitions.
7 As noted in Flood and Pacas (2016), the CPS-ASEC provides a continuous set of two-year panels
from 1996 on. The CPS-ASEC 1995 is not possible to link to 1996 and thus an undesirable break in series
occurs.
8 Diﬀerences in the 2010-2016 SPM and OPM samples are due to the diﬀerent family definitions used
by each measure but the same number of individuals are in both samples.
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and a t2 of 2016. Poverty rates will refer to the poverty rate using t2 observations such that
a given year’s poverty rate can be decomposed into families entering poverty plus families
remaining in poverty. Poverty transitions will generally be referred to in the following
manner. Those families not transitioning, those below or above the poverty threshold in
both time periods, will be referred to as Poor-to-Poor (P-P) or “Always Poor” and NonPoor-
to-NonPoor (NP-NP) or “Never Poor.” Similarly, families transitioning will be denoted by
Poor-to-NonPoor (P-NP) for those exiting poverty and NonPoor-to-Poor (NP-P) for those
entering poverty.
Table 2.4 presents statistics on selected demographics for the SPM sample. These same
set of statistics are available for the OPM in Appendix Table A.1.9 Table 2.4 highlights
how studying poverty transitions using the linked CPS-ASEC can reveal new insights into
the most vulnerable populations. For example, it is known that African American and His-
panics are disproportionately poor under both SPM and OPM definitions.10 This trend
continues to be true in this longitudinal setting but a more interesting pattern emerges.
African Americans and Hispanics disproportionately become poor but they are even more
disproportionately represented in the group that remains poor. Specifically, African Ameri-
cans represent about 8 percent of the total SPM sample and about 12 percent of the poverty
transitioners (NP-P and P-NP). This rate is about double for those remaining in poverty
at around 15 percent. This pattern is similar for Hispanics where the full sample is about
10 percent Hispanic but the P-P population is about 21 percent Hispanic. The non-citizen
population exhibits this same pattern.
These statistics suggest that the underlying reason for being in poverty for these groups
are diﬀerent than for other groups. Though this paper does not focus on understanding
these racial disparities, these statistics show that the linked CPS-ASEC can identify more
economically vulnerable populations. The remainder of this paper unravels the ways in
which the linked CPS-ASEC can be used to give insight into the year-to-year changes in
family resources.
9 Overall, the patterns noticed between SPM and OPM are the same and therefore does not warrant
separate discussion.
10 Note that the race/ethnicity assigned to a family unit is typically that of the householder, as is
customary in oﬃcial Census reports. For complex households with more than one family, the designation
is typically made with the eldest member of the family.
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2.4 The Churn of Poverty Rates
This paper is the first to document the churn of the oﬃcial poverty rate. Figure 2.1 plots
the OPM flows between 1996 and 2016 as a percentage of total U.S. population.11 The
top line in Figure 2.1 graphs the overall OPM rate in t2 for the linked CPS-ASEC sample.
The most striking pattern in Figure 2.1 is that churn accounts for about 50 percent of the
total poor population at any given time while 50 percent of the poor population are families
who remained in poverty in both time periods.
Through this analysis, it is also possible to visually inspect what drives the overall
poverty rate. For example, in the pre-2000 time period, one notices an overall poverty rate
drop from around 11 percent to about 9.5 percent. As seen in the poverty transitions,
this was driven by an overall drop in the P-P group as well as an increase in the poverty
exits relative to the poverty entries. A clear shift is seen in 2000, at the beginning of the
recession, where the poverty entries exceed the exits. The Great Recession (2007 through
2009) period can be explained by a rise in the P-P group and poverty entries, relative to
the poverty exits until 2014 where the poverty exits surpassed the poverty entries for the
first time since 2007. In sum, taking advantage of a linked-CPS allows for the study of
poverty churn and highlights that the rate of churn is about equal to the rate of people
who remain in poverty. The analogous analysis for SPM is presented in Figure 2.2 for 2010
through 2016. As opposed to the OPM, the SPM shows that poverty transitions are higher
than those who remain in poverty.
To more clearly make the comparison, Figure 2.3 compares the flows of poverty tran-
sitions using the OPM and SPM. The first trend to notice from these figures is that the
SPM poverty rates are higher than the OPM rates, which is in line with the published rates
(for example, the 3-year OPM average from 2011 to 2013 is nearly one percentage point
lower than the SPM rate for the same time period (14.9 versus 15.9)). The second trend is
that the churn under the SPM definition is higher than that of the OPM. Under the SPM,
the P-P stays around 7 percent but the transitioners are closer to 10 percent of the total
population, or closer to 60 percent of the poor population.
What drives the higher churn rate under the SPM? Two potential sources are obvious
starting points from the diﬀerences between OPM and SPM definitions. First, family units
11 The denominator for all groups is the total U.S. population in t2.
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under the SPM are more expansive and thus may lead to more family composition changes
between years. Second, SPM resource components are more comprehensive than under the
OPM definition. In particular, the inclusion of expenditures that may be more volatile,
such as medical expenditures, may drive the higher churn rate. These explanations are
investigated in more details in subsequent sections.
2.4.1 Who becomes poor? Even the really rich and the middle class.
A diﬀerent way of looking at poverty transitions is to look at the relationship between
resources in one year and the likelihood of being in poverty in the next year. While the
overall churn rate reveals the number of people who move in and out of poverty, this analysis
reveals which families are most likely to be in poverty. The main finding of this section
is that, under both the OPM and the SPM, the likelihood of being in poverty from one
year to the next is non-zero, regardless of a family’s resource level in a given year. In other
words, no family is immune to negative economic shocks.
Figure 2.4 plots the percent of families in poverty in t2 given their resources in t1.
Resources are measured relative to each family’s poverty line (threshold). For example, a
family of four people with $40,000 in resources will be about 1.5 times over their poverty
line while an individual with $40,000 will three time over their poverty line.12 Thus,
by using the ratio of resources to poverty line, families with similar resources per person
are grouped together. The top panel of Figure 2.4 plots the percent of families that are
in poverty in t2 for each percentile of ratio of resources to poverty line. The bottom panel
gives the distribution for the ratios of resources to poverty line. For example, under the
OPM definition, four percent of families at the 50th percentile of resources in t1 (which is
a ratio of about 2.3 times over the poverty line) are in poverty in t2.
What does this analysis imply for poverty transitions? In general, it shows that all
families are vulnerable to falling into poverty though the relatively wealthy families are much
less likely to do so. More importantly, even families who might be considered economically
12 Resources are measured as total cash income for the OPM and total resources for the SPM (as
described in depth above). The thresholds refer to the respective poverty threshold for each family under
each definition.
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secure transition into poverty at a relatively high rate. Consider the lower end of middle-
income families, or families who are two times over their poverty line.13 These families are
found around the 30th percentile of resources which implies that about 9 percent of these
families fall into poverty in t2. Similarly, under the SPM, families around two times their
poverty line (43rd percentile) are about 10 percent likely to fall into poverty. Thus, even
those families who are able to make their way into the middle-class still face a one-in-ten
chance of falling into poverty. Of course, the probability of falling into poverty drops as
resources increase but even two to three percent (OPM and SPM, respectively) of families
at the top percentile of resources (about 35 times and 20 times over the poverty threshold
for OPM and SPM, respectively) fall into poverty.
On a more methodological note, Figure 2.4 also highlights important diﬀerences between
the OPM and SPM. The relatively flatter pattern of the SPM line relative to the OPM line
shows that the risk of being in poverty is more evenly distributed under the SPM than
under the OPM. Consider those in poverty in t1 which is denoted by the vertical line which
corresponds to those with a resource-to-threshold ratio below one). For the OPM, for all
those in poverty in t1, the likelihood of being in poverty in t2 is over 40 percent. Indeed,
the likelihood for those in the bottom 5 percentiles is over 50 percent. In contrast, the
likelihood for those in poverty in t1 under SPM is closer to 35 percent for those percentiles
right below the poverty line (between the 10th and 14th percentile) and around 45 percent
for those below the 10th percentile. The implication is that the OPM gives a diﬀerent
picture of the economic mobility of those in poverty; that is, families in poverty are less
likely to exit poverty. However, including other resources with the SPM shows that the
OPM overstates the level at which families stay in poverty.
Above the respective poverty lines, the likelihood of poverty under the OPM is con-
tinuously lower than the SPM. This finding reinforces the idea that the SPM shows more
people moving in and out of poverty and, more importantly, that these people are found
across the entire resource distribution. Indeed, for the OPM, the likelihood for families
two times over the poverty threshold (30th percentile) is about 10 percent but about 20
13 This analysis uses the definition for middle-income from Pew Research Center (2016). Specifically,
these categories are $24,042-$72,126 for a family of one, $34,000-$102,001 for a family of two, $41,641-
$124,925 for a family of three, $48,083-$144,251 for a family of four, and $53,759-$161,277 for a family of
five. On average, the OPM thresholds for each of these family sizes is about two times below the lower
limit and about 6 times below the upper limit.
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percent for families in the 30th percentile of the SPM. Around the 50th percentile of the
ratio distribution, both the SPM and OPM flatten to around 5 percent and 2 percent,
respectively.
The bottom panel of Figure 2.4 highlights that, on average, the OPM and SPM ratios
are similar up to about the 13th percentile at which point the OPM ratios exceed the
SPM. At the higher percentiles, the OPM ratios exceed the SPM ratios by larger amounts
with the 100th percentile of OPM exceeding the SPM ratio by about 75 percent (an OPM
ratio of 35 versus an SPM ratio of 20). The reason for this diﬀerence is due mainly to the
definitional diﬀerences of resources (see Table 2.2) as opposed to the diﬀerent threshold
definitions.14 One pattern that emerges from the resource-to-threshold graph is the role
that taxes play across the SPM and OPM definitions. Intuitively, the SPM captures the
resources that families have at their disposal; at the higher percentiles of income, the tax
liability of a family reduces their cash income significantly. While there are many other
SPM components that contribute to this diﬀerence, taxes are the component that most
aﬀects the higher percentiles of income.16 Overall, these findings highlight the long
tails of resources under both definitions and shows that the OPM resources are increasingly
larger than the SPM resources at the higher percentiles of income.
2.4.2 Changing picture of poverty with alternate thresholds
One question that continuously arises when discussing poverty is the sensitivity of the
poverty rate to alternate thresholds. Researchers have called this the “near poor” popula-
tion (Hokayem and Heggeness, 2014). A simple exercise is to look at alternative poverty
thresholds and consider how the pattern of transitions change across the income distribu-
tion. Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 duplicate the top panel of Figure 2.4 but also add the
likelihood of being in poverty if the poverty thresholds were redefined at 125% above their
current levels. Figure 2.5 shows that the OPM exhibits a nearly parallel shift up to the
14 Though defined diﬀerently, the SPM thresholds are on average rather close to the OPM thresholds.
For example, the 2015 SPM thresholds had a national average of about $24,440 for a family of 2 adults
with 2 children.15 Meanwhile, the OPM threshold for a family of that type in 2015 was $24,339.
16 One final pattern to notice is that the bottom two percentiles under the SPM are negative while the
bottom percentile for the OPM is negative. Though this is not an important finding, it is worth noting that
it is possible for families to show negative resources under both definitions. While the SPM has numerous
resource components that can drive this negative resource (see Table 2.2), a negative cash income under
OPM is typically driven by farm/business income.
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40th percentile at which point this new line converges with the original OPM line from
Figure 2.4. More specifically, around the 10th percentile, the likelihood of being in poverty
is about 40 percent under the normal OPM thresholds but about 55 percent for 125% of
the OPM poverty threshold. On the other hand, Figure 2.6 shows a much larger jump
below the 40th percentile for the SPM. At the lowest 5 percentiles, the shift is about 10
percentage points but swells to about 30 percentage points at the 100% poverty line (14th
percentile). The lines then begin to converge around the 125% poverty line (22nd per-
centile) and ultimately converge around the 50th percentile. These findings demonstrate
that a more complete resource definition, such as the SPM, leads to a higher percentage of
families living just above the poverty line.
Ultimately, this section gives insight into why the SPM exhibits higher churn but also
how the definitions give a diﬀerent look at the economic vulnerability of families. The
question to be answered now is why families are likely to fall in and out of poverty? What
role does family composition play and what role do changes in resources play? Most im-
portantly, how do real-life events push people in and out of poverty? The rest of this paper
proposes new methods for answering these questions.
For simplicity of exposition, the paper now focuses solely on the SPM as the definition
of poverty. It is important to note that the SPM includes total cash income as one of its
resource components which is the only resource component in the OPM definition. Thus,
in looking at resource changes, this paper will treat cash income separately to highlight the
patterns of the OPM.
2.5 Characterizing the relationship between family composi-
tion changes and poverty
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Holding all resource changes constant between one year and the next, two factors can
aﬀect a family’s poverty status in the subsequent year. First, the poverty thresholds are
adjusted each year for inflation and thus, all else remaining equal, the inflation-adjusted
threshold could be responsible for a change in poverty status. For example, in 2015, the
poverty threshold for a family of 4 (2 adults and 2 children) was $24,036. In 2016, this
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threshold was $24,339. Therefore, if a family of this composition had an income of $24,300
in both 2015 and 2016, the family would fall into poverty in 2016 based solely on the
inflation adjustment. As later sections will show, changes in income are rarely zero and
thus changing thresholds to adjust for inflation is typically not a source of poverty entries.
The second factor that can aﬀect poverty transitions when all resources are held constant
is a change in family composition. As Table 2.3 shows, a family of 3 people in t1 that has
a newborn (and thus 4 people in t2) moves their poverty threshold from $19,078 to $24,339
(in 2015 and 2016, respectively). Thus, the addition of a baby can be responsible for
a transition into poverty because of the increased need for resources as indicated by the
higher poverty threshold for the now-larger family. Conversely, a loss of a family member
will typically lead to a lower poverty threshold and thus can be responsible for a poverty
exit. Overall, any family composition change could lead to a diﬀerent poverty threshold.
Table 2.5 demonstrates that about 13 percent of all families experience a change in
family composition between one year and the next (see Appendix Table A.2 for the com-
parable OPM statistics). In this analysis, family composition change is defined by the
arrival/departure of a family member.17 About 7 percent of families experience a de-
parture of a family member, about 5 percent of families have a family member arrive, and
a little under 1 percent of families have both an arrival and departure. A few patterns
are worth mentioning. Those families entering poverty have a proportionally higher rate of
family member departures (9.67 percent) than those never in poverty (6.85 percent). Sec-
ond, these departures are mostly adult departures. Families entering poverty have nearly
two percentage points higher adults departing than those never in poverty (7.80 percent
versus 6.00 percent). Elderly departures for families entering poverty are twice as likely
than they are for those never in poverty (2.44 percent versus 1.02 percent). To the extent
that can be noted in the data, divorce/separation is about 1 percentage point higher for
families entering poverty than those never in poverty (1.73 percent versus 0.67 percent).18
Finally, the percent of families losing a spouse (widowed) is about 1 percentage point higher
for those entering poverty than those never in poverty (1.50 percent versus 0.66 percent). In
17 In practical terms, an arrival is defined as the presence of a person in t2 not in the data in t1 while a
departure is the presence of a person in t1 but not found in the data in t2.
18 Divorce/separation is noted by the departure of a family member whose marital status was married
and then the remaining spouse changes their marital status to divorced/separated. For widows, the marital
status changes to widowed.
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general, the arrival of adults is more common for families exiting poverty than those never
in poverty (5.19 percent versus 3.43 percent). In sum, these patterns suggest that family
composition changes are more common occurrences for families transitioning in and out of
poverty than those not transitioning and thus could be an important factor in explaining
poverty transitions.
2.5.2 Counterfactuals
In order to separate the role of family composition in poverty transitions, it is necessary
to tease out the eﬀect of concurrent resource changes. A simple intuitive counterfactual
can be developed. Consider that a family is in poverty when family resources are less than
their corresponding poverty threshold. Adjusting resources and thresholds so that there is
no eﬀect of inflation (i.e. CPI-deflated), then it is possible to isolate the eﬀect of family
changes from resource changes. The counterfactuals can be constructed as follows. Hold
the resources of a family at the t1 level and then only allow their threshold to change to
their corresponding t2 level:
(Resources t1/ Threshold t2)  1! Poverty Rate from Family Composition Changes.
For the role of resource changes, the inverse counterfactual can be calculated:
(Resources t2/ Threshold t1)  1! Poverty Rate from Resource Changes,
which captures the poverty rate in t2 if only resources had changed and family composition
stayed at its t1 state.
Table 2.6 presents the results of this counterfactual analysis and shows that the family
composition changes result in less families falling into poverty than resource component
changes. The overall SPM rate for t1 is 13.94 percent. If only family composition changed,
the SPM rate would not be statistically diﬀerent at 14.07 percent. If only resources changed,
the SPM rate would by about 0.8 percentage points higher and statistically diﬀerent at 14.74
percent. Therefore, despite family composition changes being rather common (recall that
about 13 percent of families experience a composition change), these changes alone do not
lead to a higher poverty rate. Resource changes have a larger eﬀect on the poverty rate.
The overlap of family composition changes and resource changes is clear and even logical.
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When an adult family member leaves the household, they also take their resources with
them. Thus, family changes alone, through their changes on the relevant poverty threshold,
are not a largely influential source of poverty transitions. However, the concurrent change
in resources associated with family composition changes are more influential. In order to
more fully understand the role of resource changes, more structure must be given to the
analysis.
2.6 Decomposing poverty transitions into resource compo-
nents
This section unravels the changes in resources from one year to the next. To simplify
the analysis, this section focuses only on those families entering or exiting poverty. The
overarching questions posed here is: What are the resource changes that drive poverty
transitions and which resource components are the most influential in driving these transi-
tions? Figure 2.7 graphs the distribution of family resource-to-threshold deficit (i.e. total
SPM resources minus their corresponding SPM poverty threshold value). The overall SPM
poverty rate is noted at 14.2 percent (noted with the vertical line (a)) and over nine per-
cent of families are $5,000 or less above their threshold. The implication here is that, if
these families were to receive a shock to their resources of $5,000 and all else remained the
same, the poverty rate would increase to about 23.5 percent. Yet the national poverty rate
has never increased by more than about a percentage point in any given year. Logically,
resources fluctuate for families in both directions and, as the churn of poverty rates has
already shown, families move in and out of poverty at about the same rate in any given
year between 2010 and 2016.
2.6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.7 presents the average change in SPM resource components by poverty transition
type. SPM total resources are broken down by the categories in Table 2.2 though total
cash income is further broken down into income from wages/salaries and all other cash
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income (see Appendix Table A.3 for the t2 averages).19 On average, a family entering
poverty loses about $29,000 in total resources relative to their t1 total resources. This loss
comes mainly from losses in family wages/salaries (about $18,000) as well as other cash
income (about $15,000). By definition, tax liability is also decreased when income drops;
specifically, taxes drop by nearly $6,000. For expenditures, medical expenditures increase
by about $2,000 for families entering poverty while necessary expenses actually decrease on
average by about $300. Necessary expenses are, by construction, a function of child care
and work expenses. The drop in wages/salaries signals that there is likely a loss of a job
or of work hours and hence there is likely a decrease in the child care and work expenses.
Finally, government subsidies increase nearly $150 on average for families entering poverty
which would be expected for these newly poor families.
Families exiting poverty exhibit a symmetrical set of changes in resource components.
On average, the gain in total SPM resources is about $28,000. Families exiting poverty
gain about $32,000 in cash income, on average, while families entering poverty lose about
$33,500. The symmetry of these changes at the average is surprising given that, a priori, one
would expect the changes pushing families into poverty may be diﬀerent from those pushing
families out of poverty. However, averages provide a limited picture of these changes.
In order to best understand the full distribution of these changes, Figures 2.8 - 2.14 plot
the distribution of resources changes for these poverty transitions. The symmetry between
total SPM resource changes is noted in the distribution in Figure 2.8. 99 percent of poverty
entries experience a decrease in total SPM resources while 99 percent of poverty exits see
an increase in total SPM resources. This finding is key. Figure 2.8 shows that only 1
percent of families lose resources and still exit poverty while only 1 percent of families gain
resources and still enter poverty. The magnitudes of these changes also matter. For these 1
percent of families who enter poverty despite gaining resources, the average change in total
resources is only about $3,000. For those exiting poverty, the families lose about $6,000 in
total resources. Relative to the changes noted in the entire distribution (ranging from a
loss of over $250,000 to gains of over $250,000), these changes are small.
Figure 2.8 also demonstrates that the change in total resources for about 30 percent
of families exiting poverty is less than $10,000 while around 55 percent of families exiting
19 Note that total cash income is the only resource component included in the OPM and so patterns
noticed from this resource is largely reflective of OPM patterns.
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poverty experience increases of over $20,000. There is a significant proportion of families
who exited poverty but are still close to the poverty line. For example, families that in-
creased their resources by only $5,000 amount to about 12 percent of all families exiting
poverty. The symmetry between those exiting poverty and those entering poverty implies
that a similar story is true for those families entering poverty. In sum, the distribution of
change in total resources shows that a majority of families exiting poverty are not experi-
encing large increases in resources but are arguably gaining an amount that places them
in a vulnerable position but better oﬀ than before. From Figure 2.4, it is known that the
lower the ratio of resource to poverty line, the higher the likelihood of falling into poverty.
Therefore, the smaller the change in total resources for those families exiting poverty, the
higher the probability there is of these families falling back into poverty.
The symmetry of these changes is also noticed in the distribution of individual SPM
resource component changes. The distributions of the changes in family wages/salaries for
families exiting poverty show that families gain, lose and see no change in their wages/salaries
(see Figure 2.9). Nearly 40 percent of families experience no change in the wages/salaries.
About half of all families exiting poverty had an increase in their wages/salaries and about
10 percent of families that exited poverty experienced a decrease in their wages/salaries.
Families entering poverty exhibit an almost identical symmetrical pattern not just in the
distribution but also in magnitude.
Figure 2.9 shows that about 28 percent of families exiting poverty gain the equivalent
of a full-time year-round minimum wage job or less (48th percentile to the 67th percentile
of the change in wages/salaries), implying that over a quarter of families exiting poverty
are likely not adding full-time jobs.20 The 10 percent of families losing wages/salaries
highlight how the more complete accounting of resources included in the SPM lead to
diﬀerent conclusions about poverty transitions. Under the OPM, except in vary rare cases
where families experience a loss from business/farms, all families exiting poverty experience
increases in wages/salaries. Thus, by including expenses, the SPM shows that there are
about 10 percent of families exiting poverty that lose wages/salaries but gain enough in
other resources to exit poverty.
20 Minimum wage jobs year-round full-time: $7.25 x 40 hours x 52 weeks = $15,080.
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The distribution of changes for other cash income (see Figure 2.10) is smaller in magni-
tude to that of wages/salaries and shows that no families have a zero change in other cash
income. 75 percent of families exiting poverty experience an increase in other cash income
while about the same percent of families entering poverty see a decrease. The simple reason
for why families experience a change of some sort is that there are about 19 diﬀerent sources
comprising other cash income.
Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12 plot the distributions of taxes paid and necessary expenses,
respectively (note that the axes on these are diﬀerent than Figures 2.8 - 2.10). As these
resource components are a function of cash income, it follows that the distribution of
these changes are similar to that of wages/salaries.21 Specifically, about 63 percent
of families entering poverty pay less taxes while about 20 percent have no change in their
taxes (Figure 2.11). For necessary expenses, about 45 percent of families exiting poverty
see an increase while about 35 percent see no change (Figure 2.12). The symmetry between
poverty entries and exits is again noted.
The change in government subsidies merits more discussion as poverty typically increases
the likelihood of being eligible for government subsidies. Surprisingly, nearly half of all
families entering poverty and half exiting poverty see no change in government subsidies
at all (see Figure 2.13). The lack of a change implies that many of these families were not
receiving government subsidies in either time period. Another surprising finding is that
families entering poverty experience an increase in government subsidies in nearly the same
percentage and magnitude as families exiting poverty. That is, about 20 percent of both
families exiting and entering poverty see an increase in government subsidies. The same is
true for the decrease in government subsidies. One potential explanation for this pattern
is that government subsidies are helping families out of poverty. It is possible that the 20
percent of families that see increases in government subsidies and exit poverty are exiting
poverty because of these subsidies. Similarly, the 20 percent of families that lose government
subsidies and enter poverty could be entering because of the loss of these subsidies. The
following section looks into this matter in more depth.
The distributions of changes in medical expenditures show that medical expenditures
increase and decrease for both exiting and entering families (see Figure 2.14). However,
21 Taxes change as total cash received changes. Necessary expenses change as wages/salaries change
inasmuch wages/salaries are correlated with hours worked.
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the largest decreases in medical expenditures occur for families exiting poverty while the
largest increases occur for those entering poverty. Indeed, the top 1 percent of medical
expenditures changes for families entering poverty is an increase of about $100,000 while
the top 1 percent of those exiting poverty is about $100,000. While it is common to hear
about catastrophic medical issues leading to poverty, these distributions show that only
about 3 percent of families entering poverty experience an increase in medical expenditures
of over $20,000 and only 7 percent experience an increase of over $10,000.
The main takeaway from this analysis is that resources do not uniformly increase for
families entering poverty or decrease for families exiting poverty. Resources change con-
currently but, when summed to total resources, almost all families entering poverty see
resources decrease and almost all families exiting poverty see resources increase. Given all
these changes, it is necessary to develop a method for determining which of these compo-
nents are the most influential in poverty transitions.
2.6.2 Importance of resource component changes on poverty transitions
With so many moving parts to the SPM, it is diﬃcult to ascertain which components are
in fact the most relevant in predicting poverty transitions. From the averages and overall
distributions of changes, one would naturally suspect that the most relevant factors would
be those that have the largest changes in total magnitude (i.e. income from wages/salaries
and other cash income). The full analysis requires more structure. This section proposes
a simple method for formalizing the relative importance of resource changes to poverty
transitions. The intuition behind the approach developed here is captured by the questions:
(1) For how many poverty entries is the change in a particular resource suﬃcient? (2) For
how many poverty entries is the change expected? Suﬃcient change occurs when the change
in a particular resource is large enough to push that family into poverty by itself. Expected
changes are those where resources change in the expected direction (i.e. wages/salaries
drop for families that fall into poverty while medical expenses increase for families that
fall into poverty). Expected changes determine the upper bound of relevance of a resource
change. Of the percent of expected changes, a proportion will be suﬃcient. The higher the
proportion of suﬃcient changes, the more influential that resource is in determining poverty
(i.e. a lower bound of relevance).
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Consider the following example. A family of four people has total SPM resources of
$60,000 in t1 where $80,000 come from wages/salaries and medical expenses are $20,000.
In t2 wages/salaries drop by $55,000 to $25,000 while medical expenses drop by $20,000 to
$5,000. The total SPM resources in t2 are $20,000. This pushes the family into poverty
since the poverty threshold is about $24,000. In this example, the change in wages/salaries
and the change in medical expenses are expected. Neither one of these resource changes are
suﬃcient, however, since the change of a single resource alone does not push that family
into poverty.
Now, consider the same family with the $60,000 in t1. This time, the change in
wages/salaries drops by $60,000 to $20,000 and medical expenses still drop to $5,000. Total
SPM resources are $15,000. In this case, the change in wages/salaries is suﬃcient since the
family would fall into poverty regardless of the change in medical expenses (i.e. $20,000
in wages/salaries already puts the family into poverty). The change in medical expenses is
still expected because it moves in the expected direction.
This example uses only two resources whereas total SPM resources consist of six major
resource categories. To formalize this analysis consider families that are not poor in t1 but
enter poverty in t2. By definition, the following is true:
TotalResourcest1 > Thresholdt1 ) Not poor in t1,
T otalResourcest2 < Thresholdt2 ) Poor in t2.
With some algebraic manipulation, the following must be true:
TotalResourcest2   TotalResourcest1 < Thresholdt2   Thresholdt1 .
For all practical purposes, the right-hand side is zero. Section 2.5.2 established that, in
practice, the changes in thresholds alone (i.e. family composition changes alone) have a
negligible impact on poverty transitions in comparison to the change in total resources.
Thus, to simplify analysis, it is defensible to study the following:
TotalResourcest2   TotalResourcest1 < 0.







MedicalExpt + Taxest +NecExpensest
⌘
,
where WorkIncome is the total family cash income from wages/salaries, OtherIncome is
all other cash income, GovSubs is the total non-cash benefits, MedicalExp is the total
family medical out-of-pocket expenditures, Taxes are total taxes paid, and NecExpenses
are a family’s necessary work and child care expenses. The change in total SPM resources
between two time periods is simply:




(MedicalExpt2  MedicalExpt1)+(Taxest2  Taxest1)+(NecExpensest2  NecExpensest1)
⌘
This can then be decomposed into specific SPM resource components and, for any given
component, the equation can be arranged to isolate a particular change in one resource








(OtherIncomet2  OtherIncomet1) + (GovSubst2  GovSubst1)
⌘
This relationship states that for families who enter poverty, the loss in wages/salaries must
be less than the change of expenses of a family net of their other income.
Using this relationship, one could establish a counterfactual framework by setting all
other changes in resources to zero. That is, if none of the other components changed, would
this family still be in poverty? But, this approach does not advantage of the actual changes
in resources experienced by a family. Allowing resources to change, it is possible to define
suﬃcient and expected changes. A suﬃcient change is defined as a change in resources
that is large enough to push a family into poverty even if other resources increase. Then
it must be true for a change to be suﬃcient that a family would not enter poverty without
the change in this resource. Then, setting (WorkIncomet1 WorkIncomet1) = 0, a family











In the case where this relationship holds true, the change in the work income is suﬃcient
for exiting poverty, once all other components have changed. Using this final equation, the
percent of families who enter poverty for whom the change in work income is suﬃcient to
enter poverty can be calculated. First, define poorsufficient=1 if the equation above holds.




Poor   to NonPoor .
The expected condition can be constructed in a similar fashion. Since we know that the
change in total resources must be negative in order for a family to fall into poverty, then
the expected condition occurs when work income decreases regardless of the change in the
other resources. The expected condition for families that enter poverty occurs when:
(WorkIncomet2  WorkIncomet1) < 0.
Intuitively, this percentage captures the number of families that enter poverty where the
change in resources happen in the expected direction. That is, positive resources (e.g.
work income) decrease for families entering poverty while negative resource (e.g. medical
expenses) increase. Thus the expected conditions capture all the families that experience
the expected change in resources while the suﬃcient condition captures the subset of these
families where the change in one resource is enough to push the family into poverty.
For families exiting poverty, the algebraic exercise is analogous to that just shown but
where TotalResourcest2   TotalResourcest1 > 0. That is, all families that exit poverty
experience a positive change in total SPM resources overall. The results for these sets of
calculations are shown in Table 2.8.
Changes in income from wages/salaries are the most influential factor in poverty tran-
sitions. As Table 2.8 shows, for families entering poverty, about 54 percent experience a
decrease in wages/salaries (the expected condition). Moreover, about 31 percent of families
experience a suﬃcient change in wages/salaries. That is, of the 54 percent of families who
experience a decrease, about 60 percent (31.2/53.5) of families experience a decrease in
wages/salaries large enough to push them into poverty. Other cash income is another influ-
ential resource. Though 28 percent of families experience a suﬃcient change in other cash
income, this change represents only 36 percent of all expected changes in other cash income
(28/76.1). Most families entering poverty experience changes in other cash income but a
smaller proportion of those changes are suﬃcient relative to changes in wages/salaries.
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Changes in medical expenditures prove not to be as influential as changes in wages/
salaries. Only about 4 percent of families entering poverty experience a suﬃcient increase in
medical expenditures though more than half of families (54 percent) experience an increase
in medical expenditures. This proportion amounts to only 7 percent (3.8/54.0) of increases
in medical expenditures that are suﬃcient relative to the total expected changes. Changes in
taxes paid, necessary expenses and government subsidies are much less likely to be expected
and rarely suﬃcient.
The overall changes presented in Figures 2.8 - 2.14 demonstrated an almost symmet-
rical distribution between families entering poverty and those exiting poverty. However,
is there reason to suspect that the suﬃcient and expected changes would not reflect such
a symmetry? As Table 2.8 shows, the symmetry holds even in this analysis. Changes in
wages/salaries tend to push families out of poverty at a higher suﬃcient rate than all other
resources. Most families also experience changes in other cash income that are expected
but a lower proportion of these are suﬃcient changes. Finally, all other resource changes
do not prove to be as influential though, of all these other resources, medical expenditures
tends to have more of an impact.
A final set of analysis is conducted to ascertain the level at which changes in two
resources are suﬃcient at the same time. Both poverty exits and entries exhibit similar
patterns. About 25 percent of families exiting poverty experience the expected changes in
wages/salaries and the expected changes in medical expenditures. However, less than 1%
of families exiting poverty experience changes in these two resource that are both suﬃcient.
This pattern holds for the combination of changes in wages/salaries with changes in other
cash income as well as changes in other cash income with medical expenditures. This
finding suggests that the movements out of poverty tend to be strongly driven by one major
component change (either family wages/salaries or other cash income). Indeed, nearly 60
percent of all poverty exits and entries can be explained by the changes in these two resource
components alone.
2.7 Poverty transitions and real-life events
The suﬃcient and expected framework can be used to describe events in addition to changes
in resource categories. To highlight the potential of this framework, this section analyzes
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four diﬀerent life-events that are commonly associated with poverty transitions. Specifi-
cally, this section looks at (1) reaching retirement age and social security receipt, (2) large
increases in medical expenditures, (3) the loss of jobs and the role of social safety nets and
(4) departures of family members.
2.7.1 Social security
Social Security income has lifted millions of elderly Americans out of poverty. Specifically,
in 2016, it was calculated that “without Social Security benefits, 40.5 percent of elderly
Americans would have incomes below the oﬃcial poverty line, all else being equal” (Romig
and Sherman, 2016). This estimate uses the CPS-ASEC, relies only on cross-sectional data
and is conducted by subtracting the amount of social security income from total income
and comparing it to the OPM threshold. Because of the cross-sectional nature of the data,
the estimate cannot calculate the number of families that actually exit poverty because of
Social Security income.
The suﬃcient framework is applied to poverty exits based on Social Security income by
the age of householder.22 Figure 2.15 presents the percent of families that exit poverty
where the increase in Social Security income is suﬃcient conditional on the age of the
householder. The figure marks three key ages: (1) 61 for early retirement benefits which
means that the householder turns 62 in t2, (2), 65 to denote full benefit age which begins
at 66 and (3) 69 to denote the maximum retirement age.23
22 Recall that the age of householder denotes the person on the household roster who was identified as
the householder during the CPS-ASEC interviews. When the householder changes across two time periods,
it is typically the remaining spouse or the next oldest person that is assigned as householder. In linking
the samples, householder is assigned to the person that is in the household in both years.
23 To expand on the Social Security retirement age:
Social Security’s full-benefit retirement age is increasing gradually because of legislation passed
by Congress in 1983. Traditionally, the full benefit age was 65, and early retirement benefits
were first available at age 62, with a permanent reduction to 80 percent of the full benefit
amount. Currently, the full benefit age is 66 for people born in 1943-1954, and it will gradually
rise to 67 for those born in 1960 or later. Early retirement benefits will continue to be available
at age 62, but they will be reduced more. When the full-benefit age reaches 67, benefits taken
at age 62 will be reduced to 70 percent of the full benefit and benefits first taken at age 65
will be reduced to 86.7 percent of the full benefit. There is a financial bonus for delayed
retirement. An individual reaching the full-benefit age in 2015 (66 years old) receives an
additional 8 percent benefit for each year he or she delays collecting benefits. If he or she
delays taking benefits until age 70, the benefit will be 32 percent higher because of that delay.
The maximum retirement benefit for someone who waits until age 70 to collect benefits is
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The role of increases in Social Security income in pushing families out of poverty is
clearly more influential as the householder reaches retirement age (as seen in Figure 2.15).
Below age 45, the percent of families exiting poverty where Social Security income is suf-
ficient is less than 10 percent and about 10 percent for ages 60 and below. This percent
increases sharply between early retirement age and full benefit age, from around 20 percent
to 40 percent. By the maximum retirement age, this percent is at or over 50 percent. To
put this in more concrete terms, of families exiting poverty that have a householder aged
69 or over, over 50 percent of these families exit poverty solely because of the increase in
Social Security.
2.7.2 Medical expenditures
It is typical to read stories of families who suﬀer a catastrophic medical emergency, rack up
expensive medical bills, potentially lose a job due to disability and end up in poverty.24
The goal of the subsequent analysis is to measure the percent of families that enter poverty
because of medical expenses, thus giving insight into the prevalence of these catastrophic
events. Rather than defining a particular cutoﬀ for what constitutes a large increase in
medical expenses, Figure 2.16 plots the percent of families that entered poverty that expe-
rience a suﬃcient increase in medical expenses by the level of increase in medical expenses.
Only families that experienced an increase in medical expenses are included in the analysis.
Figure 2.16 shows that the level at which suﬃcient changes in medical expenditures
occur grows as the absolute value of medical expenditures increases. Of the families entering
poverty that experience an increase of $10,000 in medical expenditures, only for about 10
percent or less of families is this increase suﬃcient. This level increases to about 20 percent
for families entering poverty that experience an increase in medical expenditures by $20,000.
It is only around the $45,000 mark that the percent of families entering poverty for which the
increases are suﬃcient increases to over 40 percent. These results are surprising since one
would expect that increases in medical expenditures of over $50,000 would be large enough
$3,501 a month in 2015(Schreur and Arnold, 2015).
24 Disentangling the cause and eﬀect of job loss and disability is diﬃcult and beyond the scope of
this paper though the framework demonstrated in this paper has the potential to give insight into this
relationship.
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to push most families into poverty. The analysis here reinforces the idea shown in Table 2.8
above that large medical expenditures that push families into poverty are not as prevalent
as expected. Moreover, conditional on the increases being large, this analysis suggests that
catastrophic medical events that push families into poverty are not commonplace.
2.7.3 Job loss and social safety nets
It has been shown that changes in income from wages/salaries are the most influential factor
pushing families into poverty. However, changes in wages/salaries can occur for a variety
of reasons that are not limited to job loss (i.e. work hours are reduced or wages/salaries
fall). Figure 2.17 breaks down the work schedule changes for a householder and highlights
the growing influence of losing work hours for falling into poverty (see Appendix Table A.4
for a tabular representation of this figure). The sample for this figure are all those nonpoor
families in t2 where the householder worked 52-50 full-time equivalent (F.T.E.) weeks in t1.
When the householders maintains 52-50 weeks in t2, only about 3 percent of those families
fall into poverty. As the number of F.T.E. weeks fall, the percent of families in poverty
increases. When householders drop down to 49-40 weeks, about 5 percent of families fall into
poverty. This percent more than doubles once the householder drops to working only 13-1
weeks. Moreover, the proportion of these families that fall into poverty solely because of the
change in wages/salaries increases as the weeks worked drop. For those dropping to 49-40
weeks, a little over half (56 percent) fall into poverty because of the loss in wages/salaries.
For those dropping to 13-1 weeks, about 80 percent fall into poverty because of the loss
in wages/salaries. When a householder becomes unemployed after having worked full-time
year-round, over one-third of those families end up in poverty and nearly two-thirds of
them fall into poverty because of the loss in wages/salaries. In contrast, when householders
retire, about 15 percent of these families fall into poverty.
On the flip side, there are families that experience job loss but do not fall into poverty.
Government subsidies are intended to provide a safety net for events such as job loss.25
Since the suﬃcient framework only works for the poverty transitioners, this analysis employs
a diﬀerent methodology. Using a family’s t2 resources, the total government subsidies
25 Government subsidies include SNAP, lunch subsidies, WIC, housing subsidies and energy subsidies as
well as EITC.
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received by a family are subtracted from their total resources. If that family’s total resources
net of government subsidies are below their poverty line then the government subsidies are
considered to be keeping the family out of poverty. This analysis is also conducted for
unemployment compensation.
Figure 2.18 shows that unemployment compensation helps mitigate job loss resulting
in poverty for more families than other government subsidies (see Appendix Table A.5 for
a tabular representation of this figure). As the number of F.T.E. weeks worked in t2 falls,
the more government subsidies and unemployment compensation help keep families out
of poverty. As expected, this role is most pronounced for families facing unemployment
rather than just a reduction of weeks worked. That is, of all nonpoor families in t1 whose
householder goes from working full-time year-round to unemployed, about 8 percent of
them do not fall into poverty because of government subsidies while 12 percent of them
avoid poverty because of unemployment compensation. This result implies that there are
another 80 percent of families not falling into poverty because of some other mechanism.
A couple explanations could be explored. First, families may be avoiding poverty due
to sources that are excluded from government subsidies, namely workers’ compensation,
Supplemental Security Income, public assistance (welfare), and disability benefits (these
are lumped into other cash income). Second, other adults in the family may increase their
work hours to make up for this loss of income. In sum, the role of government subsidies and
unemployment help about a fifth of families losing employment mitigate poverty. Alternate
explanations should be explored for the other four-fifths of families losing employment but
not entering poverty.
2.7.4 Family departures
As shown in Section 2.5, the role of family composition change alone, net of the resource
changes associated with them, plays a small role in explaining poverty transitions. This
section uses the suﬃcient framework to highlight how the loss of resources associated with
family departures aﬀects poverty transitions. To simplify analysis, Figure 2.19 focuses
on the departures of householder and spouses broken down by sex for families that enter
poverty in t2 (see Appendix Table A.6 for a tabular representation).26 The figure does
26 Departures are defined as noted in Section 2.5. Specifically, adults depart when they are present in
the family in t1 but not in t2. Moreover, divorce and death requires a change in the marital status of the
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not distinguish between who is listed as the householder or the spouse but rather focuses on
households where both a householder and spouse exist as opposed to families consisting of
just one individual or a single parent. The departure of males leads to a higher proportion
of families entering poverty than when females depart. Regardless of the reason for the
departure, when a male adult leaves the household, about 20 percent of those families will
enter poverty. For female departures, only about 10 percent of families enter poverty while
5 percent enter poverty when a female passes away. These results likely reflect the higher
propensity of males being the primary earner in U.S. families but the explanation should
be further explored.
Finally, using the suﬃcient framework, it is noted that the change in family wages/
salaries alone pushes a large proportion of families into poverty. When a male departs
because of divorce, 55 percent of these families enter poverty because of the loss in wages/
salaries associated with his departure. This percent is nearly the same for families where
the female departs because of divorce, though female divorces in general are associated with
fewer poverty entries. For deaths, the loss in wages/salaries is only responsible for about
10 percent of poverty entries. It is likely that deaths tend to occur at an older age when
income is likely to be in the form of retirement rather than wages/salaries. In sum, it is
clear that the role of adult departures in poverty entries is in fact an important one through
its loss of resources.
2.8 Discussion
2.8.1 Data limitations - imputations
There are two major concerns in using linked CPS-ASECs that require discussion. The first
issue, and in no particular order of importance, is that of imputations. Imputations in the
CPS-ASEC have long been studied and have been pointed out to aﬀect the results regarding
income and earnings (Lillard, Smith and Welch, 1986). The prevalence of imputations in
the CPS-ASEC has increased over time. In relation to poverty, it has been shown that
the observations with imputed income have the lowest poverty rates while those without
imputation have higher poverty rates. That is, those who respond to the CPS-ASEC tend
remaining spouse (i.e. from married to divorced/widowed).
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to have lower incomes than those who do not respond. Indeed, between 1981 and 2007, the
imputed sample exhibited a poverty rate that was about 3 percentage points lower than
those without imputations (Turek et al., 2009). While the role of imputations has been
studied in a cross-sectional setting, no study has looked at how these imputations aﬀect
poverty transitions.
The approach employed here is to first look at how imputations relate to the overall
poverty churn and then to look at how the main patterns found in this paper change, if at
all, because of these imputations. In order to clearly disentangle the diﬀerent combinations
of imputations, families are grouped into four mutually exclusive and exhaustive types
of imputations : (1) no imputes in either t1 or t2, (2) imputes in both t1 and t2, (3)
imputes in t1 only and (4) imputes in t2 only. Figure 2.20 decomposes the SPM churn
into these four groups. Of the total poverty exits and entries (including imputes), which
each amount to about 8 percent of the total population, about 30 percent of those are
non-imputes. Of the 6 percent of those in poverty in both time periods, about 40 percent
are non-imputes. Recalculating the churn based solely on the total population that does
not have imputations (these percentages are presented in parentheses in Figure 2.20) shows
that fewer families transition in and out of poverty (6.9 percent and 7.2 percent) than
those remaining in poverty (7.6 percent). This result would seemingly reverse the finding
of the total population graphed in Figure 2.20, where more families transition in and out of
poverty than remain in poverty. It also begs the question of whether the higher churn rate
of the SPM is being driven by the imputed values. That is, are these poverty transitions
artifacts of imputations?
Imputations in both time periods are more prevalent in the poverty transitioners than
those remaining in poverty. Indeed, the families with imputations in both time periods
comprise the largest proportion of the churners (36.8 percent and 35.2 percent) while the
most common group for families remaining in poverty are no imputes (41.1 percent). Recal-
culating the churn for this group of both imputes shows the percent of poverty transitions
is about three to four percentage points higher than those remaining in poverty (9 percent
and 8.5 percent versus 4.7 percent).
A similar pattern is noticed with the imputations that occur in one time period alone.
Key to understanding the pattern are two facts. First, as mentioned before, imputations
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lead to, on average, a higher income than non-imputations. The immediate implication is
that a family with imputed income in t1 and no imputes in t2 will more likely move into
poverty, on average. Second, imputations are more likely to occur in t2. This fact occurs
simply because non-response increases as the number of CPS interviews increases. Recall
the rotation pattern of the CPS. By the time a family is in their t2 period, they will be
potentially responding for a fifth or even eighth time. Thus, respondents tend to refuse to
respond more in t2.
The proper question to ask is: Are imputations necessarily wrong? Research has shown
that, in a regression setting where the coeﬃcient of interest is a variable not included in the
imputation process, the results of the regression may be biased (see Hirsch and Schumacher
(2004)). However, since the analysis in this paper is not regression-based, dealing with
imputations is not as easy as dropping all imputed observations. The real need is to assess
whether the imputed values are systematically lower or higher than their “true” values.
To this end, the relevant research uses administrative tax data to assess the accuracy of
imputations. Using data from W-2 forms, Hokayem, Bollinger and Ziliak (2014) replace all
imputed earnings values with administrative data and calculate the overall poverty rate.
They find that replacing the imputed data with administrative data lowers the OPM rate
by about 1 percentage point. The implication is that the imputed data leads to higher
incomes than their “true” values but it does not seem to lower poverty enough to negate
the patterns seen here. In a similar paper, Bollinger et al. (2014) focus on the earnings
of individuals and find that individuals who respond in one year but not the next (i.e.
imputed in the second year) are likely to be those whose wages/salaries drop significantly.
This result is in line with the patterns noticed above where imputations tend to be higher
than the real values, implying that the results in this paper are understated.27
For completeness, all the analysis in this paper was rerun for all these imputation
groups. The overall conclusions remain true. The main areas where imputations seem
to have an eﬀect are on the overall magnitudes of changes in resources and the level of
27 There is not much known about the accuracy of public benefit reporting in the CPS-ASEC. In order
to assess the reliability of these imputations, administrative data needs to be linked to the CPS responses.
This requires agreements with specific states and thus is less common. One current project has linked the
administrative data from Maryland SNAP to the CPS-ASEC and found that of all SNAP recipients found
in the CPS-ASEC for Maryland, about 60 percent report not receiving SNAP in the past calendar year. Of
those that do not misreport, the underreporting is non-negligible.
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influence diﬀerent changes have in the suﬃcient and expected framework. The distribution
of changes are slightly changed but the overall patterns remain the same. For the suﬃcient
and expected framework, the influence of resources are more pronounced when imputes
occur in one time period only. For those with imputes in t1, those exiting poverty have a
larger percent of suﬃcient and expected changes. This occurs because the income in t1 is
higher and thus families are closer to their poverty threshold on average. This then results
in more change being suﬃcient. For those with imputes in t2, those entering poverty have
a larger percent of suﬃcient changes. In sum, imputations do change the magnitude of
change but the overall patterns remain the same.
2.8.2 Data limitations - attrition
The second concern in using the linked CPS is that of attrition. As demonstrated by
Hokayem and Heggeness (2014) and Bollinger et al. (2014), the linked-CPS sample has
slightly diﬀerent characteristics than the full ASEC sample. They find that the poverty
rate is about 3 percentage points lower in the linked sample than in the full ASEC (10.5
percent v 13.7 percent) and that the demographic characteristics tend to be diﬀerent in
both samples. Table 2.9 shows that this is the case with the linked sample used here. Of
most importance is the fact that incomes tend to be lower in the full CPS-ASEC than in
the linked sample. This is to be expected since attrition in the CPS-ASEC mainly occurs
from families moving out of a household and families with less income tend to be less stable.
The implication this has for the present analysis is unclear. Assume that the families
who are not linked are all poor in t1. Do these families move from their home because they
can no longer aﬀord it and must move into public housing (i.e. remain poor)? Or do they
move because they received a job oﬀer in a diﬀerent locale and thus move out of poverty?
The missing information is what percent of these families continue to be in poverty in t2
and what percent exit poverty. Moreover, it remains unclear what their overall distribution
of resources will be in t2. In order to answer this question, research must be conducted
on the t2 characteristics of those families that fall out of the CPS-ASEC and, to date, this
research has not been conducted. A possible research design that could be used would be
to leverage administrative data. One could link administrative tax data to get a complete
earnings history of a person. By doing so, one would have data on t2 earnings and even
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beyond.
To give some insight into the poverty rate of movers, Figure 2.21 and Figure 2.22 plot
the poverty rates of those families in the sample for only one time period. Each figure shows
the cross-sectional poverty rate for t2 which uses the entire non-linked CPS for a given year.
This sample includes families who are present in just t1 and those present in only t2. The
linked-CPS poverty rate is the poverty rate using just the families who are present in both
time periods. Two other rates are presented: 1) the poverty rate where the families who
are present only in t1 are added to the linked families, and 2) the poverty rate where the
families who are present only in t2 are added to the linked families. Figure 2.21 presents the
results for the OPM (1996-2016 CPS-ASEC) while Figure 2.22 presents the results using
the SPM (2010-2016 CPS-ASEC). As can be seen, the poverty rates that add in the moving
families are extremely close to the cross-sectional poverty rates (in the case of the OPM,
are almost exactly the same as the cross-sectional). Moreover, the poverty rates of these
moving families are nearly identical to each other. These results suggest that the overall
results are likely unaﬀected since the poor families moving out tend to be replaced in the
sample by an equal amount of poor families.
2.9 Conclusion and future work
The analysis presented in this paper has important policy implications. First, it is clear
that the definition of poverty matters in terms of understanding the underlying factors that
push families in and out of poverty. The SPM is a robust definition and should be leveraged
in more research settings. Of most importance is the finding that more families move in and
out of poverty under the SPM than under the OPM. This finding should not be taken as
just an artifact of definition but rather a better reflection of what is actually happening to
low-income families in the U.S. A high proportion of families in the U.S. are economically
vulnerable and the SPM can better capture this fact. Second, it is shown that access to jobs
is the most important vehicle through which families avoid poverty. This finding supports
the main result found in the poverty transition literature. Job training programs or even
job relocation programs are an important anti-poverty mechanism. Moreover, higher levels
of resources are associated with a lower probability of entering poverty. Thus, whether it
be through educational programs or higher mandated wages/salaries, it is worth promoting
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better wages/salaries for families. These implications are not novel but are important to
reiterate in light of these results. Third, Social Security receipt was shown to be an eﬀective
method of escaping poverty. Nearly 50 percent of the families with householder turning 70
or more exited poverty because of Social Security.
From a research standpoint, the potential of this framework is vast. This paper focused
mainly on describing the overall patterns in resource changes. The next step would be
to apply this framework with more focus on causality, policy and specific life-events. For
example, a simple analysis could be conducted to look at the eﬀect of the Aﬀordable Care
Act on poverty transitions or medical expenditures. Since the CPS-ASEC includes data on
health insurance, it would be straightforward to look at the uptake in insurance after the
implementation of the ACA and the subsequent medical expenditures of a family.
Another vein of research are the role of social programs. The research presented here
gives initial evidence of how these programs can mitigate poverty transitions. These pro-
grams can be studied in more depth. The other cash income category includes sources such
as disability and public assistance. Unraveling these sources would be an insightful project.
Moreover, in the vein of family composition changes, how many families mitigate poverty
by having other family members move in? All these questions can be studied through the
framework established in this paper.
A final more descriptive sort of research would be to understand more fully the char-
acteristics of those families who remain in poverty. In this paper it was highlighted that
African American and Hispanics are disproportionately represented in the poor-to-poor
population, even more so than those transitioning into poverty. What are the distinguish-
ing characteristics of this always poor population? Understanding the characteristics of the
population remaining in poverty can reveal important patterns that can inform policy.
From a data standpoint, there are various research topics that would improve the re-
liability and representativeness of this study. First, as mentioned in the data limitation
section, it would be worthwhile to use administrative data to see how imputations aﬀect
the distribution of resource changes, as opposed to the overall distribution of resource in
one time period. Second, administrative data could be leveraged to understand what hap-
pens to movers. Indeed, research on movers would be valuable for using the linked-CPS
in general, even beyond poverty transitions. Third, the data presented here does not use
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population weights. This is particularly important for subgroup analysis and would also
be a more accurate way of making nationally-representative claims. The typical method
for dealing with attrition is inverse probability weights readjusted in order to account for
non-random attrition. Finally, there are a couple of sources of data that would be worth
looking analyzing. As mentioned earlier, the SPM takes root in the 1990s through the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Building up to the SPM, the Census Bureau pub-
lished the NAS experimental poverty files that include many of the components used in the
SPM. Similarly, the Center on Poverty & Social Policy at Columbia University has recently
released historical SPM datasets that impute the SPM back to 1967. These data sources
could be included in this framework and would allow for a longer time frame to study these
poverty transitions.
The goal of this paper was to put poverty statistics in more tangible terms. To be
able to say something like: “When a male adult leaves the household, about 20 percent
of those families will enter poverty but, for female departures, only about 10 percent of
families enter poverty.” In order to get to this point, this paper used the linked-CPS to
understand poverty transitions and established the necessary building blocks and framework
for analyzing poverty transitions with this dataset. By doing so, various insights were
evident. First, the definition of poverty matters. The SPM has a higher churn rate than
the OPM, implying that the SPM capture more families falling into poverty. Second, family
composition changes are an important factor in explaining poverty transitions inasmuch as
these departures result in lost resources for a family. Third, the paper documents how
resources change by component for families entering and exiting poverty. To begin to show
how one may use this framework to its full potential, a simple methodology is created
to isolate the eﬀects of SPM resource components. From this analysis, it is clear that
employment is the most important factor for SPM transitions and that most transitions
can be explained by the change in one resource alone. And lastly, above all, the framework





















































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Breakdown of SPM resource components
Total Cash Incomea
1. Wages and Salary 11. Disability benefits
Other Cash Income 12. Pension or retirement income
2. Business 13. Interest
3. Farm 14. Dividends
4. Unemployment compensation 15. Rents, royalties, and estates
5. Workers’ compensation and trusts
6. Social security 16. Educational assistance
7. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 17. Alimony
8. Public assistance (welfare) 18. Child support
9. Veterans’ payments 19. Financial assistance from
10. Survivor benefits outside of the household
20. All other income
Plus:
Government Subsidies
21. Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP)
22. National School Lunch Program
23. Supplementary Nutrition Program for Women Infants and Children (WIC)
24. Housing subsidies
25. Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)
Minus:
Taxes Paidb
26. Federal income tax (-) 32. Child Tax Credit (CTC) (+)
27. State income tax (-) 31. Earned Income Tax Credit (+)
28. Annual property taxes (-) 33. Additional Child Tax Credit (+)
29. Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) (-)
30. Federal retirement payroll deduction (-)
Minus:
Necessary Expenses
34. Expenses related to work 36. Child support paid
35. Child care expenses
Minus:
Medical Expenditures
37. Medical Out-of-Pocket (MOOP) expenses and Medicare B subsidy
Source: Proctor, Semega and Kollar, 2016. Notes: (a) Total cash income encompasses all income
components used for OPM total family income. (b) Tax components are subtracted (-) while credits
are added (+) such that total taxes are the diﬀerence between taxes (-) and credits (+).
48
Table 2.3: Identifying family composition changes using the CPS-ASEC






t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2
Householder Householder $ 19,078 $ 24,339 $ 19,078 $ 24,339
Spouse Spouse $ 19,078 $ 24,339 $ 19,078 $ 24,339
Child Child $ 19,078 $ 24,339 $ 19,078 $ 24,339










# # # #
Corresponding
Poverty Thresholda $ 19,078 $ 24,339 $ 19,078 $ 19,318
Total
Family Income $ 19,000 $ 19,500 $ 19,000 $ 19,500
Poverty
Status Poor Poor Poor NonPoor
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t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2
Elder h.h. — $ 14,326 — — —
Elder spouse Widowed h.h. $ 14,326 $ 14,507 $ 14,326 $ 14,507










# # # #
Corresponding
Poverty Threshold $ 14,326 $ 14,507 $ 11,367 $ 11,511
Total
Family Income $ 12,000 $ 12,500 $ 12,000 $ 12,500
Poverty
Status Poor Poor NonPoor NonPoor
Note: (a) Poverty threshold values correspond to calendar year 2015 for t1 and 2016 for t2.
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Number of People - T1 2.24 2.29 2.08 2.07 2.06
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Number of People - T2 2.22 2.27 2.03 2.08 2.07
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Selected Demographics
of Householder
Age of Householder 54.61 54.56 56.30 55.13 52.18
(0.047) (0.051) (0.177) (0.185) (0.211)
% White - Non. Hisp. 76.77 80.08 68.66 68.47 56.89
(0.118) (0.127) (0.457) (0.461) (0.570)
% Afr. Amer. - Non. Hisp. 8.25 6.79 12.69 12.31 15.39
(0.077) (0.080) (0.328) (0.326) (0.415)
% Amer. Ind. - Non. Hisp. 0.45 0.40 0.54 0.64 0.77
(0.019) (0.020) (0.072) (0.079) (0.100)
% Asian - Non. Hisp. 3.35 3.24 3.21 3.67 4.55
(0.050) (0.056) (0.174) (0.187) (0.240)
% Other - Non. Hisp. 1.11 1.07 1.28 1.17 1.41
(0.029) (0.033) (0.111) (0.107) (0.136)
% Hispanic 10.05 8.42 13.62 13.74 21.00
(0.084) (0.088) (0.338) (0.341) (0.469)
% Non-Citizen 6.54 5.12 9.33 10.39 15.56
(0.069) (0.070) (0.287) (0.303) (0.417)
% Naturalized Citizen 7.18 6.88 7.57 8.33 9.00
(0.072) (0.080) (0.261) (0.274) (0.329)
Observations 127,146 99,116 10,308 10,170 7,552
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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% Departure of Any 7.04 6.85 9.67 6.46 6.54
Family Member (0.072) (0.080) (0.291) (0.244) (0.284)
% Arrival of Any 5.35 5.15 5.83 6.36 5.84
Family Member (0.063) (0.070) (0.231) (0.242) (0.270)
% Both Departure 0.80 0.73 1.15 1.06 0.90
and Arrival (0.025) (0.027) (0.105) (0.101) (0.109)
% No Change in 86.82 87.28 83.36 86.12 86.72
Family Composition (0.095) (0.106) (0.367) (0.343) (0.390)
Arrivalsa
% Newborn 1.86 1.87 1.83 1.47 2.33
(0.038) (0.043) (0.132) (0.119) (0.173)
% Arrival Child (2-6) 0.47 0.41 0.72 0.56 0.72
(0.019) (0.020) (0.083) (0.074) (0.097)
% Arrival Child (7-17) 0.75 0.66 1.08 0.97 1.23
(0.024) (0.026) (0.102) (0.097) (0.127)
% Arrival Adult (18-64) 3.64 3.43 4.17 5.19 3.51
(0.053) (0.058) (0.197) (0.220) (0.212)
% Arrival Elder (65+) 0.36 0.33 0.41 0.59 0.42
(0.017) (0.018) (0.063) (0.076) (0.074)
% Marriage 0.90 0.88 0.82 1.37 0.71
(0.027) (0.030) (0.089) (0.115) (0.097)
Departuresa
% Departure Child (0-6) 0.70 0.62 0.87 1.16 0.90
(0.023) (0.025) (0.092) (0.106) (0.109)
% Departure Child (7-17) 1.04 0.99 1.02 1.25 1.37
(0.028) (0.032) (0.099) (0.110) (0.134)
% Departure Adult (18-64) 6.12 6.00 7.80 5.94 5.54
(0.067) (0.075) (0.264) (0.234) (0.263)
% Departure Elder (65+) 1.12 1.02 2.44 1.00 0.86
(0.030) (0.032) (0.152) (0.099) (0.106)
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% Departure Spouse 1.06 0.96 2.25 1.03 0.73
(0.029) (0.031) (0.146) (0.100) (0.098)
% Departure Head 1.37 1.17 3.04 1.31 1.68
(0.033) (0.034) (0.169) (0.113) (0.148)
% Divorce/Separation 0.75 0.67 1.73 0.66 0.62
(0.024) (0.026) (0.128) (0.080) (0.090)
% Widowed 0.71 0.66 1.50 0.56 0.43
(0.024) (0.026) (0.120) (0.074) (0.075)
Observations 127,146 99,116 10,308 10,170 7,552
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (a) The summary
of changes are mutually exclusive but the breakdown of arrivals and departures are not
mutually exclusive. Changes in family composition can be concurrent.
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Table 2.6: Counterfactual poverty rates for family composition and resource changes - SPM











Percent Poor 13.94 14.05 14.07 14.74⇤⇤⇤
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099)
Observations 127,416
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Diﬀerence between Poor t2
(14.05%) and Resource Change (14.74%) is significant at *** p<0.01.
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Mean   Mean   Mean  
t1 t2   t1 t1 t2   t1 t1 t2   t1
SPM Total Resources 54,206 -509⇤⇤ 38,543 -29,291⇤⇤⇤ 9,604 27,775⇤⇤⇤
(55,976) (36,098) (14,940)
Total Cash Income 74,505 78 48,523 -33,506⇤⇤⇤ 15,427 32,007⇤⇤⇤
(84,684) (52,888) (13,863)
Wages/Salaries 53,641 -288 25,673 -18,444⇤⇤⇤ 7,666 17,550⇤⇤⇤
(80,362) (45,793) (13,222)
Other Cash Income 20,864 366⇤⇤ 22,850 -15,062⇤⇤⇤ 7,761 14,457⇤⇤⇤
(36,919) (35,858) (9,270)
Taxes Paid 14,159 488⇤⇤⇤ 6,264 -5,884⇤⇤⇤ 281 5,972⇤⇤⇤
(28,462) (16,457) (2,973)
Necessary Expenses 2,075 -26⇤⇤⇤ 1,329 -306⇤⇤⇤ 1,092 261⇤⇤⇤
(2,770) (1,875) (2,788)
Government Subsidies 454 -12⇤⇤ 858 143⇤⇤⇤ 1,038 -163⇤⇤⇤
(1,762) (2,465) (2,589)
Medical Expenditures 4,538 94⇤⇤⇤ 3,269 2,093⇤⇤⇤ 5,505 -2,183⇤⇤⇤
(6,969) (4,293) (15,061)
Observations 127,146 10,308 10,170
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. All values are adjusted to reflect 2015 dollars. Adjustment made
using annual average Consumer Price Index Research Series (CPI-U-RS). Standard deviations in
parentheses. Diﬀerence (t2   t1) significant at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Suﬃcient Expected Suﬃcient Expected
Wages/Salaries 31.4 51.9 31.2 53.5
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Other Cash Income 27.7 76.1 28.0 76.1
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Taxes Paid 0.4 12.2 0.1 13.2
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Necessary Expenses 0.3 18.2 0.4 22.3
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Government Subsidies 1.3 20.0 1.1 19.6
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Medical Expenditures 4.2 52.6 3.8 54.0
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Both components are suﬃcient
Both Wages and Medical 0.14 25.4 0.26 27.7
Both Wages and Other Cash Income 0.17 32.3 0.12 33.0
Both Other Cash Income and Medical 0.14 38.3 0.28 39.3
10,028 10,204
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: One percent of observations from each sample has been
dropped. For the NonPoor to Poor, 104 observations that had increases in total resources were
dropped. For the Poor to NonPoor, 142 observations that had decreases in total resources were
dropped. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.9: Attrition in the linked CPS-ASECs
Full Sample Linked Sample
Number of People 2.38 2.24
(0.002) (0.004)
Selected Demographics of Householder
Age of Householder 43.76 54.61
(0.031) (0.047)
% White - Non. Hisp. 67.17 76.77
(0.064) (0.118)
% Afr. Amer. - Non. Hisp. 12.20 8.25
(0.044) (0.077)
% Amer. Ind. - Non. Hisp. 0.65 0.45
(0.011) (0.019)
% Asian - Non. Hisp. 4.92 3.35
(0.029) (0.05)
% Other - Non. Hisp. 1.59 1.11
(0.017) (0.029)
% Hispanic 13.47 10.05
(0.046) (0.084)
% Non-Citizen 6.33 6.54
(0.033) (0.069)
% Naturalized Citizen 5.74 7.18
(0.032) (0.072)
Resource Components
SPM Total Resources 51,966 54,206
(55,246) (55,976)




Other Cash Income 17,651 20,864
(35,283) (36,919)
Taxes Paid 13,912 14,159
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(29,180) (28,462)
Necessary Expenses 2,221 2,075
(2,941) (2,770)
Government Subsidies 606 454
(2,052) (1,762)
Medical Expenditures 4,174 4,538
(6,754) (6,969)
Observations 541,850 127,146
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard
deviations reported for Resource Components.
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Figure 2.1: Poverty churn as percent of total U.S. population, OPM
























Source: CPS-ASEC 1996-2016. Notes: Shaded areas denote recession periods. Because the sample
consists of two-year panels, the poverty rate uses t2 observations such that the poverty rate is the sum of
those entering poverty (NonPoor to Poor) and those staying in poverty (Poor to Poor).
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Figure 2.2: Poverty churn as percent of total U.S. population, SPM
























Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: Because the sample consists of two-year panels, the poverty rate
uses t2 observations such that the poverty rate is the sum of those entering poverty (NonPoor to Poor)
and those staying in poverty (Poor to Poor).
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Figure 2.3: Poverty churn as percent of total U.S. population, OPM v. SPM












Poverty rate - OPM















Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: Because the sample consists of two-year panels, the poverty rate
uses t2 observations such that the poverty rate is the sum of those entering poverty (NonPoor to Poor)
and those staying in poverty (Poor to Poor).
61
Figure 2.4: Percent of families in poverty in t2 by t1 ratio of resources to poverty line, OPM
v. SPM





OPM rate in t1 - 11.2%
SPM rate in t1 - 14.2%
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Likelihood of poverty - SPM















SPM - t1 ratio of resources to poverty line
OPM - t1 ratio of resources to poverty line
OPM rate in t1 - 11.2%
SPM rate in t1 - 14.2%


















Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: The probability of being in poverty in t2 is higher for families with
lower t1 resources. For example, the probability of being in poverty for families two times over the poverty
line (43rd percentile of t1 ratio of resources to poverty line) is about 10 percent under SPM definitions.
The definitions of OPM and SPM diﬀer on various levels including resource components and poverty lines.
For a complete overview, see Section 2.2.
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Figure 2.5: Percentile of t1 ratio of resources to alternate poverty lines, OPM












125% Poverty rate in t1 - 16.3%
100% Poverty rate in t1 - 11.2%









Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: The alternate poverty lines and rates are calculated by multiplying
the poverty lines in both t1 and t2 by 1.25 and then recalculating the t1 ratio of resources to poverty line
and each family’s t2 poverty status.
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Figure 2.6: Percentile of t1 ratio of resources to alternate poverty lines, SPM












125% Poverty rate in t1 - 22%
100% Poverty rate in t1 - 14.2%









Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: The alternate poverty lines and rates are calculated by multiplying
the poverty lines in both t1 and t2 by 1.25 and then recalculating the t1 ratio of resources to poverty line
and each family’s t2 poverty status.
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Figure 2.7: The depth of poverty - Resources relative to poverty line in t1 by percentile,
SPM



















































Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Note: 100th percentile truncated for presentation purposes. Real value is
about $370,000. (a) 14.2% of the families in the 2010-2016 sample were in poverty. (b) All else equal, if all
families received a shock in income that reduced their resource by 5,000 dollars then (c) the poverty rate
would increase 9 percentage points from 14.2% to 23.5%.
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Figure 2.8: Change in total resources by percentile, SPM
















Below 0: Decrease in total resources
Above 0: Increase in total resources



























Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) 99% of families exiting poverty gain resources while (b) 99% of
families entering poverty lose resources.
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Figure 2.9: Change in wages/salaries by percentile, SPM


















Below 0: Decrease in wages/salaries
Above 0: Increase in wages/salaries




























Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) 51.5 percent of families exiting poverty experience an increase
in their wages/salaries while (b) 38 percent of families exiting poverty experience no change. 10.5 percent
(not marked) of families exiting experience a decrease in wages/salaries. Similarly, (c) 54.5 percent of
families entering poverty experience a decrease in wages/salaries while (d) 36 percent of families entering
poverty experience no change in their wages/salaries. 9.5 percent (not marked) of families entering
poverty experience an increase in wages/salaries.
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Figure 2.10: Change in other cash income by percentile, SPM
















Below 0: Decrease in other cash income
Above 0: Increase in other cash income





























Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) 75.5% of families exiting poverty experience an increase in
other cash income while (b) 76.5% of families entering poverty experience a decrease in other cash income.
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Figure 2.11: Change in taxes paid by percentile, SPM


















Below 0: Decrease in taxes
Above 0: Increase in taxes

























Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) 62.5 percent of families exiting poverty experience an increase
in taxes paid while (b) 24 percent of families exiting poverty experience no change. 13.5 percent (not
marked) of families exiting experience a decrease in taxes paid. Similarly, (c) 63.5 percent of families
entering poverty experience a decrease in taxes paid and (d) 23 percent of families entering poverty
experience no change in their taxes paid. 13.5 percent (not marked) of families entering poverty
experience an increase in taxes paid.
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Figure 2.12: Change in necessary expenses by percentile, SPM
















Below 0: Decrease in necessary expenses
Above 0: Increase in necessary expenses





























Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) 45.5 percent of families exiting poverty experience an increase
in necessary expenses while (b) 34 percent of families exiting poverty experience no change. 20.5 percent
(not marked) of families exiting experience a decrease in necessary expenses. Similarly (c) 43.5 percent of
families entering poverty experience a decrease in necessary expenses and (d) 34 percent of families
entering poverty experience no change in their necessary expenses. 22.5 percent (not marked) of families
entering poverty experience an increase in necessary expenses.
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Figure 2.13: Change in government subsidies by percentile, SPM


















Below 0: Decrease in gov’t subsidies
Above 0: Increase in gov’t subsidies































Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) 19.5 percent of families exiting poverty experience an increase
in government subsidies while (b) 54 percent of families exiting poverty experience no change. 26.5
percent (not marked) of families exiting experience a decrease in government subsidies. Similarly (c) 20.5
percent of families entering poverty experience a decrease in government subsidies and (d) 54.5 percent of
families entering poverty experience no change in their government subsidies. 25.5 percent (not marked)
of families entering poverty experience an increase in government subsidies.
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Figure 2.14: Change in medical expenditures by percentile, SPM
















Below 0: Decrease in medical exp.
Above 0: Increase in medical exp.






























Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) 46% of families exiting poverty experience an increase in
medical expenses while (b) 45% of families entering poverty experience a decrease in medical expenses.
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Figure 2.15: Percent of poor to nonpoor families where change in Social Security receipt is
suﬃcient to push families out of poverty in t2 by age of householder, SPM












Early retirement age (62 years)
Full retirement age (66 years)
Maximum retirement age (70 years)

















Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) In order to simplify analysis, the age of the householder is used
to identify households that are likely to see an increase in Social Security. The CPS-ASEC refers to a
householder as the person in the family who owns/rents the unit. In the case of married couples, the
householder may be either one of the spouses. Certainly, there are families where the spouse may be
entering retirement age but these are not captured in this analysis. The percentages plotted are derived
for families where total SPM resources increase between t1 and t2 in following the “suﬃcient” setup
establish in Section 2.6.2. Each age group consists of more than 100 families.
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Figure 2.16: Families where increases in medical expenditures are suﬃcient for poverty
entries, SPM






























Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: The probabilities plotted are derived from the number of families
where total SPM resources decrease between t1 and t2 and medical expenses increase. Nine separate bins
(observations) are created: 0-3,000 (3,387), 3,000-6,000 (928), 6,000-9,000 (468), 9,000-12,000 (282),
15,000-20,000 (167), 20,000-30,000 (141), 30,000-40,000 (67), 40,000-50,000 (37), 50,000+ (77).
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Figure 2.17: Percentage of nonpoor families entering poverty for householders working 52-50
F.T.E. weeks in t1 by F.T.E. weeks in t2, SPM











































  in wages/salaries is suﬃcient   in wages/salaries is not suﬃcient
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) The CPS-ASEC refers to a householder as the person in the
family who owns/rents the unit. In the case of married couples, the householder may be either one of the
spouses. Full-time equivalent weeks are calculated from householder responses to weeks worked in the past
year who also reported being employed at a full-time basis (35 hours or more per week). The bars present
the percentage of families for each work schedule change that fall into poverty in t2 as well as the percent
of those families for whom the change in wages (total family wages) is suﬃcient for pushing a family into
poverty (see Section 2.6.2). For a tabular representation of this figure, see Appendix Table A.4.
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Figure 2.18: Percentage of nonpoor families where government subsidies or unemployment
compensation keep families out of poverty for householders working 52-50 F.T.E. weeks in
t1 by F.T.E. weeks in t2, SPM























































Government subsidies Unemployment compensation
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: In order to calculate the percent of families staying out of poverty,
government subsidies in t2 are subtracted from SPM total resources in t2. Families that fall below the
poverty line without the government subsidies are considered to be those families for whom government
subsidies keep families out of poverty. Each bar represents the percentage of nonpoor families in that
work schedule change category that do not fall into poverty because of government subsidies and the
percent of families that do no fall into poverty because of unemployment compensation. Government
subsidies include SNAP, lunch subsidies, WIC, housing subsidies and energy subsidies as well as EITC.
householders working 52-50 F.T.E. weeks in t1 and 52-50 F.T.E. weeks in t2 or retiring in t2 are not
presented as the number of families are essentially zero. For a tabular representation of this figure, see
Appendix Table A.5.
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Figure 2.19: Percent of nonpoor families in t1 who fall into poverty in t2 as a result of a























































  in wages/salaries is suﬃcient   in wages/salaries is not suﬃcient
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: The bars represent the percent of a particular departure that fall
into poverty as well as the percent of those families where the change in wages/salaries are suﬃcient to
push those families into poverty. The sample includes only nonpoor families. For a tabular representation
of this figure, see Appendix Table A.6.
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Figure 2.20: Decomposing poverty rates by imputation type, SPM











21.2% (8.7%) 20.0% (8.1%)
18.9% (5.7%)
14.6% (7.8%) 15.9% (8.4%)
13.8% (5.4%)
36.8% (9.0%) 35.2% (8.5%)
26.2% (4.7%)















No imputes Imputes in t1 and t2 Impute in t1 only Impute in t2 only
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: Two percentages are displayed in each block. The first set presents
the percent that particular block represents of each type of poverty transition. The second, in
parentheses, is the recalculated percent of total population where the total population includes only that
particular type of imputation.
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Figure 2.21: Gross flows as percent of total U.S. population, OPM
















Families moving out after t1 + Linked families
Families moving in at t2 + Linked families
Cross-sectional
Linked families
Source: CPS-ASEC 1996-2016. Notes: Shaded areas denote recession periods. The linked-CPS sample
keeps families that are present in both t1 and t2. The linked poverty rate denotes the poverty rate for t1.
For example, the linked poverty rate in 2002 represents the linked sample for families where t1 is 2002 and
t2 is 2003. Families moving out in t1 are those families present in the CPS-ASEC only in t1. These
families are then replaced by families moving into the sample in t2. The cross-sectional rate uses the
cross-sectional CPS-ASEC, which includes all families regardless of their being in sample in t2, to
calculate the poverty rate.
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Figure 2.22: Comparing poverty rates for linked-CPS samples, SPM
















Families moving out after t1 + Linked families
Families moving in at t2 + Linked families
Cross-sectional
Linked families
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: The linked-CPS sample keeps families that are present in both t1
and t2. The linked poverty rate denotes the poverty rate for t1. For example, the linked poverty rate in
2002 represents the linked sample for families where t1 is 2002 and t2 is 2003. Families moving out in t1
are those families present in the CPS-ASEC only in t1. These families are then replaced by families
moving into the sample in t2. The cross-sectional rate uses the cross-sectional CPS-ASEC, which includes
all families regardless of their being in sample in t2, to calculate the poverty rate.
Chapter 3
Union card or welfare card? Evidence
on the relationship between union
membership and net fiscal impact at
the individual-worker level1
3.1 Introduction
This paper oﬀers the first evidence on whether union membership causes workers to use
less public benefits and to pay more taxes. The prior literature’s findings of union wage
and benefit premiums gives reason to expect this, although prior work has neither tested
nor measured this directly. The literature’s evidence about eﬀects of unionization on wages
and benefits is insuﬃcient to understand the eﬀect of unionization on taxes paid or benefits
received. Tax and public-benefit eﬀects depend on interactions of workers’ earnings with
household characteristics and tax and benefit policy. For instance, a union-induced 10
percent wage increase will have diﬀerent tax and benefit implications for a worker earning
near the poverty line versus one earning at the median, for a childless worker versus with
one with 3 children, and for a worker in California versus Mississippi.




Through unionization, many workers raise their labor compensation, both in earnings
and employer-provided fringe benefits. The positive eﬀect of unionization on labor earnings
is especially pronounced for workers who would otherwise have very low earnings. Frandsen
(2012) follows workers after close union elections and finds that unionization strongly raises
post-election earnings for workers who were below the 25th percentile of the pre-election
earnings distribution but has no eﬀect for workers who were at higher percentiles. Frand-
sen’s focus on earnings, rather than wages, accounts for any reduction in hours induced by
higher hourly compensation. He also follows workers even if they leave the establishment
and counts earnings as zero if they do not earn from any employer, so this also accounts
for any reductions in employment driven by unionization. Union membership also raises
workers’ likelihood of having private, employer-provided health insurance and other bene-
fits (Buchmueller, DiNardo and Valletta, 2002; Freeman and Medoﬀ, 1984; Freeman, 1981).
Employer expenditures on fringe benefits are 2.5 times higher per hour worked for unionized
jobs than for nonunion jobs and, as with earnings, the eﬀects of unions on benefits appear
larger in lower-paying establishments (Budd, 2007).
Through these channels, unionization may have a positive net fiscal impact on public
balance sheets by both (1) reducing public-benefit use and (2) increasing tax payments by
workers. While media have speculated about this fact (Eidelson, 2013; Sanders, 2012), it
has not received much direct attention from economists or social scientists. Economists have
understandably focused most of our attention on the eﬀects of unions on wages, employ-
ment and hours, and labor and organizational productivity. While these are the first-order,
narrowly-economic questions, we have ignored closely-connected questions of social, policy,
and economic import. For instance, what is the impact of unionization on household in-
come? There is some work on labor earnings, the product of wages and hours, but little
attention to other kinds of income or on contributions to and dependence on the public fisc.
There has been extensive study of costs and benefits to the public of numerous, other eco-
nomic phenomenon. Immigration (Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999; Blau, 1984; National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2016; Preston, 2014; Storesletten, 2000)
and early childhood investments (Council of Economic Advisers, 2015; Elango et al., 2015)
are two prominent examples. The analysis here is static, focusing on annual eﬀects, rather
than dynamic, computing a net present value of a point-in-time event (National Academies
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of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2016).
This paper estimates the average net fiscal impact of union members to observably-
similar non-member workers using data from the Current Population Survey over 1994 to
2015. We measure individual net fiscal impact (NFI), which is taxes paid (T) less the
cost of public benefits received (B): NFI = T - B. Theory tells us that the key mechanism
by which individual unionization would aﬀect these variables is through raising private
income among low earners. The analysis yields evidence strongly consistent with this and
provide the first estimates of the magnitude of these relationships. Additional analysis
explores sensitivity to issues arising from the possibility that union membership aﬀects
transitions out of employment. Looking beyond this paper’s main focus on worker-level
analysis, the conclusion oﬀers interpretation given evidence on other channels by which
union membership might aﬀect NFI, such as by aﬀecting labor productivity, profit, and
public policy.
3.2 Research design
We would ideally have an experiment among a representative sample of workers where
some were randomly assigned to be union members and others to be nonunion. In that
case, we could credibly interpret any observed union-nonunion diﬀerences in outcomes as
causal eﬀects of union membership. Unfortunately, randomization is not feasible.2 Free-
man (1984) describes many relevant issues in the study of union eﬀects using CPS data
arising from measurement error in the observed union-status variable. In particular, he
discusses plausible conditions under which the true eﬀect of union membership is bounded
above by the cross-sectional estimator and below by the individual first-diﬀerence estima-
tor. Following his lead, we will present both estimates and interpret our results in this
framework.
To get a nationally-representative sample, we use the Current Population Survey (CPS),
which includes detailed data on all key variables (Flood et al., 2015). The study period is
1994 to 2015, the longest over which the necessary variables are all available. Careful linking
2 A more-credible, regression-discontinuity design (DiNardo and Lee, 2004; Frandsen, 2012; Sojourner
et al., 2015) would require the ability to connect the population of individually-identified workers between
the establishment where they worked during a NLRB unionization election and later, individually-identified
measures of taxes paid and benefits received. This is not feasible.
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is required to maximize sample size conditional on the necessary variables. Specifically, we
focus on the subsample who were given both the Annual Social and Economic Supplement
(ASEC) and the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) survey. The ASEC is necessary because
it contains income, tax, and benefit data for outcomes. Annually, the ASEC fields only
in March so only a third of the total CPS sample are eligible. The ORG is necessary to
measure union-membership status. Two sets of individual, longitudinal identifiers recently
produced by the Minnesota Population Center enable both linking of ASEC and ORG
responses (MARBASECID, Flood and Pacas (2016)) and linking of ORG responses across
consecutive years (CPSID, Rivera Drew, Flood and Warren (2014)). The Appendix gives
details on the linking process and sample construction.
As is common in the study of union eﬀects on wages, our primary sample screens in
only non-student, employed, wage and salary workers age 18 or older.3 The longitudinal
nature of our analysis requires a few additional restrictions. First, the sample includes
only observations that are present in both year t and t+1. Second, in linking the March
ASEC to ORG questions from April through June, we keep only observations where age, sex
and race match. More importantly, because we need union membership regarding the job
referred to in March, we only keep observations whose April-June job characteristics match
those job characteristics from March. In eﬀect, these variables include, labor force status,
employment status, class of workers, and broad classifications of industry and occupation.
Third, for the links across years and months, we keep only observations that match on
age, sex and race. For consistency between the cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis,
we restrict attention to individuals linked across two waves of the CPS-ORG and meeting
sample-screening conditions in both.
All cross-sectional analysis uses each observation’s sample weights. Longitudinal analy-
sis gives each individual the average sample weight of its two observations. Dollar amounts
are inflated to 2015 dollars. Since we use a longitudinally linked-CPS, our sample consists
of only those people who do not move from their household between two consecutive years.
We assess robustness using an extended sample that includes those both in and out of the
labor force across the two observations.
3 Non-workers generally cannot belong to unions and plausibly have diﬀerent unobserved characteristics
than workers. If unionization impacts public balance sheets by reducing employment, our primary analysis
will miss this channel. We return to this in the robustness section.
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Nonresponse for various CPS variables are a potential source of bias for our analysis,
as evidenced by the growing literature on imputations in CPS. Our general approach for
dealing with nonresponse is to drop cases with nonresponse and then conduct robustness
checks. More specifically, when a respondent refuses to respond to a particular survey
question, rather than leaving the field blank, the Census Bureau allocates a value from
a donor set comprised of respondents from that same sample. The process by which the
allocation is conducted is known as the hot-deck imputation procedure and, in essence, takes
a nonrespondent and matches based on a set of measured attributes. For earnings items,
this set broadly consists of age, sex, race, employment status, and industry/occupation.
As early as 1986, Lillard, Smith and Welch investigated the Census Bureau’s approach to
dealing with missing data and pointed out that the hot-deck procedure for imputing income
likely aﬀects results regarding income and earnings (Lillard, Smith and Welch, 1986). More
recently, various studies (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004; Bollinger and Hirsch, 2006, 2013)
have warned about missing data in the CPS highlighting that “coeﬃcient bias resulting from
imputation of a dependent variable (earnings) can be of first-order importance” (Hirsch and
Schumacher, 2004).
In our analysis, item nonresponse on earnings, union-status, and all sources of income
raise familiar issues. The Census Bureau imputes values for missing data. However, relying
on these imputed values has been shown to introduce bias in analysis like ours. Hirsch and
Schumacher (2004) showed that using imputed earnings as an outcome, “if the attribute
under study is not used as a census match criterion in selecting a donor, wage diﬀerential
estimates (with or without controls) are biased towards zero.” More importantly, “this
bias is large and exists independent of any from the nonrandom determination of missing
earnings” (p. 691). Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) estimated attenuation bias from missing
union-status data to be about 5 percentage points for estimates between 1999 and 2001.
The prevalence of imputations has only increased since 2001. We drop observations with
imputed union status to reduce the attenuation bias introduced by the imputation itself.
About 6 percent of the full sample have imputed union status. Secondly, the hot-deck
procedure used for imputing earnings leads to attenuation that is roughly the size of the
imputation rate (Bollinger and Hirsch, 2006). As they suggest, “the simplest approach
to account for match bias is to omit imputed earners from wage equation (and other)
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analyses” (p. 517). Following their recommendation, we also drop individuals with any
imputed earnings, who are about 45 percent of the sample.4 Third, for respondents
who answer the March Basic CPS but refuse to answer the longer ASEC questions, the
Census Bureau performs a “full-line” impute for these cases, imputing answers to every
income question. In other words, there are respondents in the March Basic for whom there
is not enough income data collected. Rather than leaving these cases as non-responses, the
Census Bureau uses a hot-deck procedure to impute the values of the missing income data
(Stewart, 2002). Hokayem, Bollinger and Ziliak (2014) analyzes the role of nonresponse for
the CPS-ASEC including the full-line impute and find evidence of bias from non-response.
More importantly, in a longitudinal framework, dropping respondents with full-line imputes
is preferred. In eﬀect, comparing a full-line impute in one time period to an actual response
in the second time period introduces unnecessary measurement error. We drop respondents
with full-line imputes, who are about 14 percent of the sample. These three categories
are not mutually exclusive. Dropping all observations with any type of imputation means
dropping just over half (57 percent) of our otherwise-eligible sample. Table B.5 breaks
down the resulting sample sizes from each imputation restriction imposed here.5
The primary analysis sample is 241,906 individuals, each observed in two consecutive
years. Table 3.1 describes the frequency of union-status transitions in our sample. The
sample includes 3,742 individuals moving from union in the first wave to non-union in
the second, 3,986 moving from non-union to union, 14,185 who are union in both waves,
and 99,040 who are non-union in both waves. We treat covered non-members as nonunion.
This is a conservative assumption, as it diminishes the contrast between union and nonunion
categories.
A diﬀerent form of measurement error arises from any inaccurate reports of union status.
While we present specifications for a balanced, pooled cross-sectional model, we also use an
individual fixed-eﬀect model. Doing so allows us to make a better causal claim of the eﬀect of
unionization. Indeed, Freeman (1984) points out two relevant facts: (1) there is substantial
4 The analyses of Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) focuses primarily on a single earning variable from the ORG
files while we focus on a larger set of variables from the CPS-ASEC (listed in Table B.3). But the imputation
method is nearly the same for both surveys and, more importantly, imputation is more pronounced in the
CPS-ASEC. These facts further warrant dropping the observations with imputed earnings and union status.
5 We also look at the eﬀect of dropping free/reduced price lunch and housing subsidies from our analysis.
We find that there is no significant eﬀect of doing so our final model includes these benefits. Results not
presented.
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measurement error in reported union status and (2) this can bias down estimates based on
individual fixed eﬀects. This measurement error comes from inaccurate responses, rather
than the nonresponse discussed above. Freeman (1984) further argues that cross-sectional
estimates can be interpreted as an upper bound on the causal eﬀect of unionization, due to
likely positive omitted-variable bias. That is, given high union wages, it is typically assumed
that firms selected workers with higher unobserved ability which cannot be controlled for in
a standard cross-sectional setup. Furthermore, the fixed eﬀect estimate can be interpreted
as a lower bound due to attenuation caused by the union-status measurement error.
3.3 Taxes
All tax variables are imputed in the CPS-ASEC using a Census Bureau created tax model.
These variables include federal and state taxes, local property taxes, payments to social
security and federal retirement. Also included are diﬀerent credits such as the earned
income tax credit, the child and additional child tax credit, and the Making Work Pay
stimulus of 2009-2010 and the federal stimulus payments of 2008. The general approach
the Census Bureau uses for imputing taxes is to statistically match CPS tax units to a
Statistics of Income (SOI) public use file from the IRS (O’Hara, 2006). State and local
taxes follow a similar procedure but includes diﬀerent parameters as is relevant to specific
state tax laws.
Wheaton and Stevens (2016) review diﬀerent methods for calculating taxes in the CPS-
ASEC and find that, on average, the Census Bureau’s method produces roughly the same
results as those using other tax models. However, no research has looked at whether the
choice of tax model results in diﬀerent results across union membership status. Future
research would benefit from looking at the potential bias of tax models across diﬀerent
subgroups.
3.4 Outcomes
The primary outcome of interest is individual net fiscal impact (NFI) on public balance
sheets, defined as taxes paid less the cost of public benefits received. The sample average
(standard deviation) is $8,862 ($14,327) (Table 3.2), suggesting that the average worker pays
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$8,862 more in tax liabilities than the value of public benefits and tax credits she collects.
In the cross-section, union members average $11,505 in NFI and non-union workers average
$8,399 implying a raw $3,106 or 37 percent diﬀerence that workers in unions contribute to
the public purse over workers not in unions (Table 3.3).
To measure taxes paid by each individual, we add up reported annual federal and state
income tax liabilities before credits, property tax, Social Security, and federal retirement
plan payroll deductions. Income from tax credits - Earned Income, Make Work Pay, Child,
Child Care, and Stimulus - are also included in this sum but enter with negative sign. The
sample mean (SD) is $10,290 ($13,030), with union members paying $2,757, or 28 percent,
more than non-union workers on average. Table 3.3 contains summary statistics for each
component of taxes paid. Those that enter the sum negatively are denoted (-). Federal
income tax and Social Security payroll deductions are the largest components.
To measure the public cost of public benefits received, we add up the reported value of
benefits received through various programs. Following Bitler and Hoynes (2016), we look
at the private-market value of three major public benefits.6 Namely these are Food
Stamps (SNAP), welfare in the form of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
(Families with Dependent Children or AFDC prior to welfare reform), and Unemployment
Insurance (UI).We further take advantage of the full list of programs for which the Census
Bureau collects data following Sherman, Greenstein and Ruﬃng (2012). Admittedly, these
programs are smaller in magnitude and cover a smaller portion of the population. These
include the private-market value of supplemental Social Security Income, Medicaid, and
Medicare benefits, and of school-lunch, housing, home heating subsidies, post-secondary
educational assistance, Social Security, workers compensation, veteran’s benefits, and sur-
vivor’s benefits.7 These benefits average $1,427 annually. Union members report $349 or
24 percent less in earned public benefits than non-union workers.
In our analysis, private income is the key mechanism by which unionization would aﬀect
6 Bitler and Hoynes (2016) look at fourth major program: the Earned Income Tax Credit. We include
this in taxes paid.
7 Most of these tax and benefit-income variables are reported by the individual respondent about him
or herself individually. However, some of the benefits are supplied at the family-level: public housing,
Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, school lunch, and home heating. To match the individual-level sample-
selection criteria and unionization measure, we construct an individual-level measure for each of those
benefits. We allocate the total family’s cost of the benefit equally to all adults in the family.
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taxes paid and public benefits received.8 To measure private income, we sum income
from alimony, farm income, non-farm business income, child support, dividends, interest,
rent, retirement, wage and salary income wages, assistance from friends and relatives, and
income from other sources. For homeowners, we also include the flow value of housing
services so that “income” from both housing and other investments is captured. Focusing
on private income, in general, rather than labor income, in particular, makes sense for two
reasons. First, nonunion workers may compensate for lower hourly compensation at their
primary employer by devoting extra time to other income-generating strategies including
self-employment and it does not make sense to ignore the available information on these
channels, as these will aﬀect outcomes. Second, if union members enjoy a long-term flow
of higher income, this might allow them to accumulate greater assets, which would return
additional income in interest, dividends, and the value of housing services, all of which
would aﬀect outcomes. The sample average (SD) is $51,821 ($36,378) in private income per
year, with union members reporting $10,113 or 20 percent more annual income than non-
union workers. By far, the largest component is wage and salary income with an overall
average of $47,904 and union workers earning $7,817 or 17 percent more that nonunion
workers on average.
3.5 Empirical methodology
To examine whether the raw mean diﬀerences by union status hold up in more homogeneous
comparisons, we use mean regression analysis. The primary predictor of interest is an
indicator of union membership. The excluded category is nonunion workers. Covered non-
members, who work under a union contract without joining the union, are conservatively
categorized as nonunion workers.
To isolate the relationship between outcomes and union status, we condition on other
three types of observable determinants of the outcomes. First, we include a standard set
of wage determinants (X): potential experience in quartic form, indicators for educational
attainment, marital status, race and ethnicity, sex, foreign-born, part-time work, size of
8 Unionization may aﬀect public balance sheets through the political economy as well, by encouraging
political support for higher tax rates and more expansive public benefit programs. This channel is largely
outside the scope of the current analysis. The concluding discussion explores this more fully.
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metropolitan area, industry, occupation, employment by federal government, by state gov-
ernment, or by local government (private sector omitted) following Bollinger and Hirsch
(2006). Second, we include measures of family structure (F) because these govern tax lia-
bility and benefit eligibility. In addition to marital status, we condition on the number of
adults in family, number of children aged birth to 5 in family, and number of children aged
6 to 18 in family. Table 3.2 presents summary statistics. Third, individuals’ tax liabilities
and income from public benefits will also depend on states’ current economic and policy
conditions. These may also be correlated with the likelihood of union membership. To
mitigate this possible sources of omitted-variable bias, we include state-year fixed eﬀects
(1s1t) in all of our models, ensuring that all comparisons are made between individuals of
diﬀerent union status within the same state-year.
We estimate three models. The first specification is a pooled cross-section, regressing
outcomes on an indicator for union membership, individual demographic covariates (all
individual wage determinant and family structure variables), and state-year fixed eﬀects.
This is the Bollinger and Hirsch specification augmented with family structure and state-
year fixed eﬀects:
yit =  1(union)it +  1Fit +  2Xit + 1s1t + "it. (3.1)
In this setting, the identifying assumption is that, comparing across workers in the same
state and year and controlling linearly for observed diﬀerences in family structure and stan-
dard wage determinants, the unobservable determinants of outcomes are not conditionally
associated with union membership.   measures the mean diﬀerence in outcomes between
union workers and otherwise-similar non-union workers.
To tighten the comparison further, we relax the assumption that linear controls are ade-
quate and construct indicators for highly-interacted combinations of control variables. The
first set of controls interacts the variables more-closely related to tax liability and benefit
eligibility. Specifically, we interact number of kids 0-6, number of kids 6-18, total adults
in family, marital status (6 categories: married spouse present, married spouse absent,
separated, divorced, Widowed, and never married/single), sex, Hispanic origin, African
American, Asian, Foreign-born status, state, and year. That is, we construct 101,249 in-
dicators representing the observed combinations of these variables, denoted 1(F)it1s1t.
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In this specification, comparisons are only made between individuals in the same demo-
graphic cell-state-year. We also interact wage-determinant variables and denote the set
of cell indicators as 1(W)it. Specifically, we interact federal public sector, state public
sector, local public sector, industry (13 categories), occupation (6 categories), part-time
status, metropolitan size (7 categories), potential experience (in 5 year bins for a total of
10 groups), and education (4 categories: less than H.S., H.S or equivalent, some college or
Associate’s degree, and college degree or more) for a total of 26,545 indicators. Specification
2 is thus:
yit =  1(union)it +  11(F)it1s1t +  21(W)it + "it. (3.2)
The third specification recognizes that union and non-union workers may diﬀer in unobserv-
able ways correlated with unionization status and NFI that are not credibly controlled for
by cross-sectional comparisons, even with very flexible controls. To address this, we exploit
the longitudinal nature of the data to estimate a specification with individual fixed eﬀects.
Ideally, this identifies the eﬀect of unionization as the average change in NFI experienced by
the workers’ who switch between union and nonunion status, conditional on other changes
in observables such as educational attainment, family structure, and state-year. More im-
portantly, it allows us to control for unobserved qualities of people who choose to be in
unions versus those who are not in unions by largely ignoring people are always union or
never union and focusing on changes in outcomes coincident with changes in unionization
status holding the worker fixed.
The nature of the outcomes studied here warrant a modification in the specification
usually used to study union eﬀects in longitudinal data. Hourly wages and weekly hours,
the outcomes usually studied, adjust quickly when a person changes a job and, hence,
union status. However, the outcomes studied here are stocks across a year (annual taxes
due or benefits received) and, so, the timing of change matters. The union status and
conditioning variables are defined at two points in time, twelve months apart. Each outcome
is defined with respect to the prior twelve months. Identification comes from seeing how
changes within person in union status relates to changes in outcomes reported at those
two time periods. Consider someone who switches from non-union to union between the
first and second survey. If the person was non-union for the whole year prior to the first
survey, switches status immediately after the first survey and stays union for the whole
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intervening year. The estimated eﬀect would be accurate. However, if the person switched
only immediately prior to the second survey, the person would really be non-union the
whole time and so though we would have the same measured change in union status. In
this case, the estimated eﬀect would be zero. Assuming that the timing of switches is
distributed uniformly across the year, switches occur halfway between the first and second
survey on average. So, the estimated eﬀect is half of the true eﬀect.9 For this reason, a
change in union status across a 12-month period represents an expected change for half the
year. Including a 0.5 constant in the specification corrects for this, eﬀectively doubling the
estimate that would otherwise be obtained and letting   express the implicit eﬀect of union
status on annual outcomes. This issue does not arise with estimating wage eﬀects because,
like union status, wage is defined at a point in time. However, it would apply to any flow
variables, including annual hours or annual earnings. Specification 3 gives the individual
fixed-eﬀect estimate:
 i(yit) = (0.5)  i(unionit) +  1 i(Fit) +  2 i(Xit) + 1s1t + i("it). (3.3)
9 Ideally, we would measure the share of each year spent in each union status. Ignoring covered non-
member status, suppose st measures the share of year t = 1, 2 a person spends working union in year-t
and Yu is the instantaneous flow of an outcome for each moment spent in union status u. The union eﬀect
is   ⌘ Y1   Y0. An observed outcome is Yt = Y0(1   st) + Y1(st). Let ut measure union status at the
end of year-t. Our fixed eﬀects analysis relates  Y ⌘ (Y2   Y1) to the observable  u ⌘ (u2   u1) 2
{ 1, 0, 1} but  Y really depends on latent  s ⌘ (s2   s1) 2 [ 1, 1]. Given persistence in jobs,  u and
 s should be positively correlated. To take a simple case, if there is no change in the year prior to the
first observation (s1 = u1 2 {0, 1}) and there is no more than a single change in u over the intervening
year, then the sign of  s equals the sign of  u but the magnitude of the change in treatment is overstated:
 s 2 [ 1, 0) ,  u =  1, s = 0 =  , and  s 2 (0, 1] ,  u = 1. An observed  Y generated by a
given true change in treatment  s but is attributed to a change in measured treatment  u with larger
magnitude. The estimated eﬀect will be attenuated to zero. Suppose that the switch occurs at a random,
uniformly-distributed time during the intervening year independent of (Y0, Y1), s ⇠ U [0, 1]. Conditional
on a change, the average magnitude of change is E|s2   s1| = 0.5, although E|u2   u1| = 1. Then,
 ˆ = E[ Y/ u] = E[ Y/2 s] = 0.5(E[ Y/ s]) = 0.5 . Are the assumptions of this case plausible?
Uniform s is natural. The realism of the assumption that people make no more than one switch in status
annually is diﬃcult to evaluate. Just over 90 percent of individuals in the sample have the same status at
the start and end of a year, consistent with a high degree of stability in status. Acknowledging that s1 =
0.9 if u1 = 1 and s1 = 0.1 if u1 = 0 would suggest amplifying the cross-sectional and longitudinal estimates
by another 25 percent, as 1/(0.9-0.1)=1.25.
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3.6 Results
We begin the regression analysis with NFI as the outcome. Specification 1 estimates that
union membership is associated with a $1,290 increase in NFI (Table 3.4: Top panel:
Column 1). The controls account for 42 percent of the $3,106 raw diﬀerence in union
versus non-union sample means but 58 percent of the diﬀerence remains. In specification
2, which includes a much more flexible control set, the estimated association falls by less
than 2 percent to $1,264. Though the standard error increases, from $92 in specification
1 to $138 in specification 2 due to the large fall in degrees of freedom from the flexible
controls, the association remain significant at the 1 percent level. Specification 3 gives the
individual fixed-eﬀect estimate. The estimated eﬀect of union membership on NFI here is
$540, significant at 5 percent.
Next, the NFI result is decomposed between taxes paid and benefits received, as reported
in the lower panels of Table 3.4. The logic of the analysis and the specifications used are the
same. Only the outcomes diﬀer. Union members pay about $1,174 more (average for spec-
ifications (1) and (2)) in taxes each year, according to the cross-sectional regressions. This
result is stable and highly significant statistically across both cross-sectional specifications.
The individual fixed eﬀect analysis yields an estimated union-membership eﬀect of $216
on annual taxes paid, though this is not statistically significant. Union members collect
$102 less (average for specifications (1) and (2)) in public benefits than observably-similar
nonunion workers though the results for Specification 2 is not statistically significant. In
the panel, the estimated eﬀect is larger: union membership reduces benefit received by $324
annually and this is significant at the 5-percent level. Whereas cross-sectional analysis sug-
gests NFI eﬀects are driven by more taxes paid, longitudinal analysis suggests a stronger
role for reductions in benefits received.
Presumably, union members pay more taxes and collect less public benefits because they
have higher incomes from private sources. Do we see evidence of this hypothesized channel
in the data? In the cross-sectional analysis, union members earn about $4,625 (average for
specifications (1) and (2)) more than nonunion workers. In the longitudinal analysis, the
estimated union eﬀect on income is $1,614. For this outcome, the fixed eﬀect estimate is
statistically significant at 1 percent, despite attenuation issues. Full estimates for all these
models are not reported.
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Because increased private income is the primary channel through which union mem-
bership increases tax payments and reduces public benefit receipt, our specifications for
taxes, public benefits and NFI exclude income as a control. Including it would overcontrol
(Wooldridge, 2005). This theory provides a testable implication: including private income
as a control should soak up much of the estimated “eﬀect” of union status. To investigate
this, we run our 3 specifications including polynomials of income as regressors. The logic
of this analysis is that the if income is indeed the channel taxes are increased and bene-
fits reduced for union members, then the coeﬃcient on union membership should decrease
substantially when private income is included in the regression. As Table 3.5 shows, this
is largely the case for NFI and income, but much less so for public-benefit receipt. The
first panel reproduces the results of our main specifications for reference. As NFI is a func-
tion of taxes paid and benefits received, we begin by looking at the results for taxes paid
before turning back to NFI. In all specifications, adding private income linearly reduces
the magnitude of the estimated union eﬀect and none of the estimates are significant. Tax
schedules are not linear functions of income, so the lower panels show estimated union eﬀect
coeﬃcients when higher-order polynomial terms of private income are added to allow more
flexibility in the relationship. The estimates remain much smaller than those excluding
income, although the cross-sectional specifications yield statistically-significant estimates.
In all cases, the fixed eﬀect estimate is not significant. These results support the fact that
income is a main driver of higher tax payments, on average, for those in unions.
The results for benefits do not exhibit this pattern entirely. The specification-1 estimates
drop in magnitude and significance, consistent with the theory. However, estimates in
specifications 2 and 3 do not change substantively with the addition of private income
terms, providing some evidence against the theory. Alternatively, it may be a spurious result
driven by a long lag in public-benefit changes as income changes. Certainly, individuals
have incentives to reduce tax liabilities immediately but to delay loss of benefits as long as
possible.
The NFI results follow the tax results and largely confirm the theory. Diﬀerences in
private income associated with union membership largely explain the association between
union membership and NFI that is observed when private income is excluded.
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3.7 Heterogeneous eﬀects: sector and education
Union membership may have diﬀerent eﬀects for public-sector workers than private-sector
workers for various reasons. Union membership rates diﬀer dramatically between the sec-
tors. Union members now comprise about 7 percent of private-sector workers but about 35
percent of public-sector workers (Hirsch and Macpherson, 2003).
To examine whether the relationship between union membership and outcomes are
stronger in certain subgroups, we generalize specification 1 by interacting all of its coeﬃ-
cients with an indicator for public-sector. Our results (Table 3.6: top panel) show that the
eﬀect of union membership is statistically diﬀerent between public and private sector work-
ers for all outcomes. Union members are estimated to earn $1,769 more in private income
than similar nonunion workers in the public sector. Among workers in the private sector,
union members enjoy a much larger advantage, earning $6,192 more than similar non-union
workers. The estimated diﬀerence in the union coeﬃcient between sectors is a practically
and statistically significant $4,223. Consistent with this, union membership has a much
larger association on taxes paid in the private sector than the public sector. Somewhat
surprisingly, the reduction in public-benefits received associated with union membership
is larger in the public sector than the private sector. It is statistically significant in each
sector. Following the tax result, the positive association of union membership with NFI is
larger in the private sector than the public sector.
We also look at diﬀerent eﬀects among workers with diﬀerent education levels, in par-
ticular workers with a college degree versus those without a college degree. In theory, we
would expect union-membership eﬀects to be more pronounced for those with lower lev-
els of education than those with higher education. We find evidence in support of this.
Among college graduates, union members have $2,724 more in private income than similar
non-union workers. The union diﬀerence is $5,541 among those with no college degree.
Union membership does not relate to public-benefits received among college grads but it
does among those without a college degree. The eﬀects are also larger on taxes paid and
NFI among those without a college degree than among those with.
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3.8 Beyond workers
The propensity to remain employed may diﬀer by union-membership status, which might
bias the analysis towards the results we found. Suppose union companies were more likely
to go out of business than other companies and, so, throw a higher share of employees
into unemployment or out of the labor force, and onto public benefits and into lower tax
liabilities. These kinds of workers would fall out of our main sample due to the sample-
inclusion requirement that workers be employed in both periods. Unionization would, by
this channel, have a negative impact on taxes paid, positive impact on benefits received,
and negative impact on NFI but this channel would be hidden from our main analysis. This
section develops relevant evidence.
First, we measure the relative propensity of union workers and non-union workers to
transition into unemployment and out of the labor force, which is partitioned into either
in school (and not working) or idle. Table 3.7 presents transition probabilities of the full
sample. Contrary to the concern, transitions into unemployment and out of the labor force,
into either idleness or school, are more likely for non-union workers than for union workers.
For instance, union workers in one year have a 1.4 percent chance of being unemployed 12
months later. Nonunion workers have a 2.1 percent chance.
Second, we expand the sample to include all people older than 18 and estimate models
that add indicators for unemployed, in school, and idle in addition to employed union,
leaving employed nonunion as the omitted category. Summary statistics for all outcomes
and predictors by status are presented in Appendix Table B.3. The regression results,
presented in Table 3.8, corroborate our main findings and are, in most cases, stronger.
The estimated coeﬃcient of union membership on NFI is about $1,534 in specification 2
and $976 in the individual fixed eﬀect model, higher than the original sample ( $1,300 and
$540, respectively). Estimated union eﬀects on taxes paid are higher in this sample as
well and here all are statistically significant. In the original sample, the individual fixed
eﬀect estimate was about $200 but not statistically significant. In this extended sample,
the individual fixed eﬀect estimate is nearly double ( $400). Estimated eﬀects on benefits
received are also nearly twice as much in this extended sample. The individual fixed eﬀect
estimate was about -$325 in the main sample but is -$565 in the extended sample. Finally,
for private income, we see similar union premiums in our main and extended samples.
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The eﬀects for those not working follow expected patterns. As compared to non-union
workers, those who are unemployed, idle, or in school have negative NFI, pay less in taxes,
receive more public benefits and earn less in private income. These results are robust to all
3 specifications.
3.9 Displaced Worker Survey
One of the advantages of using a linked-CPS sample is the ability to link to the Displaced
Worker Survey (DWS). This sample focuses only on individuals who report being displaced
from a prior job as a result of a plant or firm closure in the prior three years. Their current
outcomes, current employment and union status, and union status at the job from which
they were displaced, are observable. With only current outcomes measured, only a cross-
sectional model can be estimated. Further, this sample is much smaller, containing only
2,823 workers. Despite these limitations, it oﬀers a diﬀerent cut at the problem. Specifically,
we run:
yit =  1(union)it +  21(union in prior job)it +  1Fit +  2Xit + 1s1t + "it. (3.4)
This is similar to specification 1, except it adds a control for union status in a prior
job and is limited to individuals who found a job in the prior 3 years after being laid
oﬀ for reasons outside their control. For these reasons, the identifying assumption that
unobservable influences are conditionally mean independent of current union status may be
more credible here than in the main analysis. As Table 3.9 shows, the coeﬃcients all have
the same sign as in specification 1 of the main analysis and are all larger in magnitude. The
sample size is almost 100 times smaller and the standard errors are much larger. Estimates
on NFI, taxes paid, and private income are all still statistically significant but that on
benefits received is not. Additional robustness analysis is discussed in the appendix.
3.10 Social Security
One of the tax components included in our analysis is payroll taxes (i.e. Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA)). However, this particular tax has a delayed benefit and thus
poses a particular problem for this analysis. In particular, the amount of benefit received
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in retirement age is generally a function of the wages earned but this function is not a
one-to-one relationship. Even though union workers tend to earn higher wages, the net
value of retirement contributions and retirement benefits received is uncertain. Therefore,
as it relates to the present study, it is unclear whether payroll taxes bias taxes paid upward.
Ideally, we would have a net present value measure of future retirement benefits received
and this value would be included in the benefits received.
As a simple test, we exclude FICA contributions from taxes paid and re-run the main
set of regressions. Table 3.10 presents the results. The coeﬃcients all have the same sign
as in the main analysis but the change in NFI (individual fixed eﬀect model) is no longer
statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients
for NFI and taxes are reduced. The coeﬃcients of benefits received and private income
do not change. Future research will more carefully consider the role of current FICA
contributions and future benefit receipts.
3.11 Discussion
The analysis provides strong, though not completely robust, evidence that, at the employee
level, union membership has a large, positive eﬀect on net fiscal impact. Union members
appear to pay more every year in federal, state, and local taxes than do similar non-
union workers, which is connected to the fact that they earn thousands more dollars in
annual private income on average. Furthermore, union members appear to receive less in
public benefits. Aggregating across NFI components and measuring NFI at the individual
level, we observe that union members contributed on average $1,300 more per year to the
public balance sheet than similar non-union workers. The fixed-eﬀect estimate is smaller in
magnitude, union membership causes an additional $540 more per year in NFI, but points
to the same substantive conclusion. If one accepts the conditions laid out in Freeman
(1984), we have bounded a causal NFI estimate between these. Though the prevalence
of unionization is declining, this evidence suggests that nearly 15 million American union
members are contributing an average of between $900 and $1,300 more annually to the
public balance sheet than they would otherwise be. To our knowledge, this is the first
analysis focusing on or quantifying this eﬀect of unions.
This worker-level analysis ignores other channels by which union membership might
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aﬀect NFI. However, available evidence allows discussion and approximation of some other,
potentially-important channels. To achieve a full accounting of the net fiscal impact of
unionization, one must understand from where the higher, private compensation of union
members derives. Lee and Mas (2012) estimate that unionization reduces firm equity by
10 percent, implying a 10 percent reduction in the stream of future profits or stream of
payments to equity owners. As Lee and Mas (2012) discuss, this 10 percent reduction
is composed of two parts: a change in the overall size of the pie and a change in the
way the pie is split. The former is the reduction in organizational productivity (p). The
latter is the change in labor’s share of surplus (s). A 10 percent reduction in profits is
consistent with any combination such that  p   s = -10. Lee and Mas (2012) assume
that unionization triggers an 8 percent wage premium for labor (s=8) and a negative 2
percent impact on productivity (p=2). However, their data is consistent with other (p, s)
combinations. Consider the implications of these two channels separately.
For any given level of p, consider an increase in labor’s share (s). Organizations are
assemblages of workers and capital aimed at producing value. After consumer surplus is
deducted and suppliers are paid, the enterprise’s surplus must be divided among labor and
capital. For a given level of productivity, unions shift the distribution of an organization’s
surplus towards workers and away from investors.10 So, the overall net fiscal impact
should account for the fact that each extra dollar in union members’ earnings coming
through this channel implies a dollar less in shareholder earnings. The question becomes
what is the diﬀerence between the NFI of the marginal dollar in workers’ pockets compared
to the NFI of the marginal dollar in investors’ and managers’ pockets.
First, the eﬀects of unionization on worker taxes paid and benefits received should be
oﬀset by changes in associated impacts among firm owners. For a back-of-the-envelope
estimate, we turn to estimates of marginal eﬀective tax rates and compliance rates. The
marginal federal tax rate on capital income from large C-Corporations businesses is 35 per-
cent. It seems reasonable to assume that the cost of public benefits used by shareholders
will not be aﬀected, as ownership of companies is concentrated among those unlikely to
be on social safety programs. The average eﬀective marginal federal tax rates on low- and
moderate-income workers’ income is 31 percent, including changes in both taxes paid and
10 Our analysis accounts for eﬀects of unionization via diﬀerences in the distribution of wage and salary
income among employees.
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benefits received (U.S. Congressional Budget Oﬃce, 2014).11 These eﬀective marginal
tax rates should be adjusted for diﬀerential noncompliance. Only 1 percent of labor income
is lost to noncompliance, while approximately 10 percent of business and corporate income
goes untaxed due to noncompliance (U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 2012). It is worth not-
ing that our estimates derived from the microdata over the study period are very consistent
with this 31 percent estimates. In the fixed eﬀect estimates (Table 3.2: specification 3),
unionization caused a $1,614 increase in private income and a $540 increase in NFI, sug-
gesting a 33 percent eﬀective marginal rate. The cross-sectional estimate in specification
2 suggests a 28 percent rate. Marginal tax federal revenue approximately equal from both
sources: marginal revenue from labor income = 0.99*0.31 = 0.307 ⇡ 0.90*0.350 = 0.315 =
marginal revenue from capital income. From these calculations, to the extent that union-
ization aﬀects only income distribution within the firm, the net fiscal impact on workers of
unionization appears approximately fully oﬀset by reduced taxes paid by firm owners. The
pie-splitting channel appears to be a wash.
Now, hold share fixed and consider the case where unionization changes productivity.
Unionization may cause some ceteris paribus boost to labor productivity (Freeman and
Medoﬀ, 1984; Sojourner et al., 2015). On the other hand, if it lowered productivity, this
would generate real economic cost with negative fiscal impact through many channels.
Changes in on-the-job productivity are only partly reflected in the analysis. Changes in
productivity that aﬀect workers’ earnings holding employer fixed are reflected.
Our comparisons between similar individuals in the same state-year considers only chan-
nels involving labor-management bargaining that changes the creation and distribution of
value within organizations. However, unions have fiscal impacts through policy channels
as well. For instance, organized labor often advocates for larger public budgets, higher
tax rates on higher-income individuals and corporations, and more generous social safety
nets. In addition to influence exerted through political action, working-class legislators have
diﬀerent policy preferences than other legislators (Carnes, 2012, 2013) and unionization in-
creases the likelihood of working people holding elected oﬃce (Sojourner, 2013). Brady,
Baker and Finnigan (2013) provide that states with higher levels of unionization have more
generous public-benefit programs for the working poor and lower rates of working poor.
11 Frandsen (2012) finds little eﬀect of unionization on earnings above the 20th percentile of earnings.
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Table 3.1: Union-status transition joint frequencies and probabilities
Status in year t+ 1
Status in year t Union member Non-Union




Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015.
Notes: Cell frequencies and row percentages reported.
Sample includes the 120,953 individuals linked across
2 outgoing rotation groups and meeting sample inclu-
sion criteria in both waves: employed, non-student,
wage and salary workers aged at least 18 years with
non-imputed union status and no missing covariate or
outcome data.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for longitudinally-linked sample
Mean S.D. Min Max
Outcomes
Net fiscal impact $8,862.42 $14,326.50 -$46,140.16 $71,915.36
Taxes paid $10,289.70 $13,030.14 -$9,295.38 $71,915.36
Benefits received $1,427.28 $5,477.84 $0 $38,212.23
Private income $51,821.23 $36,378.42 -$17,434.94 $206,800.70
Treatment
1(union member) 0.15 0.00 1.00
Selected demographicsa
Number adults in family 2.08 0.91 1.00 12.00
Number of children 0-5 0.26 0.58 0.00 5.00
Number of children 6-18 0.60 0.93 0.00 11.00
Potential experience, years 22.81 11.97 0.00 76.50
Percent Marriedb 63.6% 0.00 1.00
Percent H.S. Degree or Equiv.b 32.5% 0.00 1.00
Percent College Degree or Moreb 29.1% 0.00 1.00
Part-Time Worker 12.3% 0.00 1.00
Public Sector - Federal 3.1% 0.00 1.00
Public Sector - Local 10.8% 0.00 1.00
Public Sector - State 5.5% 0.00 1.00
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: (a) set of demographic controls also
includes indicators of gender (2), race-ethnicity (4), foreign-born, metropolitan size (7), industry
(13), occupation (7). Sample includes 241,906 observations of 120,953 individuals employed over 2
consecutive years each without missing variables or imputed union status. (b) Controls for marital
status include 6 groups and educational status include 4 groups. All means are weighted using sample
weights and all dollar amounts are inflated to 2015 dollars.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for variables and underlying components in full sample, union
subsample and non-union subsample
Sample: All Union Non-union
Net fiscal impact 8862.4 11505 8398.5
(14326.5) (13304.0) (14448.8)
Taxes paid 10289.7 12635.2 9877.9
(13030.1) (12358.8) (13101.2)
Federal income tax liability before credits 5540.3 6446.4 5381.2
(13378.7) (13357.5) (13376.1)
State income tax liability before credits 1605.1 2051.3 1526.8
(3918.9) (3831.6) (3928.8)
Annual property taxes 1003.6 1251.9 960.1
(2138.0) (2208.8) (2122.4)
Social security retirement payroll deduction 3155.7 3451.6 3103.7
(2353.1) (2290.4) (2360.1)
Federal retirement payroll deduction 141.6 315.3 111.1
(1036.5) (1333.0) (972.0)
Earned income tax credit (-) 235.6 115.1 256.8
(888.9) (603.9) (928.4)
Additional child tax credit (-) 53.66 29.44 57.91
(329.3) (251.4) (340.9)
Child tax credit (-) 154.3 183 149.2
(549.1) (608.9) (537.7)
Credit received from making work pay (-) 45.14 43.68 45.40
(170.6) (170.0) (170.7)
Federal stimulus payment (-) 38.73 39.37 38.62
(221.4) (230.0) (219.9)
Income from public benefits 1427.3 1130.2 1479.4
(5477.8) (4922.3) (5568.0)
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 18.27 11.64 19.44
(421.1) (369.6) (429.5)
Welfare (public assistance) 14 5.99 15.40
(343.3) (205.4) (362.2)
Person market value of Medicare 1029.3 895.8 1052.8
(9588.6) (9169.3) (9660.1)
Person market value of Medicaid 1028.8 891.4 1053.0
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(9580.6) (9166.9) (9651.2)
Person value of food stamps 63.97 24.97 70.82
(464.0) (264.4) (490.4)
Person value of housing subsidy 2.39 1.627 2.524
(22.6) (17.6) (23.36)
Person value of school-lunch subsidy 57.08 41.22 59.87
(184.8) (145.6) (190.7)
Person value of energy subsidy 2.863 1.829 3.044
(40.8) (31.5) (42.21)
Educational assistance (beyond HS) 80.2 69.27 82.12
(1014.2) (890.5) (1034.4)
Social security 343.9 166.6 375.1
(2389.9) (1745.2) (2484.6)
Unemployment benefits 104 135.7 98.39
(1071.3) (1183.5) (1050.3)
Worker’s compensation 35.47 92.28 25.49
(788.3) (1345.0) (642.0)
Veteran’s benefits 63.25 69.88 62.08
(1258.6) (1171.7) (1273.2)
Disability benefits 23.1 35.31 20.96
(931.2) (1265.4) (859.2)
Survivor’s benefits 84.73 96.21 82.71
(2393.2) (2514.9) (2371.2)
Private income 51821.2 60338.7 50325.8
(36378.4) (30772.9) (37074.4)
Alimony 18.99 12.81 20.07
(666.0) (484.2) (693.0)
Non-farm business income 144.8 128.2 147.7
(3716.4) (3146.2) (3807.8)
Child support 164.7 154.8 166.4
(1406.7) (1356.1) (1415.3)
Dividends 278.4 235.9 285.9
(2555.9) (2011.9) (2639.8)
Farm 20.98 19.69 21.20
(1296.3) (1428.0) (1271.8)
Interest 385.3 400.9 382.5
(2714.9) (2400.2) (2766.5)
Income from other source not specified 21.23 25.3 20.52
(706.7) (614.5) (721.7)
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Rent 188.2 223.1 182.1
(3103.7) (3499.0) (3028.9)
Retirement 395.2 287.8 414.1
(3873.7) (3179.9) (3982.8)
Wage and salary income 47903.7 54553.7 46736.1
(47113.7) (35829.1) (48733.1)
Assistance from friends/relatives not in HH 23.69 20.96 24.17
(720.8) (622.0) (736.8)
Implied value of owner-occupied housing 4047.9 5030.9 3875.3
(5386.7) (5988.4) (5255.0)
Observations (individual-year) 241,906 36,098 205,808
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: Standard deviations
presented in parentheses. All means are weighted using sample weights and all dollar
amounts are inflated to 2015 dollars.
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Table 3.4: Estimates of conditional association of union-membership on four outcomes using
longitudinally-matched observations and various sets of conditioning variables
Specification: 1 2 3
Outcome: net fiscal impact
1(union member) 1289.8⇤⇤⇤ 1264.3⇤⇤⇤ 540.0⇤⇤
(91.5) (138.1) (254.4)
Outcome: taxes paid
1(union member) 1108.6⇤⇤⇤ 1240.2⇤⇤⇤ 216.3
(85.6) (129.7) (208.5)
Outcome: public benefits received
1(union member) -181.2⇤⇤⇤ -24.1 -323.7⇤⇤
(35.0) (47.1) (144.9)
Outcome: private income earned
1(union member) 4661.6⇤⇤⇤ 4588.0⇤⇤⇤ 1614.0⇤⇤⇤
(205.3) (302.3) (575.1)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes:
Coeﬃcient (within-individual, correlation-corrected SE). Signif-
icant at: *10 **5 ***1 percent level. 241,906 observations
of 120,953 individuals over 2 consecutive years each. Coef-
ficient estimates on 1(union member) are presented for each
{outcome}x{specification} regression model. All regressions are
weighted using sample weights and all dollar amounts are inflated
to 2015 dollars.
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Table 3.5: Estimated union-membership coeﬃcients when controlling for various functions of private income
Specification: 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Net fiscal impact Taxes paid Benefits received
Base Model
1(union 1289.8⇤⇤⇤ 1264.3⇤⇤⇤ 540.0⇤⇤ 1108.6⇤⇤⇤ 1240.2⇤⇤⇤ 216.3 -181.3⇤⇤⇤ -24.2 -323.7⇤⇤
member) (91.6) (138.1) (254.4) (85.6) (129.7) (208.5) (35) (47.1) (144.9)
Base Model + Income
1(union 71.5 91.9 143.7 -73.5 97.6 -163.7 -145.0⇤⇤⇤ 5.7 -307.4⇤⇤
member) (69.8) (113) (209) (61.5) (101.5) (155.6) (35) (47.2) (144.8)
Base Model + Income + Income2
1(union 219.1⇤⇤⇤ 184.4⇤ 171.7 166.6⇤⇤⇤ 252.7⇤⇤ -122.8 -52.5 68.3 -294.5⇤⇤
member) (70.3) (111.7) (208.8) (62) (99.9) (154.8) (34.9) (47.4) (144.6)
Base Model + Income + Income2 + Income3
1(union 237.8⇤⇤⇤ 200.4⇤ 178.7 204.7⇤⇤⇤ 280.4⇤⇤⇤ -110.4 -33.1 80.0⇤ -289.0⇤⇤
member) (70.4) (111.7) (208.8) (62) (99.4) (154.6) (34.9) (47.1) (144.4)
Base Model + Income + Income2 + Income3 + Income4
1(union 241.9⇤⇤⇤ 201.4⇤ 182.4 211.3⇤⇤⇤ 260.9⇤⇤⇤ -105.6 -30.7 59.6 -288.1⇤⇤
member) (70.4) (111.7) (208.7) (62) (99.6) (154.3) (34.9) (46.7) (144.4)
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: These models use the base models and three specifications from Table 3.4 but
add progressively adds controls for diﬀerent functional forms of income. Coeﬃcient (within-individual, correlation-corrected SE). Significant
at: *10 **5 ***1 percent level. 241,906 observations of 120,953 individuals over 2 consecutive years each. Coeﬃcient estimates on 1(union
member) are presented for each {outcome}x{specification} regression model. All regressions are weighted using sample weights and all
dollar amounts are inflated to 2015 dollars.
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Table 3.6: Estimated coeﬃcients by selected subsamples for Specification 1
Outcome: Net fiscal impact Taxes paid Benefits received Private income
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
1(union 510.7⇤⇤⇤ 1717.1⇤⇤⇤ 210.7 1619.6⇤⇤⇤ -300.0⇤⇤⇤ -97.5⇤⇤ 1769.4⇤⇤⇤ 6192.0⇤⇤⇤
member) (157.9) (114.1) (148.9) (104.2) (56.4) (43.4) (323.2) (292.1)
Diﬀerence -1206.5⇤⇤⇤ -1408.9⇤⇤⇤ -202.5⇤⇤⇤ -4422.5⇤⇤⇤
N 49,403 192,503 49,403 192,503 49,403 192,503 49,403 192,503
College No college College No college College No college College No college
1(union 741.4⇤⇤⇤ 1575.5⇤⇤⇤ 713.8⇤⇤⇤ 1358.7⇤⇤⇤ -27.7 -216.8⇤⇤⇤ 2723.6⇤⇤⇤ 5541.1⇤⇤⇤
member) (257.6) (98.2) (244.2) (90.8) (90.1) (38.6) (479.9) (238)
Diﬀerence -834.1⇤⇤⇤ -645.0⇤⇤ 189.1⇤ -2817.5⇤⇤⇤
N 47,283 194,623 47,283 194,623 47,283 194,623 47,283 194,623
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: These models use the base models from Table 3.4 but run the
regressions for the particular subsamples noted. Coeﬃcient (within-individual, correlation-corrected SE). Coeﬃcients and diﬀerences
between the subsample coeﬃcients 1(union member) significant at: *10 **5 ***1 percent level. 241,906 observations of 120,953
individuals over 2 consecutive years each. Coeﬃcient estimates on 1(union member) are presented for each {outcome}x{specification}
regression model. All regressions are weighted using sample weights and all dollar amounts are inflated to 2015 dollars.
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Table 3.7: Transitions including unemployed, idle, and in school
Status in t+1
Status in t Non-Union Union Unemp. Idle School Total
Non-Union 122,191 4,203 2,898 4,493 727 134,512
% 90.84 3.12 2.15 3.34 0.54 100
Union 3,925 14,327 272 446 19 18,989
% 20.67 75.45 1.43 2.35 0.1 100
Unemp. 2,840 255 1,851 1,341 93 6,380
% 44.51 4 29.01 21.02 1.46 100
Idle 3,762 225 931 73,237 337 78,492
% 4.79 0.29 1.19 93.31 0.43 100
In School 1,334 40 212 619 2,904 5,109
% 26.11 0.78 4.15 12.12 56.84 100
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: Cell frequencies and
row percentages reported. Sample includes the 243,482 individuals linked across 2
outgoing rotation groups and meeting sample inclusion criteria in both waves of being
at least 18 years with non-imputed union status and no missing covariate or outcome
data.
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Table 3.8: Results including idle, unemployed and in school
Specification: 1 2 3
Outcome: net fiscal impact
1(union member) 2006.6⇤⇤⇤ 1534.1⇤⇤⇤ 976.4⇤⇤⇤
(108.8) (134.5) (292.4)
1(unemployed) -5533.2⇤⇤⇤ -5935.9⇤⇤⇤ -745.8⇤⇤
(189.8) (245.5) (333.6)
1(idle) -6373.6⇤⇤⇤ -4338.5⇤⇤⇤ -1155.2⇤⇤⇤
(192.8) (237.1) (397.8)
1(in high school or college) -469.2⇤⇤ -3831.6⇤⇤⇤ -928.2⇤
(230.1) (307.9) (524.8)
Outcome: taxes paid
1(union member) 1513.9⇤⇤⇤ 1326.1⇤⇤⇤ 411.8⇤⇤
(83.5) (108.3) (187.8)
1(unemployed) -3282.7⇤⇤⇤ -3586.4⇤⇤⇤ -413.6⇤⇤
(106.3) (156.1) (196.8)
1(idle) -2473.3⇤⇤⇤ -1876.7⇤⇤⇤ -214.6
(110.8) (174.8) (219.8)
1(in high school or college) -1026.6⇤⇤⇤ -2409.7⇤⇤⇤ -998.0⇤⇤⇤
(122.9) (180.9) (219.6)
Outcome: public benefits received
1(union member) -492.7⇤⇤⇤ -208.0⇤⇤⇤ -564.6⇤⇤
(62.9) (70.9) (220.2)
1(unemployed) 2250.5⇤⇤⇤ 2349.5⇤⇤⇤ 332.2
(131.8) (169.7) (261.4)
1(idle) 3900.3⇤⇤⇤ 2461.9⇤⇤⇤ 940.6⇤⇤⇤
(145.6) (164.0) (335.0)
1(in high school or college) -557.4⇤⇤⇤ 1421.9⇤⇤⇤ -69.8
(179.1) (249.9) (480.8)
Outcome: private income earned
1(union member) 6541.9⇤⇤⇤ 5571.0⇤⇤⇤ 2094.4⇤⇤⇤
(198.1) (244.6) (534.8)
1(unemployed) -17644.6⇤⇤⇤ -18258.9⇤⇤⇤ -2638.0⇤⇤⇤
(403.3) (540.5) (625.2)
1(idle) -14093.6⇤⇤⇤ -10858.0⇤⇤⇤ -2130.4⇤⇤⇤
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(338.8) (474.8) (711.6)
1(in high school or college) -7514.4⇤⇤⇤ -14207.1⇤⇤⇤ -7112.6⇤⇤⇤
(385.3) (488.0) (762.4)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: Coeﬃcient
(within-individual, correlation-corrected SE). Significant at: *10 **5 ***1
percent level. 486,964 observations of 243,482 individuals over 2 consecutive
years each. Coeﬃcient estimates on 1(union member) are presented for each
{outcome}x{specification} regression model. All regressions are weighted
using sample weights and all dollar amounts are inflated to 2015 dollars.
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Table 3.9: Results using Displaced Worker Survey supplement of CPS
Outcome: Net Fiscal Impact Taxes Paid Benefits Received Private Income
Current Union 2939.4⇤⇤ 2646.5⇤⇤ -293.0 8028.6⇤⇤
Member (1343.1) (1208.2) (575.2) (3119.2)
Prior Union 701.5 448.4 -253.1 1744.1
Member (1194.4) (1056.7) (541.7) (2637.7)
Source: CPS-Displaced Worker Survey (1996,1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014),
CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: Coeﬃcient (within-individual, correlation-corrected SE). Significant at:
*10 **5 ***1 percent level. 5,646 observations of 2,823 individuals over 2 consecutive years each.
Coeﬃcient estimates on current union member and prior union membership are presented for each
outcome. Controls include family and individual characteristics as well as state-year fixed eﬀects. All
regressions are weighted using sample weights and all dollar amounts are inflated to 2015 dollars.
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Table 3.10: Results excluding FICA contributions
Specification: 1 2 3
Outcome: net fiscal impact
1(union member) 930.9⇤⇤⇤ 905.6⇤⇤⇤ 364.8
(84.6) (129.4) (238.0)
Outcome: taxes paid
1(union member) 749.7⇤⇤⇤ 881.4⇤⇤⇤ 41.0
(78.0) (120.1) (189.0)
Outcome: public benefits received
1(union member) -181.2⇤⇤⇤ -24.1 -323.7⇤⇤
(35.0) (47.1) (144.9)
Outcome: private income earned
1(union member) 4661.6⇤⇤⇤ 4588.0⇤⇤⇤ 1614.0⇤⇤⇤
(205.3) (302.3) (575.1)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes:
Coeﬃcient (within-individual, correlation-corrected SE). Signif-
icant at: *10 **5 ***1 percent level. 241,906 observations
of 120,953 individuals over 2 consecutive years each. Coef-
ficient estimates on 1(union member) are presented for each
{outcome}x{specification} regression model. All regressions are
weighted using sample weights and all dollar amounts are inflated
to 2015 dollars.
Chapter 4
Assessing the eﬀect of E-Verify
mandates on employment
4.1 Introduction
Immigration reform is a timely and important policy issue in the United States. As of 2015,
according to the best estimates available, there were slightly over 11 million unauthorized
immigrants living in the U.S. which represents a significant increase relative to the estimated
3 million unauthorized immigrants in the early 1990s (Warren, 2017; Warren and Warren,
2013; Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013).1 To date, policymakers continue to
push comprehensive immigration reform to curtail the number of unauthorized immigrants.
The electronic employment verification system, known as E-Verify, is widely considered
an important component of immigration reform. As immigration reform continues to be
debated at a national level, any law that requires mandatory employment verification would
only increase the use of E-Verify.
Lacking federal action, states have passed laws requiring the use of E-Verify to certain
employers, some to all, and some states have even made it illegal to use E-Verify at all.
This state-by-state variation in the implementation of E-Verify has been used to analyze
the policy’s eﬀect on various outcomes. Indeed, the variation allows the direct test of its




eﬀectiveness since the explicit goal of the E-verify program is to “reduce unauthorized em-
ployment without undue burden on employers or contributing to discrimination” (Westat,
2009). Therefore, the first-order eﬀect of the policy is that of the employment of unau-
thorized immigrants. Do these mandates reduce the employment levels of unauthorized
immigrants? An answer in the aﬃrmative would be evidence of the policy’s eﬀectiveness.
A second-order eﬀect is how the employment levels of authorized immigrants and native-
born workers change as a result of these mandates. An indirect eﬀect studied in this paper
is how the E-Verify mandates aﬀect the population of unauthorized immigrants. Stricter
immigration enforcement policies should decrease the size of the unauthorized population.
Since the population of unauthorized immigrants has been falling since 2008 and E-Verify
mandates have been increasing concurrently, it is a natural extension to analyze the role of
these mandates on the changes in unauthorized immigrant populations.
The growing literature exploiting this variation highlights an important methodological
issue. Economic research related to unauthorized immigrants relies on some representative
definition for unauthorized immigrants. The most popular definition researchers have used
is that of “Hispanic, non-citizen, young working-age (under 45) individuals with a high
school education or less” citing the work of Passel and Cohn (2010), arguing that this
a “group workers previously shown to be a very good representation of the most likely
unauthorized” (Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak, 2014). A central question of this paper is:
How representative is this group for unauthorized immigrants? That is, does this particular
group of Hispanics represent a random sample of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S.? The
definition fits well into the common media portrayal of who is unauthorized but, as the data
will show, does not capture the full distribution of unauthorized immigrants’ educational,
country of birth, or geographical choice of living. The representativeness of this definition
has two direct practical implications. On one hand, showing that the misclassification error
associated with this definition is negligible will highlight the need to make available data
on likely unauthorized immigrants to the broader research community. On the other hand,
finding evidence supporting the use of this definition gives more substantial evidence for
continuing to do so. As a benchmark, this paper uses data from the “logical edit” method
of identifying likely unauthorized immigrants in microdata. While this method is also a
proxy measure for unauthorized immigrants, it is widely considered the most reliable data
115
on unauthorized immigrants in the U.S.
This paper adds to the literature in two ways. First, this paper directly assesses the rep-
resentativeness of working-age Hispanics with low-levels of education relative to the “logical
edit” method. Second, given that existing papers use data up to December 2012 and half
of the enactment dates for universal E-Verify mandates are in 2012 (four of eight states),
this paper uses data through 2014 to account for any potential lag in the eﬀects of E-Verify
on employment. This paper proceeds as follows. First, the paper gives an overview of
the E-Verify program and the research related to its impact of various outcomes. Second,
the paper provides a general overview of the diﬀerent methods for identify likely unautho-
rized immigrants. Third, the paper presents descriptive evidence on the diﬀerences between
the typical definitions of unauthorized immigrants and the full population of unauthorized
immigrants. Fourth, the paper gives direct evidence on the representativeness of typical def-
initions for unauthorized immigrants by analyzing the eﬀect of E-Verify on population size.
Fifth, the paper focuses on the role of E-Verify on employment. The paper concludes with
a discussion of the results and proposes various practical options for researchers studying
unauthorized immigrants.
4.2 E-Verify
As the Department of Homeland Security explains “E-Verify is an Internet-based system
that compares information from an employee’s Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verifica-
tion, to data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Social Security Adminis-
tration records to confirm employment eligibility.” Employers can voluntary enroll in the
E-Verify program but, unless the employer conducts their business in a state with an E-
Verify mandate, there is no requisite that the employer do so. In 2017, E-Verify was used
nationwide by more than 700,000 employers of all sizes and was joined by about 1,400 new
participating companies every week. Since E-Verify was launched at a nationwide scale,
the number of participating employers had grown nearly thirty-fold (from about 25,000 in
2007 to about 700,000 in 2017) (Citizenship and Services, 2014).
Form I-9 is used for verifying the identity and employment authorization of individ-
uals hired for employment in the United States. All U.S. employers must ensure proper
completion of Form I-9 for each individual they hire for employment in the United States.
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However, an employer does not necessarily need to check whether the information on the I-9
is legitimate unless the employer is a federal contractors or they work in a state that man-
dates E-Verify use. The key innovation of the E-Verify program is that it allows employers
to compare the I-9 information of a new worker via an online platform to information from
the Social Security Administration and the Department of Homeland Security. Thus, in
theory, an employer can positively identify unauthorized immigrants.
Using the E-Verify program has become simpler and faster for employers to use. Within
three days of a newly hired worker starting their job, the employer must take the Form I-9
information and submit the information to the E-Verify webpage, thus creating a “case” for
the new employee. Two outcomes are possible. First, which is the case for the vast majority
of new employees, the result is “Employment Authorized” and is confirmed within seconds
or, in some cases, up to 24 hours. For 98.82 percent of over 8 million cases in fiscal year
quarter 1 of 2017 (October 2016 through December 2016), the new employee was automat-
ically confirmed. In these cases, the employer and employee are free to continue business
as usual. A second possible outcome is a “Tentative Nonconfirmation” which means that
the Form I-9 information does not match the SSA and/or DHS records. In this case, the
employee has the option to appeal the result within eight days and must contact the SSA or
DHS to resolve the issue. In 2016, 1.18 percent of employees received these “Tentative Non-
confirmations” and only 0.16 percent (or 13.5 percent of all “Tentative Nonconfirmations”)
were able to reconcile the mismatch and receive their “Employment Authorized”. The re-
maining 1.02 percent (or 86.5 percent of all “Tentative Nonconfirmations”) were found to
be not work authorized. In these cases, the employer must terminate employment though,
in many cases, the worker walks away from the job on their own (Citizenship and Services,
2014).
Table 4.1 lists the 21 states who have enacted legal status verification mandates by
their date of adoption, date of implementation and the sectors the mandate aﬀects (see
Figure 4.1 for a map of these states). Seven states have enacted universal mandates that
require all employers to use E-Verify on all new employees while two states (Colorado and
Tennessee) require that employee verify the legal status of new hires but not necessarily
through the E-Verify program. Twelve have enacted mandates that aﬀect employers in the
public sector or that contract with the state. The implementation dates of more than half
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of the universal E-Verify mandates begin in 2012. If there is a lag in the eﬀect, the impact
of the mandate may not take eﬀect until after 2012. In order to address this lag, when
analyzing the eﬀect of E-Verify on employment, data up to December 2014 is used.
4.3 Basic theory and empirical evidence
4.3.1 Theory
From a theoretical standpoint, E-Verify mandates have various labor market eﬀects that
vary by the immigration status of workers. In this section, the focus will be on the theoreti-
cal eﬀects of E-Verify mandates on employment and wages in states with universal E-Verify
mandates. Beginning with unauthorized workers, the most straightforward prediction is
that their labor demand should fall. Labor demand decreases as the employers face higher
employment costs. Most directly, demand for unauthorized labor declines as a result of
better information on the authorization status of employees. Since it is illegal to hire unau-
thorized workers, it follows that knowing with certainty that a worker is unauthorized will
decrease the demand for those workers as employers face an increased likelihood of sanc-
tions/penalties for hiring such workers. Secondly, employment costs increase as a result of
tentative nonconfirmations. Recall that employers have three days to start an E-Verify case
for a new employee. Furthermore, after these days, for these tentative nonconfirmations,
there are an additional eight days for workers to redress the nonconfirmation. As a result,
employers who hire unauthorized workers incur these transaction costs in the form of the
cost of training the unauthorized worker for the time they were employed and having to
find another person to hire.
The labor supply of unauthorized workers should also decline as the E-Verify mandates
make it more diﬃcult for unauthorized workers to gain employment. Moreover, if unau-
thorized workers end up migrating to states with no E-Verify mandates, then the labor
supply will decline further. As a result, the employment of unauthorized workers should
theoretically fall because of a decline in both labor supply and demand. The eﬀect on
wages, however, will depend on the elasticity of supply and demand for unauthorized work-
ers. Assuming that some employers continue to hire unauthorized workers, as a result of
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noncompliance or fraud, then, all else equal, the decreased labor supply alone of unautho-
rized workers would result in higher wages for these workers. However, because of the lower
demand for these unauthorized workers, the overall wage change will depend on the relative
elasticities of the labor demand and supply.
E-Verify mandates also aﬀect the employment and wages of authorized workers. In
general, since universal E-Verify mandates aﬀect all employers, the costs associated with
E-Verify use could drop the demand for all workers. This drop in demand would likely be
most pronounced in sectors that employ higher shares of unauthorized immigrants since
these are likely to be the employers that face higher numbers of “tentative nonconfirma-
tions.”2 Other subgroups of workers will be aﬀected diﬀerently. For those workers who
are near substitutes for unauthorized workers, there should be an increase in demand and,
since the labor supply should remain largely unaﬀected, their employment and wages should
rise as well. However, an unintended consequence of the higher costs associated with “ten-
tative nonconfirmations” is that employers may begin to discriminate against those they
perceive as likely to be unauthorized. Thus, the increase in employment and wages for
this substitute group of authorized workers may be tempered by this discrimination eﬀect.
Overall employment in states with E-Verify mandates should decrease as the overall labor
supply and overall labor demand fall. Once again, the overall wage eﬀect will depend on
the elasticities of labor demand and supply. As many of the eﬀects of E-Verify mandates,
particularly the eﬀect on wages, are ambiguous, the literature has focused on empirically
measuring the impact of E-Verify mandates.
It should be noted that the explicit purpose of E-Verify mandates is to reduce the num-
ber of employed unauthorized immigrants in those states. Therefore, empirical evidence
showing a decline in the employment of unauthorized immigrants is evidence of the pro-
gram’s and mandates’ eﬀectiveness. On the other hand, evidence that the mandates lead
to adverse eﬀects for authorized workers undermine the mandates’ eﬀectiveness.
2 Stark and Jakubek (2012) construct a model demonstrating that once sanctions are set high enough
for firms hiring unauthorized workers, the firm will shift resource towards verifying the legality of employees.
This in turn reduces production eﬃciency and thus the returns to labor (i.e. wages) of native workers.
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4.3.2 Empirical evidence
The literature on E-Verify mandates has grown substantially in the past years, covering not
only the eﬀects on employment and wages but also on outcomes as varied as population
changes, foreign direct investment (see Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak and Zebedee (2015)),
migratory experiences of individual immigrants (see Amuedo-Dorantes, Puttitanun and
Martinez-Donate (2013)), the inflow of native workers (see Good (2012)), and the use of
the temporary agricultural program (H2A) (see Henry (2015)). To narrow the focus, this
section will review the literature’s findings on E-Verify mandates’ eﬀect on employment and
wages as well the methodology these papers use for identifying unauthorized immigrants.
On this latter point, it will be shown that the best way to address the representativeness of
unauthorized immigrants is to focus on the eﬀect of E-Verify mandates on the population
of unauthorized immigrants.
The literature generally demonstrates mixed results on the employment and wages of
unauthorized workers. Two papers have looked at these eﬀects. Amuedo Dorantes and
Bansak (2014) find that universal E-Verify mandates reduce the likelihood of employment
of likely unauthorized workers while raising the wages of likely unauthorized women. They
find no statistically significant eﬀect on the wages of likely unauthorized men. In contrast,
Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) find no statistically significant eﬀect on the likelihood of
employment of likely unauthorized workers but find that the wages of likely unauthorized
men fall as a result of universal E-Verify mandates. Regarding authorized workers, the
two papers also demonstrate mixed results. Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014) find no
eﬀect on the group of substitute labor (naturalized Hispanic immimgrants) while Orrenius
and Zavodny (2015) find that employment rises for this group. These mixed results are
inherently the focus of the current paper.
Two potential methodological issues may underlie the reason for this discrepancy.3
First, though the data for both papers come from the Basic Monthly Current Population
Surveys, the timeframes span diﬀerent years. Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014) use
data from January 2004 to December 2011 while Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) use the same
data set but from January 2002 to December 2012. This diﬀerent time horizon implies that
3 The two papers also diﬀer in the empirical methodology. Both use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach
with slightly diﬀerent controls.
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Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014) include fewer states that passed universal E-Verify
laws (only four states have implementation dates before December 2011) and thus the
studies do not study the same states. Importantly, though this point may not explain the
diﬀering results, it is important to note that both Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014)
and Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) have short post-enactment periods for most universal
E-Verify mandating states. Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014) do not include half of all
universal E-Verify states while Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) include all these states but
four of them (Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina) have implementation
dates in 2012. The present study will test whether E-Verify mandates are sensitive to the
length of post-enactment periods.
Second, the definition of likely unauthorized diﬀers between the two papers.4 Orre-
nius and Zavodny (2015) define likely unauthorized as immigrants “who have at most a high
school diploma, are from Mexico, and are not naturalized citizens” (p. 952). Amuedo Do-
rantes and Bansak (2014) use a slightly diﬀerent definition: Hispanic, non-citizens of
working-age (under 45), with a high school education or less. Indeed, the definition of
likely unauthorized in the E-Verify literature as a whole is not uniform. In a separate
paper, Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) extend their definition to include immigrants from
Central America but focus on immigrants age 20-54. Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2015)
and Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2013) use the same definition as Amuedo Dorantes and
Bansak (2014) (i.e. working age Hispanics with low levels of education).
This methodological issue is a key focus of the present study. Finding a group of immi-
grants that is most likely to be aﬀected by E-Verify mandates can reveal the eﬀect subgroup
of all unauthorized immigrants but may not necessarily be reflective of the overall eﬀect the
policy has on all unauthorized immigrants. In other words, are a subgroup of immigrants
that are extremely likely to be unauthorized reflective of the entire population of unau-
thorized immigrants? What eﬀect is being measured given this definition of unauthorized
immigrants? Future sections of this paper will go into more depth regarding the definition
of likely unauthorized immigrants as well as provide direct evidence of how the definition
of unauthorized immigrants matters for policy analysis. Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) look
4 Pia Orrenius mentioned at the PAA Annual Meeting in San Diego that they updated their definition
to include all Hispanics and that this change reconciled the diﬀerence between their paper and Amuedo Do-
rantes and Bansak (2014).
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at how universal E-Verify mandates aﬀect the population size of unauthorized immigrants
(using the definition of working-age Mexican and Central Americans with low education)
and find that the mandates reduce the number of likely unauthorized.5 Importantly, they
use the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2005 through 2014. As will be shown, the
ACS provides the most reliable benchmark for comparing definitions of likely unauthorized
immigrants.
4.4 Identifying likely unauthorized immigrants
The fundamental problem in identifying unauthorized immigrants in microdata is that there
exists no survey that specifically asks the authorization status of an immigrant and that is
also nationally-representative and continuously updated. Bachmeier, Van Hook and Bean
(2014) highlight seven diﬀerent publicly available surveys that include measure on legal
status but only one of these is designed to be nationally representative. Specifically, the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is a panel survey designed to be rep-
resentative of U.S. household and focuses on household income and program participation.
The 2004 panel includes 12 diﬀerent waves and the second wave includes detailed ques-
tions on citizenship. In this set of questions, foreign-born respondents describe their status
upon arrival as legal permanent resident, refugee/asylee, non-immigrant status (these are
typically tourists or students), or “other.” This final “other” category is considered to be
the unauthorized immigrant group. The drawback of these data is that the SIPP is not
designed for state-level analysis and, more importantly, sample of foreign-born respondents
is relatively small (Bachmeier, Van Hook and Bean (2014) cite 9,178 foreign-born persons
responding to the arrival status question) and thus makes sub-national analysis for this
subgroup even less reliable.6 Furthermore, while the SIPP includes potentially reliable
data on unauthorized immigrants, the public-use files lump the unauthorized immigrant
responses with those of refugees.. Thus, unless a researcher gains access to the restricted-
use data, the most reliable SIPP responses on unauthorized immigrants are not readily
available to researchers.
5 This finding is in line with Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael (2013) who found a significant reduction in
the proportion of the Arizona population that is foreign-born and in particular, that is Hispanic noncitizen.
6 The SIPP 2008 panel is representative for the 20 largest states.
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The other six surveys that include question on immigration status are not designed to
be nationally representative and are also temporally limited. Four of the surveys are limited
to smaller geographies and cover only short periods of time (i.e. Immigration and Intergen-
erational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA), Immigrant Second Generation
in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY), Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI)
and Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey (LAFANS)) (Bachmeier, Van Hook and
Bean, 2014). The other two surveys are national but focus on specific subgroups. The
National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) is nationally-representative of the agricul-
tural workforce while the National Asian American Survey (NAAS) looks only at Asian
Americans (Bachmeier, Van Hook and Bean, 2014). In sum, “surveys that have included
measures [of legal status] are limited by the fact they are typically relatively small, re-
gionally targeted, and/or focused on a particular subpopulation of immigrants” (Van Hook
et al., 2014).
Furthermore, even with these existing datasets, this is an a priori concern about signif-
icant underreporting by unauthorized immigrants. That is, how reliable are self-responses
from unauthorized immigrants? The literature on this topic is rather sparse but Bachmeier,
Van Hook and Bean (2014) provide evidence supporting the reliability of legal status mea-
sures. Using the SIPP and LAFANS, Bachmeier, Van Hook and Bean (2014) analyze the
non-response rates of legal status questions and show that these rates compare favorably
to other immigration-related questions. Specifically, they show that the non-response to
the legal status question is no higher than the non-response rates of year of immigration.
A second concern with legal status questions is that their presence alone will reduce the
response rates to surveys overall, a so-called “chilling eﬀect”. Bachmeier, Van Hook and
Bean (2014) also show that the attrition rates from wave to another are no higher for
unauthorized immigrants as they are for other subgroups. In all, even with some evidence
supporting the reliability of legal status measures, the issue comes full circle in that the
SIPP is not designed for sub-national analyses.
4.4.1 The “logical edit” method
Given that legal status questions are not available on the more popular datasets for economic
research (i.e. the Current Population Survey, (CPS) the American Community Survey
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(ACS), etc.), researchers have relied on diﬀerent strategies for imputing legal status in
these surveys. The most popular of these is the “logical edits” method which “have come to
be trusted and widely cited outside of academia” (Van Hook et al., 2014) but the “specific
details of the [logical edits] method are not publicly available” and thus are not easily
replicated by researchers (Van Hook et al., 2014).7 The development of the “logical edit”
methodology is key to understanding the data used in this paper.
Identifying unauthorized immigrants in microdata first requires knowing the total num-
ber of unauthorized immigrants residing in the U.S. Indeed, both the methodology and
researchers who developed the methodology are key to the development of the microdata
on unauthorized immigrants. The aggregate total was developed by Robert Warren and
Jeﬀrey Passel in 1987, documented in a paper titled “A Count of the Uncountable: Esti-
mates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census” (Warren and
Passel, 1987). It has subsequently been used for years by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to produce oﬃcial estimates on the unauthorized population. At its core,
measuring the total unauthorized population is based on the diﬀerence between the to-
tal foreign-born population to the legally resident foreign-born population (Warren and
Warren, 2013). The foreign-born population is estimated using larger government survey
such as the Decennial Census, the ACS or the CPS.8 The legal resident population re-
lies on data from DHS on legal permanent residents and non-immigrant residents (such as
students, tourists), and data on refugees from the Oﬃce of Refugee Resettlement. After
other adjustments for mortality, undercount, emigration and removals, the total number
of unauthorized immigrants is finalized. Because this methodology relies on the diﬀerence
between total immigrants and total authorized immigrants, the methodology is known as
7 These data, however, have never been evaluated for its reliability. Therefore, researchers have relied
on statistical imputations that use these aforementioned smaller surveys to impute legal status in larger
surveys. In an evaluation of these statistical imputation methods and a pseudo-“logical edits” method,
(Van Hook et al., 2014) show that only the statistical imputation methods produced unbiased results when
jointly observed with the given dependent variable. The “logical edits” method resulted in biased estimates
in all scenarios. While this last result would seem to condemn the use of “logical edits”, it is important to
note that (Van Hook et al., 2014) were not able to replicate the actual “logical edits” method and thus it
remains largely untested. In sum, though there is some indirect evidence against using the “logical edits”
method for large datasets such as the CPS and the ACS, the method continues to be the most widely cited.
Indeed, the direct evaluation of the “logical edits” method would be a worthwhile endeavor.
8 There are also various adjustment made for the assumed undercount of the foreign born population.
See Warren and Warren (2013) for a complete overview of the methodology.
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the “residual method.” Today, both Robert Warren and Jeﬀrey Passel produce separate
estimates of the total unauthorized population using similar methodologies.
The development of the “logical edit” microdata stems from the “residual method” and
both Passel and Warren have separately produced estimates using similar approaches (see
Warren (2014) and Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera (2013)). The starting point is the
fact that survey data includes foreign-born respondents that are both authorized and unau-
thorized (Warren, 2014). Using either the CPS or the ACS, all foreign-born respondents
are selected and then a series of “logical edits” remove those immigrants who are likely
authorized. There are seven major groups that are considered to be authorized immigrants:
1) all immigrants who arrived before 1980 (as they were all granted amnesty after IRCA in
1986), 2) occupations that require legal status (such as lawyers, judges and police), 3) legal
temporary migrants (such as students or tourists), 4) immediate relative of U.S. citizens,
5) those receiving public benefits, 6) immigrants age 60 or older at entry, and 7) being from
a refugee country.
After these edits, the resulting number of unauthorized immigrants is higher in aggre-
gate than the “residual method” estimate. To bring down this number, a random selection
step is implemented that ties the number of counted likely unauthorized immigrants to a set
of population controls that reflects the distribution of unauthorized immigrants by country
of origin. A final step adjusts the population weights to account for the lower response rate
of unauthorized immigrants to government surveys. The unauthorized immigrants identi-
fied here are more aptly called likely unauthorized immigrants. Though the totals match
the total unauthorized population, it is important to recall that the population controls are
tied to the totals from the residual method and, therefore, match by construction. In sum,
the methodologies for estimating the total number of unauthorized immigrants, the “resid-
ual method”, is closely tied to the “logical edit” method of identifying likely unauthorized
immigrants in microdata.
To be clear, the “logical edit” method does not capture the true authorization status of
an immigrant. Rather, it is a measure that captures those immigrants who a very likely
to be unauthorized and, when summed up to the population total, closely reflect the size
and composition of published estimates on unauthorized immigrants. Indeed, the “logical
edit” is a measure that is, by construction, error-prone. In the remainder of this paper, the
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“logical edit” will serve as a benchmark for previous results.
4.5 Data
Three diﬀerent datasets are used in this paper. To analyze the diﬀerent definitions of
unauthorized immigrants, the American Community Survey is used from 2005 through
2015 (Ruggles et al., 2015b). The ACS is the largest nationally-representative survey of
U.S households, surveying approximately 1 percent of household or about 3.5 million people
each year.9 Topics in the ACS are rather comprehensive, covering demographic, housing,
economic and social characteristics. Because of its breadth of topics and number of people
surveyed, the ACS is currently the dataset of choice for the “logical edit” microdata.
The second and third datasets come from the Current Population Survey. Specifi-
cally, the paper uses the Basic Monthly Current Population Survey files from January 2002
through December 2014 as well as the 2002 through 2014 Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (ASEC) (Ruggles et al., 2015a). The Basic Monthly CPS files are the source
of the employment statistics of the U.S. and, as its name suggests, are fielded monthly to
about 50 thousand households or 130 thousand people. The survey focuses primarily on
the labor force characteristics of respondents and asks a limited number of questions on
social and economic topics. In this paper, the Basic Monthly CPS files are used primarily
to compare results to previous literature. The ASEC has been conducted since the 1960s
and historically included detailed questions on the same sort of issues covered in the ACS.
In fact, before 2010, the ASEC was the basis of the “logical edit” method. Both the ACS
and ASEC are used to analyze the employment eﬀects of E-Verify mandates and to test
the reliability of the definitions for unauthorized immigrants.
This paper uses data from the “logical edit” method developed by Robert Warren.10
Indeed, the ACS data used in this paper contains the likely unauthorized flag for 2010
through 2015. Since access to the code was granted, this paper extends the code to cover
9 Beginning in 2005, the ACS replaced the decennial long-form, covering almost all of the topics covered
in the long-form. Each Decennial Census looks to enumerate all people living in the U.S. For most people,
the Census questionnaire contains a few questions (in 2010, the Census was 10 questions) focusing primarily
on age, sex, and race. Between 1970 and 2000, about 15 percent of households received the long-form.
10 The code for this flag was developed by the author as a consultant. The Center for Migration Studies
of New York houses the data and granted use of the data for this project.
126
back to the ACS 2005. Moreover, the code was then adapted for use in the ASEC, covering
back to 2002. Importantly, since a majority of the variables necessary for the imputation
of likely unauthorized flags are not available in the Basic Monthly CPS files, the code was
not adapted for the Basic Monthly files.11
4.6 Assessing the representativeness of unauthorized immi-
grants
The typical measure of unauthorized immigrants in the literature has been Hispanic, non-
citizen, young prime-aged (20-54 years) individuals with a high school education or less.
For simplicity, this measure will be referred to as “Hispanics with low-levels of education”
or H.L.E. Moreover, the “logical edits” population with be referred to as L.E. and used
interchangeably with likely unauthorized immigrants. The H.L.E. has been used because
they are a good representation of a subpopulation that is very likely to be unauthorized.
The first question this paper looks to answer is: How representative are H.L.E. of all unau-
thorized immigrants in the U.S.? From published figures, it is clear that H.L.E. misses
about one-third or more of the entire unauthorized population. More importantly, as it
relates to policies in diﬀerent states, this distribution of unauthorized immigrants is not
necessarily uniform across states. Consider the composition of likely unauthorized immi-
grants by state. For 2013, in California, the most represented countries of origin for likely
unauthorized immigrants was Mexico and El Salvador followed by China and the Philip-
pines. Meanwhile, in Illinois, the most represented country was Poland. In Florida, the
most represented country was Haiti (Warren, 2014). The point here is that there are many
likely unauthorized immigrants from non-Hispanic countries that are widely represented in
each state but are omitted from the H.L.E. sample. To give evidence on this issue, this pa-
per uses the likely unauthorized sample from the “logical edit” method as the representative
sample of all unauthorized immigrants in the U.S.
11 Most recently, Borjas (2017a) and Borjas (2017b) have used similar data. Borjas gained access to
two years of likely unauthorized CPS-ASEC data (2012-2013) from the Pew Research Center but not the
underlying code. Borjas then reverse engineered the code to extend the data to CPS-ASEC 1994 through
2014 and then the ACS 2005-2014. The present study uses data generated from the actual code that
produces the logical edits data for ACS 2010-2015 and extends the underlying code to include earlier years
of ACS and the CPS-ASEC. That is, no reverse engineering is needed.
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4.6.1 Descriptives on unauthorized immigrants: L.E. v H.L.E.
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the population size of prime-aged H.L.E.’s has remained rather
steady around 7 million immigrants since 2005. The prime-aged “logical edits” population
has always been greater, closer to 9 million, but has shown a decrease from 10 million in 2007
to about 9 million in 2015. While the H.L.E. population has always been below the logical
edits population, the population size alone does not reveal the reveal the representative-
ness of H.L.E.’s for the entire unauthorized immigrant population. To be sure, a majority
of H.L.E.’s are likely unauthorized immigrants under L.E. definitions but they are not a
representative sample of all likely unauthorized immigrants. Figure 4.3 describes the char-
acteristics of the H.L.E. relative to the prime-aged (20-54) likely unauthorized immigrants
for 2015 using the ACS.12 There were close to 9 million prime-aged likely unauthorized
immigrants in the U.S. in 2015. Of this population, the H.L.E. sample represents about
sixty percent. Moreover, it also includes an extra 1.9 million people who are not likely
unauthorized. This extra group is, on average, older (40 years) than the overlap of H.L.E.
and the “logical edits” by about 4 years and have spent about seven more years living in
the U.S. This pattern points out a concern of misclassification error. A random draw of
the HLE sample would lead to choosing an authorized worker one out of every four pulls
(about 27 percent).
Moreover, as a matter of representativeness, the H.L.E. leaves out about 3.75 million
unauthorized immigrants. While the H.L.E. covers about 80 percent of all Mexican and
Central Americans (3.5 million of 4.5 million), there are still one million Mexican and
Central Americans not included in the H.L.E.. By definition, the H.L.E. will exclude a
large amount of non-Mexican/Central Americans and it is important to consider who these
are. Of the 3.75 million immigrants missing from the H.L.E., a majority of these are more
highly educated Asians and other Latin Americans. About 1.3 million Asians and nearly
one million immigrants from other Latin American countries are excluded from the H.L.E.
Indeed, about 2.7 million have high school degrees or more; half of these 2.7 million have
college degrees or more. Lastly, the 3.75 million immigrants missing from the H.L.E. tend
to have been in the U.S. for only 11 years. Table 4.2 presents statistics on the distribution of
12 See Appendix Figure C.1 for the descriptives on the entire population including the non-prime aged.
The patterns are similar though the inclusion of children adds in more kids with less than H.S. and brings
down the average age.
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the years lived in the U.S. across the two definitions. 20 percent of unauthorized immigrants
have lived in the U.S. between 1 and 5 years whereas only 13 percent of H.L.E.’s have lived
in the U.S. for that amount of time. The H.L.E. reflects a higher proportion having lived
in the U.S. for at least five years (about 83 percent) while the proportion for unauthorized
immigrants is closer to 74 percent. Moreover, because of the inclusion of more immigrants
from outside Mexico and Central America, the racial composition clearly diﬀers between
H.L.E. and the “logical edits.” Similarly, the H.L.E. show a higher proportion of married
immigrants relative to the “logical edits” (58 percent v. 52 percent) which results from the
H.L.E. sample excluding immigrants arriving in the past year. These new immigrants tend
to be single at a higher proportion than those who have established themselves in the U.S.
The employment rates across the two definitions are similar.13
The implication for policy analysis is important. H.L.E. will likely reflect the eﬀects of
policies on lower educated subgroups of unauthorized immigrants. However, is there good
reason to believe that the patterns exhibited by these more highly educated immigrants will
be in the same direction as H.L.E.? Or will there be a counterbalancing eﬀect? Ultimately,
these questions are best answered empirically.
4.6.2 Population change of unauthorized immigrants as a result of E-
Verify: L.E. v H.L.E.
In order to demonstrate how well the H.L.E. captures the eﬀect of E-Verify on all unau-
thorized immigrants, this section replicates the findings of Orrenius and Zavodny (2016).
This choice is made because Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) use the ACS. Since the code
used to develop the “logical edit” data used in the paper was designed for the ACS, com-
parisons to Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) are straightforward. The analysis looks at how
universal E-Verify mandates aﬀect the total population of unauthorized immigrants. Using
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation, Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) estimate the following:
lnPopst = ↵+ 1E V erifyst+ 2EconConditionsst 1+States+Y eart+Trendst+ "st.
(4.1)
13 Appendix Table C.1 shows the summary statistics for the full sample (ACS 2005-2015). The main
diﬀerence in patterns is that including children brings down the average age, the percent of married immi-
grants, and the overall education level.
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s denotes states and t denotes year. Since the ACS does not include month surveyed,
E-Verify controls for the fraction of a year that a state had a universal E-Verify mandate
in eﬀect. EconConditions control for state-level business cycle conditions: real state GDP
per capita, unemployment rates, local and state government spending per capita, and the
number of housing permits and housing starts. Trend is linear state-year time trend to
control for any underlying trends particular to a state. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level and the data are weighted using the sum of the person weights for each cell in
the regression.
The identification of E-Verify mandates comes from comparing the size of unauthorized
immigrant population before and after universal E-Verify mandates take eﬀect, controlling
for these various state, year, and state-specific time trends. Table 4.3 presents the results
of this model using the H.L.E. (which replicates the Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) findings)
and also the results using the “logical edits.” For completeness, the model is run on the
2005-2014 ACS sample which is the same sample used in Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) but
then adds the 2015 ACS to update the results. The model is also run on subsample of
unauthorized immigrants by years in the U.S. (specifically, greater than 5 years, between 1
and 5 years, and less than a year).
The 2005-2014 results show that the H.L.E. understates the eﬀect of universal E-Verify
mandates on unauthorized population by about 10 percent (-0.060(0.022) v -0.067(0.023))
though the coeﬃcients are not statistically diﬀerent from each other. That is, on aver-
age, the number of unauthorized immigrants falls by about 6.7 percent if the state had
a universal E-Verify mandates the entire year. This finding supports the prediction laid
out in Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) that their estimates “may reflect the lower bound of
the eﬀect of E-Verify laws” (p. 4). However, once the 2015 ACS is added to the sample,
the coeﬃcients increase to about -0.075 for both the H.L.E. and “logical edits.” There are
various implications of this result. First, the model specification may be incorrect and thus
results may be unreliable. However, as Orrenius and Zavodny (2016) show, their results
are robust to many validation checks and thus this implication seems unlikely. Second, the
results potentially contradicts the idea that H.L.E. provide a lower bound for the true eﬀect
of E-Verify mandates. As will be shown, the results by year of entry give evidence to why
this contradiction may be occurring.
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Universal E-Verify mandates reduce the population of unauthorized immigrants under
both H.L.E. and “logical edits.” However, the driving forces behind this reduction is diﬀerent
for each definition. For both definitions, the largest eﬀects are found in the recent arrival
group (1-5 years) though this eﬀect is largest for H.L.E. than for the “logical edits” (-
0.226(0.062) v -0.160(0.095)). By adding the 2015 ACS, the coeﬃcient increase by 0.05 to
-0.276(0.083) for H.L.E. but only by 0.017 for LE. Therefore, under the H.L.E., the eﬀect of
universal E-Verify is larger than for the “logical edits” and this eﬀect increases significantly
for H.L.E. but less so for “logical edits.” This diﬀerence highlights the how the H.L.E. is
not representative of the overall unauthorized population. In particular, this pattern is
noticed for the non-recent (greater than 5 years) and new immigrants (less than a year).
Under the H.L.E., there is a large negative eﬀect of universal E-Verify on new immigrants
under H.L.E. but not the “logical edits.” On the other hand, there is a small significant and
negative eﬀect for non-recent immigrants but no eﬀect under H.L.E.
The results presented in Table 4.3 use only a prime-aged sample (20-54). Relaxing this
restriction only for the “logical edits” sample shows that the eﬀect of E-Verify is understated,
for the “logical edit” sample, by excluding non-prime aged immigrants. Table 4.4 presents
the results of the analysis that includes all immigrants. Specifically, the eﬀect of universal
E-Verify mandates increases from -0.074(0.024) (using the ACS 2005-2015) to -0.090(0.021).
This result is likely due to the fact that, under the “logical edits”, the eﬀect of E-Verify is
greater for non-recent and recent immigrants relative to the new immigrants. These groups
tend to have a higher proportion of families relative to the recent immigrants who tend to be
single at higher proportions. Thus, by including the sample of non-prime aged immigrants,
universal E-Verify mandates are shown to have a larger eﬀect on reducing unauthorized
immigrant populations. The patterns by subgroup are still noticeable in this estimation in
that the non-recent and recent immigrants drive the overall eﬀect for “logical edits” while
the H.L.E. are primarily driven by recent and new immigrants.
The implication for policy analysis is that the use of the H.L.E. may, on average, result
in estimates that capture the overall direction of E-Verify mandates. However, subgroups
of the H.L.E. do not seem to reflect this same pattern. The analysis here shows that, in
the case of years in the U.S., the H.L.E. does not accurately reflect the eﬀect of universal
E-Verify mandates as compared to the unauthorized immigrants defined by the “logical
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edits.” Overall, the H.L.E. surely captures a population that is likely to be aﬀected by
E-Verify mandates but this group is not necessarily reflective of the overall unauthorized
immigrant population and thus subgroup analysis with the HLE may not be reflective of
those subgroups in the entire unauthorized population.
4.7 E-Verify mandates and employment
Turning to the eﬀect of E-Verify mandates on employment, this section looks at how uni-
versal E-Verify mandates aﬀect the probability of employment of unauthorized immigrants
as well as other subgroups. To best make comparisons with previous literature, the model
used here follows that of Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014). Importantly, Amuedo Do-
rantes and Bansak (2014) use data up to 2011 but this paper extends the timeframe to 2014.
Thus, the following analysis gives insight into how a longer post-treatment period changes
the estimated eﬀects of E-Verify as well as how the use of the “logical edits” compares to
the H.L.E. As the previous section showed, the H.L.E. may be reflect the overall result in
regards to population but it is unclear how the H.L.E. fares with the employment.
The model estimated here is a linear probability model:
List = ↵+ 1Universal E-Verifyst+ 2Public E-Verifyst+Xist + 3Ust+ s+✓t+ st+"ist,
(4.2)
where L is a dummy for employment, Universal E-Verify is a dummy for a state with a
universal E-Verify mandate, Public E-Verify is a dummy for a state with a public E-Verify
mandate (see Table 4.1). X are individual-level controls including gender, race, age, mar-
ital status, number of children, educational attainment and industry fixed eﬀects. Ust are
monthly state unemployment rates,  s are state fixed-eﬀects, ✓t are time fixed-eﬀects and
 st are state-level time trends. The identification strategy in this model comes from the dif-
ference between the probability of employment for unauthorized immigrants living in states
with universal E-Verify and those unauthorized immigrants living in states with no E-Verify
mandates. After controlling for observable characteristics,  1 captures the diﬀerence in the
change in the likelihood of employment between observably similar unauthorized immigrants
in universal E-Verify states relative to non-E-Verify states. Because the model includes a
control for Public E-Verify, the non-E-Verify states do not include states with public-sector
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E-Verify mandates. A major assumption is made in order to claim that E-Verify mandates
cause the change in the likelihood of employment of unauthorized immigrants. Namely,
the assumptions is that labor market changes in the states that adopt universal E-Verify
mandates did not lead to those states adopting E-Verify mandates. For example, it would
be plausible that states with large growth in the unauthorized worker population would be
the states most likely to adopt E-Verify mandates. The present study does not delve further
into the issue of causality as the focus is on how the choice of definitions for unauthorized
immigrants aﬀects the results of such analysis.
In order to use the logical edits, the code used to develop the ACS flags are adapted to
the CPS-ASEC 2002-2014. Equation (2) is then estimated for four groups: 1) unauthorized
immigrants (“logical edits”), 2) H.L.E.’s, 3) naturalized Hispanics, and 4) US-born non-
Hispanics. The model is further broken down by sex. The first set of results use only the
in labor force population for each subgroup such that  1 captures the eﬀect of E-Verify
mandates relative only to those who are in the labor force. However, because it is possible
for people to drop out of the labor force in response to E-Verify mandates, the model is
also run on a sample that includes all people over 18 years of age.
Table 4.5 presents the results of this analysis. Focusing first on the diﬀerence between
H.L.E. and “logical edits”, the results are sensitive to the choice of sample (in labor force
versus all people). The in labor force results show that, on average, workers in universal
E-Verify states using the ”logical edits” see an increase of 5 percentage points (0.050(0.004))
while using H.L.E. shows no statistically significant eﬀect. However, including all people
changes the results significantly. The eﬀect of E-Verify mandates under the ”logical edits” is
now negative and statistically significant (-0.04) while the H.L.E. results are also negative
and statistically significant. These results suggest that there could be considerable move-
ment out of the labor force for people in E-Verify states relative to those in non-E-Verify
states. Regarding the diﬀerence between ”logical edits” and H.L.E., since the results depend
on the choice of sample, it seems as though the H.L.E. are not necessarily representative of
the eﬀect of universal E-Verify mandates on all unauthorized immigrants.
This same inconsistency is noticed for other populations. For naturalized Hispanics,
the overall eﬀect of universal E-Verify mandates is positive for the in labor force sam-
ple but negative for the full sample. However, for U.S. born non-Hispanics, the eﬀect of
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universal E-Verify mandates is negative and statistically significant under both samples.
The implication of this finding is that universal E-Verify mandates decrease the likelihood
of employment of US-born non-Hispanics. This finding is the opposite of that found by
Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014), suggesting that the additional years included in this
study are important for identifying the eﬀect of E-Verify mandates.14
Given that these results depend on whether the sample includes only the in labor force
population or all adults, the conclusions of this paper are not cleanly summarized. Using
the in labor force sample leads to the following conclusions: Universal E-Verify mandates
result in an increase in the likelihood of being employed for unauthorized immigrants and
naturalized Hispanics but a decrease in the likelihood of employment for US-born non-
Hispanics. The H.L.E. fails to pick up an overall eﬀect in this sample. On the other hand,
including people not in the labor force leads to a diﬀerent picture overall. Universal E-
Verify mandates reduce the likelihood of all groups. This eﬀect is largest for naturalized
Hispanics who see a reduction of about 16 percentage points in the likelihood of employment
as a result of E-Verify mandates. Unauthorized immigrants also experience a reduction in
their likelihood of employment (-0.040(0.007)) but this eﬀect is larger for the H.L.E. (-
0.103(0.004)). Lastly, US-born non-Hispanics still see a reduction in their likelihood of
employment (-0.012(0.001)) as a result of universal E-Verify.
In sum, the analysis presented here highlights that the sensitive of results to the def-
inition of unauthorized immigrants and the sample used for analysis. H.L.E. do not nec-
essarily reflect the eﬀects of E-Verify mandates found with the “logical edits.” The longer
post-treatment period seems to also be an important factor for the eﬀect of E-Verify man-
dates. By including more years of data, the results Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014)
no longer hold.
14 Another plausible reason for the diﬀerence between this study and Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak
(2014) is that diﬀerent datasets are used. Amuedo Dorantes and Bansak (2014) use Basic Monthly CPS
files but this dataset does not allow for the use of the logical edits. Appendix Table C.2 runs the analysis
on the Basic Monthly CPS files. The results show that the eﬀect of universal E-Verify mandates are also
sensitive to the choice of sample (in labor force v. all people 18 and over).
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4.8 Future research and conclusion
Overall, this paper highlights that assessing the eﬀects of policies that target unauthorized
immigrants, such as E-Verify, requires a good measure of unauthorized immigrants. While
the H.L.E. is a subgroup of the unauthorized population that is very likely to be unautho-
rized, the H.L.E. is not a representative sample of the entire unauthorized population. In
the setting of population changes and universal E-Verify, the H.L.E. and “logical edits” show
a reduction in the unauthorized population but subgroup analysis is inconsistent across the
definitions. Misclassification error is a likely explanation for these results. When applied
to the setting of employment and E-Verify mandates, the results show that the measure
of unauthorized immigrants matters. Results are sensitive to the sample chosen (in labor
force v. all adults). Given these inconsistent findings, it is clear that the H.L.E. do not
accurately the eﬀect of E-Verify mandates on the likelihood of employment. Moreover, the
results here suggest that additional years of data are important in capturing the eﬀect of
E-Verify mandates.
The main question left to answer is what a researcher should do if data on unauthorized
immigrants is not available. One potential solution is to derive the misclassification prob-
abilities of H.L.E.’s relative to unauthorized immigrants as measured through the “logical
edits.” These probability could then be used to correct estimates using H.L.E. Another is-
sue arises for samples where the “logical edits” are not available. Specifically, in this paper,
the Basic Monthly CPS files do not include enough information to replicate the “logical
edits.” In this scenario, it would be possible to apply as many “logical edits” as possible
to the Basic Monthly files and then apply a selection criteria to mimic the distribution of
immigrants by country of origin, state of residence, and year of immigration. Lastly, the
most obvious option is to make public-use files of the “logical edits” microdata.
On the accurate estimation of E-Verify mandates, a few threats to validity warrant
discussion. First, it is likely that states that pass E-Verify mandates also pass other
anti-immigration laws that may aﬀect employment rates. Indeed, Arizona’s Legal Arizona
Workers Act included an E-Verify mandate as one of many measures to curtail unautho-
rized immigrants’ employment. Without explicitly controlling for these other measures,
the estimated eﬀects of E-Verify mandates may very well be due to these other factors.
Thus, it is necessary to find a way to control for this “policy climate.” Various authors have
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developed a measure that would account for this immigration policy climate. For exam-
ple, Leerkes, Leach and Bachmeier (2012) conduct factor analysis to code states into three
diﬀerent levels of immigration control: high, moderate and low. Using data on employers
participation in E-Verify, restrictive state laws, county and city involvement in the 287(g)
program, the authors are able to construct a single measure (“internal control index”) for
each state by year that is then used to classify each state into the diﬀerent levels of control.
By using these more refined measures by state and year, it would be possible to capture
the immigration policy climate of each state.
One last threat to validity is the level of enforcement within each state of the E-Verify
mandate. While the E-Verify program can track the number of cases employers process,
there is no guarantee that employers are processing all potential hires. The need here is
to find a measure that quantifies the enforcement of anti-immigration laws. Fortunately,
various authors have conducted these studies and some would be suitable for my study.
In particular, Watson (2010) codes information on 287(g) on a year-by-year basis between
1993 and 2002. Using a dataset that “consists of counts of Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS) ‘deportable aliens located’ as the result of internal investigations, by INS
internal district, country of origin, and fiscal year” (Watson, 2010). The correlation between
287(g) enforcement and E-Verify mandates is arguably strong enough for this measure to
be a good proxy of enforcement. Thus, using a measure like the one presented by Watson
(2010) (but extended through 2014), it would be possible to control for enforcement levels of
E-Verify mandates that may be confounding the analysis conducted thus far in this paper.
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Table 4.1: Overview of E-Verify mandates
State Adoption date Implementation date
Universal E-Verify mandate
Alabama June 2011 April 2012
Arizona June 2007 January 2008
Georgia May 2011 January 2012
Mississippi March 2008 July 2008
North Carolina June 2011 October 2012
South Carolina June 2011 January 2012
Utah March 2010 July 2010
Universal check mandate (alternate processa)
Colorado January 2007 August 2008
Tennessee June 2011 January 2012
Other mandateb
Florida January 2011 January 2011
Idaho July 2009 July 2009
Indiana April 2011 July 2011
Louisiana July 2011 July 2011
Minnesota July 2011 July 2011
Missouri July 2008 January 2009
Nebraska April 2009 October 2009
Oklahoma May 2007 November 2007
Pennsylvania July 2012 January 2013
Texas December 2014 September 2015
Virginia March 2011 December 2013
West Virginia March 2012 June 2012
Source: http://www.troutmansanders.com/immigration/. Notes: (a) These al-
ternate processes mandate that an employer verify the legal status of a newly
hired employee but not necessarily through the E-Verify program. (b) Other
mandates refer to mandates that are not universal but cover diﬀerent sectors.
Typically these sectors are public employers, public contractors/subcontractors
or state agencies.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for H.L.E. and Logical Edits, prime-aged (20-54) sample
H.L.E. Logical Edits H.L.E. Logical Edits
Years in U.S. 14.1 10.9 Age 35.4 34.4
(8.7) (6.9) (8.8) (8.7)
% >5 years 83.3 73.9 % Female 43.1 43.9
(37.3) (43.9) (49.5) (49.6)
% Between 1 and 5 years 13.3 20.2 % Employed 71.0 73.1
(34.0) (40.2) (45.4) (44.4)
% Last year 3.4 5.9 % Unemployed 6.3 5.9
(18.0) (23.5) (24.2) (23.5)
% Mexico and Central Am. 100.0 69.7 % N.I.L.F. 22.7 21.1
(0.0) (45.9) (41.9) (40.8)
% Other North Am. 0.0 0.4 % White 58.4 50.0
(0.0) (5.9) (49.3) (50.0)
% Other Latin Am. 0.0 10.6 % African American 0.6 5.4
(0.0) (30.8) (7.4) (22.6)
% Europe 0.0 3.1 % Asian 0.1 12.7
(0.0) (17.4) (3.4) (33.3)
% Asia 0.0 13.3 % Other 40.2 31.3
(0.0) (33.9) (49.0) (46.4)
% Africa 0.0 2.7 % Married 57.5 52.2
(0.0) (16.2) (49.4) (50.0)
% Oceania 0.0 0.2 % Single 33.3 37.9
(0.0) (4.2) (47.1) (48.5)
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% Less than H.S. 69.1 45.8 % More than H.S. 0.0 13.7
(46.2) (49.8) (0.0) (34.3)
% H.S. or equiv. 30.9 26.4 % College or more 0.0 14.1
(46.2) (44.1) (0.0) (34.8)
Observations 545,209 658,576 Observations 545,209 658,576
Weighted N’s 78,010,809 102,089,870 Weighted N’s 78,010,809 102,089,870
Source: ACS 2005-2015. Notes: Averages presented with standard deviations in parentheses. H.L.E. refers to the “Hispanics with Low
Education” proxy.
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Table 4.3: Testing the role of proxies (H.L.E. v. Logical Edits): The eﬀect of E-Verify laws on population sizes of

















ACS 2005 - 2014
E-Verify in -0.060⇤⇤⇤ -0.067⇤⇤⇤ -0.028 -0.050⇤⇤ -0.226⇤⇤⇤ -0.160⇤ -0.394 -0.150
current year (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.021) (0.062) (0.095) (0.253) (0.173)
Observations 510 510 510 510
ACS 2005 - 2015
E-Verify in -0.075⇤⇤⇤ -0.074⇤⇤⇤ -0.038 -0.053⇤⇤ -0.276⇤⇤⇤ -0.177⇤⇤ -0.481⇤ -0.198
current year (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.083) (0.079) (0.277) (0.190)
Observations 561 561 561 561
Source: ACS 2005-2015. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state (shown
in parentheses). H.L.E. refers to the “Hispanics with Low Education” proxy and are meant to replicate the results
of Orrenius and Zavodny (2016). Their results use ACS 2005-2014: All:  0.061⇤⇤(0.023), Not recent: -0.026(0.026),
Recent: 0.258⇤⇤⇤(0.071), New:  0.464⇤(0.259). The second set of results extends the analysis to include 2015.
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Table 4.4: Testing the role of proxies (H.L.E. v. Logical Edits): The eﬀect of E-Verify laws on population sizes of

















ACS 2005 - 2014
E-Verify in -0.060⇤⇤⇤ -0.083⇤⇤⇤ -0.028 -0.063⇤⇤⇤ -0.226⇤⇤⇤ -0.177⇤⇤ -0.394 -0.195
current year (0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.062) (0.075) (0.253) (0.140)
Observations 510 510 510 510
ACS 2005 - 2015
E-Verify in -0.075⇤⇤⇤ -0.090⇤⇤⇤ -0.038 -0.065⇤⇤⇤ -0.276⇤⇤⇤ -0.200⇤⇤⇤ -0.481⇤ -0.228
current year (0.023) (0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.083) (0.064) (0.277) (0.148)
Observations 561 561 561 561
Source: ACS 2005-2015. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Note: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state (shown
in parentheses). H.L.E. refers to the “Hispanics with Low Education” proxy and are meant to replicate the results
of Orrenius and Zavodny (2016). Their results use ACS 2005-2014: All:  0.061⇤⇤(0.023), Not recent: -0.026(0.026),
Recent: 0.258⇤⇤⇤(0.071), New:  0.464⇤(0.259). The second set of results extends the analysis to include 2015.
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Table 4.5: Estimates of the impact of E-Verify mandates on probability of employment -
2002 - 2014 - Annual Social and Economic Supplement
In Labor Force Population Full CPS
All Male Female All Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logical Edits
Universal 0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.042⇤⇤⇤ 0.024⇤⇤⇤ -0.040⇤⇤⇤ -0.050⇤⇤⇤ 0.103⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Observations 60,266 39,338 20,928 83,335 44,552 38,783
HLE
Universal -0.005 -0.029⇤⇤⇤ 0.041⇤⇤⇤ -0.103⇤⇤⇤ -0.155⇤⇤⇤ 0.072⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 47,993 32,596 15,397 67,650 36,817 30,833
Naturalized
Hispanic
Universal 0.047⇤⇤⇤ 0.048⇤⇤⇤ 0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.161⇤⇤⇤ -0.407⇤⇤⇤ -0.012
(0.004) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020)
Observations 31,193 16,712 14,481 45,748 21,184 24,564
US-Born
non-Hispanic
Universal -0.029⇤⇤⇤ -0.035⇤⇤⇤ -0.021⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.026⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,007,447 515,796 491,651 1,536,977 728,680 808,297
Source: CPS-ASEC 2002-2014. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Notes: Controls include
gender (when applicable), race, age, marital status, number of children in household, educational
attainment, industry fixed eﬀects, state fixed eﬀects, time (year, month) fixed eﬀects, state
specific time trends, unemployment rates. Standard errors clustered at the state level. All





Figure 4.1: States with E-Verify Mandates
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Figure 4.2: Population for prime-aged unauthorized immigrants in US - H.L.E. v Logical
Edits, ACS 2005-2015








Unauthorized Population - H.L.E.
Unauthorized Population - Logical Edits
Year
Notes: H.L.E. refers to the “Hispanics with Low Education” proxy. Estimates are weighted using ACS
person weights.
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Figure 4.3: Comparing H.L.E. and Logical Edits - Characteristics of likely unauthorized by
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1.3 million Asia
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0.2 million Europe
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Years in U.S.: 11
Notes: H.L.E. refers to the “Hispanics with Low Education” proxy. Estimates are weighted using ACS
person weights.
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Number of People - T1 2.14 2.18 1.89 1.92 2.02
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Number of People - T2 2.13 2.17 1.86 1.96 2.03
(0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Selected Demographics
of Householder
Age of Householder 53.65 54.26 53.60 51.85 47.45
(0.047) (0.051) (0.211) (0.223) (0.187)
% White - Non. Hisp. 76.93 79.97 67.91 66.70 55.60
(0.118) (0.124) (0.543) (0.552) (0.540)
% Afr. Amer. - Non. Hisp. 8.23 6.69 13.21 13.32 18.73
(0.077) (0.077) (0.394) (0.398) (0.424)
% Amer. Ind. - Non. Hisp. 0.47 0.37 0.70 0.90 1.17
(0.019) (0.019) (0.097) (0.111) (0.117)
% Asian - Non. Hisp. 3.34 3.39 3.09 3.21 3.08
(0.050) (0.056) (0.201) (0.207) (0.188)
% Other - Non. Hisp. 1.13 1.05 1.29 1.63 1.60
(0.030) (0.032) (0.131) (0.148) (0.136)
% Hispanic 9.89 8.53 13.80 14.24 19.83
(0.084) (0.087) (0.401) (0.410) (0.433)
% Non-Citizen 6.35 5.35 8.78 10.71 12.97
(0.068) (0.070) (0.329) (0.362) (0.365)
% Naturalized Citizen 7.00 7.04 7.06 6.63 6.70
(0.071) (0.079) (0.298) (0.292) (0.272)
Observations 127,404 104,257 7,387 7,284 8,476
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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% Departure of Any 5.90 5.90 8.78 4.53 4.50
Family Member (0.066) (0.073) (0.329) (0.244) (0.225)
% Arrival of Any 4.54 4.40 4.87 5.79 4.91
Family Member (0.058) (0.063) (0.250) (0.274) (0.235)
% Both Departure 0.61 0.59 0.79 0.71 0.60
and Arrival (0.022) (0.024) (0.103) (0.098) (0.084)
% No Change in 88.95 89.11 85.56 88.97 89.98
Family Composition (0.088) (0.096) (0.409) (0.367) (0.326)
Arrivalsa
% Newborn 1.90 1.82 2.28 1.49 2.90
(0.038) (0.041) (0.174) (0.142) (0.182)
% Arrival Child (2-6) 0.35 0.32 0.70 0.39 0.45
(0.017) (0.017) (0.097) (0.073) (0.072)
% Arrival Child (7-17) 0.59 0.52 1.05 0.72 0.98
(0.021) (0.022) (0.119) (0.099) (0.107)
% Arrival Adult (18-64) 2.77 2.73 2.61 4.24 2.01
(0.046) (0.051) (0.186) (0.236) (0.152)
% Arrival Elder (65+) 0.30 0.29 0.23 0.56 0.16
(0.015) (0.017) (0.056) (0.087) (0.044)
% Marriage 0.73 0.72 0.37 1.57 0.47
(0.024) (0.026) (0.071) (0.146) (0.074)
Departuresa
% Departure Child (0-6) 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.85 0.81
(0.019) (0.020) (0.074) (0.108) (0.097)
% Departure Child (7-17) 0.76 0.69 0.54 1.38 1.17
(0.024) (0.026) (0.086) (0.137) (0.117)
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% Departure Adult (18-64) 5.07 5.13 6.75 3.86 3.86
(0.061) (0.068) (0.292) (0.226) (0.209)
% Departure Elder (65+) 1.03 0.99 2.66 0.67 0.34
(0.028) (0.031) (0.187) (0.096) (0.063)
% Departure Spouse 0.89 0.84 2.26 0.76 0.49
(0.026) (0.028) (0.173) (0.102) (0.076)
% Departure Head 1.12 0.99 3.12 0.92 1.02
(0.029) (0.031) (0.202) (0.112) (0.109)
% Divorce/Separation 0.57 0.50 1.79 0.50 0.44
(0.021) (0.022) (0.154) (0.083) (0.072)
% Widowed 0.65 0.65 1.46 0.31 0.13
(0.022) (0.025) (0.140) (0.065) (0.040)
Observations 127,404 104,257 7,387 7,284 8,476
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. (a) The summary of changes
are mutually exclusive but the breakdown of arrivals and departures are not mutually exclusive.
Changes in family composition can be concurrent.
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t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2
SPM Total Resources 54,206 53,697 38,543 9,252 9,604 37,380
(55,976) (56,546) (36,098) (15,034) (14,940) (36,547)
Total Cash Income 74,505 74,583 48,523 15,017 15,427 47,434
(84,684) (86,669) (52,888) (15,001) (13,863) (56,558)
Wages/Salaries 53,641 53,353 25,673 7,229 7,666 25,216
(80,362) (82,233) (45,793) (13,993) (13,222) (52,598)
Other Cash Income 20,864 21,230 22,850 7,788 7,761 22,218
(36,919) (37,466) (35,858) (9,104) (9,270) (29,026)
Taxes Paid 14,159 14,646 6,264 381 281 6,254
(28,462) (29,825) (16,457) (3,441) (2,973) (19,915)
Necessary Expenses 2,075 2,049 1,329 1,023 1,092 1,353
(2,770) (2,725) (1,875) (2,760) (2,788) (1,862)
Government Subsidies 454 442 858 1,001 1,038 875
(1,762) (1,709) (2,465) (2,493) (2,589) (2,422)
Medical Expenditures 4,538 4,632 3,269 5,362 5,505 3,323
(6,969) (6,948) (4,293) (16,265) (15,061) (4,307)
Observations 127,146 10,308 10,170
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: All income values are adjusted to reflect 2015 dollars. Ad-
justment made using annual average Consumer Price Index Research Series (CPI-U-RS). Standard
deviations in parentheses.
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Table A.4: Job loss and poverty transitions
Panel A: Work schedule changes and poverty transitions










52-50 weeks 52-50 weeks 48,557 1,295 45,471
(2.7%) (93.6%)
52-50 weeks 49-40 weeks 2,043 133 1,791
(6.5%) (87.7%)
52-50 weeks 39-27 weeks 1,157 93 991
(8.0%) (85.7%)
52-50 weeks 26-14 weeks 512 76 408
(14.8%) (79.7%)
52-50 weeks 13-1 week 330 59 253
(17.9%) (76.7%)
52-50 weeks Unemployed 2,371 806 1,241
(34.0%) (52.3%)
52-50 weeks Retired 1,376 256 1,048
(18.6%) (76.2%)
Panel B: The influence of the change in wages on poverty transitions
Changes in Householder Weeks Worked
Percent of NP-P where
change in wages is suﬃcientb
Weeks Worked in t1 Weeks Worked in t2 N
N
(%)
52-50 weeks 52-50 weeks 1,295 631
(48.7%)
52-50 weeks 49-40 weeks 133 74
(55.6%)
52-50 weeks 39-27 weeks 93 70
(75.0%)
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52-50 weeks 26-14 weeks 76 50
(66.2%)
52-50 weeks 13-1 week 59 48
(81.4%)
52-50 weeks Unemployed 806 539
(66.9%)
52-50 weeks Retired 256 144
(56.3%)
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) Two transitions are omitted (Poor to NonPoor, Poor to
Poor) and therefore rows do not add up to 100%. (b) Suﬃcient refers to the framework established
in section 2.6.2.
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Table A.5: Avoiding poverty after job loss
Panel A: The role of government subsidies in keeping families out of poverty
after job loss
Changes in Householder Weeks Worked
Percent of NP-NP
where gov’t subs
and EITC keep families
out of povertya
Weeks Worked in t1 Weeks Worked in t2 N
N
(%)
52-50 weeks 52-50 weeks 45,471 555
(1.2%)
52-50 weeks 49-40 weeks 1,791 33
(1.8%)
52-50 weeks 39-27 weeks 991 44
(4.4%)
52-50 weeks 26-14 weeks 408 21
(5.1%)
52-50 weeks 13-1 week 253 15
(5.9%)
52-50 weeks Unemployed 1,241 95
(7.7%)
52-50 weeks Retired 1,048 9
(0.9%)
Panel B: The role of unemployment compensation in keeping families out of poverty
after job loss









52-50 weeks 52-50 weeks 45,471 44
(0.01%)
52-50 weeks 49-40 weeks 1,791 11
(0.6%)
52-50 weeks 39-27 weeks 991 35
(3.5%)
52-50 weeks 26-14 weeks 408 31
(7.6%)
52-50 weeks 13-1 week 253 33
(13.0%)
52-50 weeks Unemployed 1,241 150
(12.1%)
52-50 weeks Retired 1,048 2
(0.2%)
Source: CPS-ASEC 2010-2016. Notes: (a) Government subsidies include those outlined in Table 2.2
(SNAP, lunch subsidies, WIC, housing subsidies and energy subsidies) as well as EITC.
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Table A.6: Family member departures and poverty transitions
Panel A: Departures of male and female adults and poverty transitions


















Male Departs 1,657 1,080 351 112 114
(65.2%) (21.2%) (6.8%) (6.9%)
Divorce 550 370 114 34 32
(67.2%) (20.7%) (6.2%) (5.8%)
Death 528 349 119 32 28
(66.1%) (22.5%) (6.1%) (5.3%)
Female Departs 1,347 972 173 125 77
(72.2%) (12.8%) (9.3%) (5.7%)
Divorce 526 402 67 36 21
(76.4%) (12.7%) (6.8%) (4.0%)
Death 281 224 19 28 10
(79.7%) (6.8%) (10.0%) (3.6%)




Percent of NP-P where




















B.1 Additional robustness analysis
Table B.4 presents estimates that do not use weights. Results are largely stable.
Recall that our main analysis focuses on the set of cases with full-observed data and
excluded cases with any variable (outcome, treatment, or control) missing or imputed.
Table B.5 describes how the sample size is aﬀected by this set of exclusions. Table B.5
displays estimated coeﬃcients on each of 4 outcomes under each of the three specifications
after including only one kind of imputation at a time, then, in the final row, including all
of them. The cross-sectional results of specifications 1 and 2 are, by-and-large quite stable.
The fixed eﬀect estimates are qualitatively stable except for inclusion of full-line imputes
and inclusion of all imputes. These findings are in line with Hirsch and Schumacher (2004)
and Bollinger and Hirsch (2006). Imputations attenuate the union coeﬃcient towards zero.
B.2 Data note
Understanding the sampling methodology of the CPS is key to understanding our sample.
The CPS is a monthly survey designed to collect data primarily on employment; the Basic
Monthly CPS’s are the source of the oﬃcial unemployment statistics. The Basic Monthly
CPS consists of about 60,000 dwellings. Each dwelling is selected to be in the CPS for
4 consecutive months, then out of the CPS rotation for 8 months, and then back again
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for 4 more months. Each of these months is referred to as a Month-In-Sample (MIS) for
a total of 8 MIS’s for any given dwelling. The ORG questions refer to a survey that is
given only to dwellings from MIS groups 4 or 8 (i.e. these are the months after which
these dwellings will either be out of sample for 8 months or out of the CPS entirely). The
questions encompassed in the ORGs focus on more specific labor questions, most important
to our study is the union membership question. The union membership question is thus
asked only of one-fourth of any given Basic Monthly CPS.
Every March, the CPS administers the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC)
to all dwellings in the March Basic CPS. Among the questions asked here are detailed break-
downs of annual income sources and social program benefit recipiency. In order to conduct
our analysis, it is necessary for us to link the March Basic CPS to the ASEC which is a
more tedious ordeal in practice. We use the newly created identifiers of the Minnesota Pop-
ulation Center (MARBASECID) for this purpose; the exact algorithm and more detailed
explanation of the CPS sampling methodology is included in Flood and Pacas (2016).
As part of our sensitivity analysis, we use our linked-CPS sample with the biennial Dis-
placed Worker Survey (1998-2014). Because this survey is fielded in January and February,
it is only possible to link a smaller subsample of March respondents. Specifically, from the
36,531 (unweighted) displaced workers, 2,823 workers are linked to our sample, about 7.8
percent of the total Displaced Worker Survey sample.
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Table B.1: Sample description
Sample: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Year: N N N N N N N
1994 150,943 133,669 121,386 86,477 11,658 5,927 2,245
1995 149,642 100,490 94,223 67,658 11,658 5,927 2,245
1996 130,476 114,667 104,622 74,532 13,190 6,668 1,967
1997 131,854 115,963 105,774 75,723 26,652 13,485 4,033
1998 131,617 115,369 105,640 75,736 25,672 13,059 3,934
1999 132,324 115,066 105,165 75,627 23,483 11,897 3,589
2000 133,710 115,800 105,968 76,632 22,062 11,189 3,420
2001 218,269 111,062 101,365 73,573 20,726 10,636 3,238
2002 217,219 133,615 120,342 87,153 21,778 11,153 3,347
2003 216,424 135,524 122,174 88,847 23,912 12,124 3,578
2004 213,241 131,818 119,186 86,624 22,802 11,562 3,480
2005 210,648 129,816 118,784 86,697 22,741 11,401 3,436
2006 208,562 128,322 117,205 85,777 24,913 12,424 3,634
2007 206,639 127,990 116,991 85,685 26,498 13,479 3,992
2008 206,404 127,219 116,347 86,102 27,546 13,776 4,153
2009 207,921 128,976 117,473 86,767 28,148 13,625 4,054
2010 209,802 129,156 117,896 87,378 27,916 13,434 3,893
2011 204,983 126,241 115,228 86,110 27,292 13,296 3,793
2012 201,398 125,256 114,506 85,819 27,182 13,164 3,757
2013 202,634 124,254 113,802 85,412 24,583 11,498 3,292
2014 199,556 123,438 112,740 75,403 18,763 8,597 2,446
2015 199,024 122,467 111,277 83,695 7,789 3,585 1,026
Total 4,083,290 2,716,178 2,478,094 1,803,427 486,964 241,906 72,552
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Sample 1 - Full ASEC. Sample 2 - Keep if
month-in-sample (MIS) equals 4 or 8 and then only the people that link to their ORG. This should
include all March respondents and respondents who link to April, May, and June. Sample 3 - Drop
respondents who do not match on age, sex, race and seem to be at the same job. Sample 4 - Drops
respondents aged less than 18. Sample 5 (this is the sample used for Tables 7 and 8) - Keep NILF
and unemployed . Drop if respondent not in both years, or if union is not in universe (civilians
15+ wage/salary workers, excludes self-employed), or do not match in sex, hispanic, black, asian,
or foreign born. Sample 6 (main sample) - Drop if respondent not in both years, or if union is
not in universe (civilians 15+ wage/salary workers, excludes self-employed), or do not match in
sex, hispanic, black, asian, or foreign born. Sample 7 - Keep only March Basic observations from
Sample 6.
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Table B.2: Details of variables
Variable Var Name (IPUMS) Variable (Census) Type Record type Special construction
Taxes
Federal income tax
liability before credits FEDTAX FEDTAX_BC Imputed Person None
State income tax
liability before credits STATETAX STATETAX_BC Imputed Person None
Annual property taxes PROPTAX PROP_TAX Imputed Household
Divided by total adults
(age>18) in household
Social security retirement
payroll deduction FICA FICA Imputed Person None
Federal retirement payroll
deduction FEDRETIR FED_RET Imputed Person None
Earned income tax credit EITCRED EIT_CRED Imputed Person None
Additional child tax credit ACTCCRD ACTC_CRD Imputed Person None
Child tax credit CTCCRD CTC_CRD Imputed Person None
Credit received from
Making Work Pay MWPVAL MWP_VAL Imputed Person CPS ASEC 2010-2011
Federal stimulus payment STIMULUS STIMULUS Imputed Person CPS ASEC 2009
Income from Public Benefits
Supplemental Security Income INCSSI SSI_VAL Collected Person None
Welfare (Public assistance) INCWELFR PAW_VAL Collected Person None
Person market value
of Medicare PMVCARE P_MVCARE Receipt Person None
Person market value
of Medicaid PMVCAID P_MVCAID Receipt Person None
Person value of food stamps
FMFDSTAMP
(Not in IPUMS) F_MV_FS Collected Family
Divided by total adults
(age>18) in family
Person value of housing
subsidy
FMVHOUSSUB
(Not in IPUMS) FHOUSSUB Receipt Family
Divided by total adults
(age>18) in family
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Person value of school-lunch
subsidy
FMVSCHLUNCH
(Not in IPUMS) F_MV_SL Receipt Family
Divided by total adults
(age>18) in family
Person value of energy
subsidy HEATVAL HENGVAL Collected Household
Divided by total adults
(age>18) in household
Educational assistance
(beyond HS) INCEDUC ED_VAL Collected Person None
Social security INCSS SS_VAL Collected Person None
Unemployment benefits INCUNEMP UC_VAL Collected Person None
Worker’s compensation INCWKCOM WC_VAL Collected Person None
Veteran’s benefits INCVET VET_VAL Collected Person None
Disability benefits INCDISAB DSAB_VAL Collected Person None
Survivor’s benefits INCSURV SRVS_VAL Collected Person None
Private Income
Wage and salary income INCWAGE PEARNVAL Collected Person None
Alimony INCALIM ALM_VAL Collected Person None
Non-farm business income INCBUS SEMP_VAL Collected Person None
Child support INCCHILD CSP_VAL Collected Person None
Dividends INCDIVID DIV_VAL Collected Person None
Farm INCFARM FRM_VAL Collected Person None
Interest INCINT INT_VAL Collected Person None
Income from other
source not specified INCOTHER OI_VAL Collected Person None
Rent INCRENT RNT_VAL Collected Person None
Retirement INCRETIR RTM_VAL Collected Person None
Assistance from friends
not in HH INCASIST FIN_VAL Collected Person None
Implied value of owner-
occupied housing HOUSRET HOUSRET Imputed Household
Divided by total adults
(age>18) in household
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Table B.3: Summary statistics for variables and underlying components in full sample, union subsample and non-union
subsample
Sample: All Union Non-union Unemployed Idle In School
Net fiscal impact 1120.7 10833.7 7670.5 -686.8 -11856.7 -3497.4
(18087.5) (14324.0) (15857.3) (13264.0) (15746.9) (10150.3)
Taxes paid 7184.0 12368.6 9721.4 4134.3 2370.7 308.4
(11877.1) (12196.8) (13295.8) (8856.6) (6981.0) (2570.7)
Federal income tax liability before credits 4002.8 6366.3 5427.1 2260.8 1431.3 203.7
(12426.1) (14002.0) (14436.7) (8945.3) (7484.5) (4197.4)
State income tax liability before credits 1142.9 2018.2 1534.3 713.4 381.2 47.29
(3741.8) (3880.8) (4425.9) (2531.7) (2179.4) (566.5)
Annual property taxes 921.7 1237.7 966.8 753.2 843.9 53.35
(2104.0) (2176.2) (2099.2) (1909.4) (2157.3) (532.9)
Social security retirement payroll deduction 2059.2 3397.6 3145.6 1331.5 92.32 106.5
(2665.3) (2305.5) (2809.6) (1905.1) (602.7) (425.5)
Federal retirement payroll deduction 72.94 304.4 87.28 11.58 3.024 1.128
(743.1) (1310.3) (859.3) (279.8) (124.0) (70.97)
Earned income tax credit (-) 193.8 118.6 255.1 374.7 103.8 32.18
(814.2) (613.1) (922.9) (1090.8) (620.7) (324.4)
Additional child tax credit (-) 45.66 29.98 57.56 76.18 29.31 7.141
(307.7) (251.8) (341.0) (377.2) (257.8) (116.7)
Child tax credit (-) 106.0 180.9 140.1 97.07 37.72 6.981
(462.4) (605.6) (523.1) (426.2) (289.3) (107.1)
Credit received from making work pay (-) 31.86 43.52 42.29 52.81 11.45 4.450
(145.6) (169.3) (164.7) (181.3) (94.69) (41.30)
Federal stimulus payment (-) 30.40 39.84 37.57 51.79 16.00 3.634
(194.2) (230.3) (215.5) (246.6) (139.1) (46.63)
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Income from Public Benefits 6063.3 1534.8 2050.9 4821.1 14227.4 3805.9
(11977.3) (7618.6) (8360.3) (9711.3) (14028.9) (9938.5)
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 233.2 12.13 21.27 76.94 665.1 153.0
(1498.3) (386.4) (461.4) (881.8) (2473.2) (1113.4)
Welfare (public assistance) 45.09 7.252 17.85 145.1 91.74 46.34
(604.1) (224.3) (376.9) (1036.3) (869.4) (570.0)
Person market value of Medicare 1939.6 925.1 1102.4 1016.5 3733.0 1239.3
(10195.7) (9304.1) (9759.6) (9120.9) (10902.6) (10926.3)
Person market value of Medicaid 1749.7 921.6 1090.1 1349.2 3101.3 1774.0
(10238.5) (9300.3) (9743.9) (9230.7) (11123.8) (11065.0)
Person value of food stamps 128.3 28.75 76.10 357.3 219.2 155.2
(637.3) (292.4) (509.8) (1093.1) (801.6) (653.3)
Person value of housing subsidy 7.504 1.771 2.671 14.38 16.58 6.242
(44.70) (18.59) (24.77) (64.54) (66.85) (36.87)
Person value of school-lunch subsidy 56.91 41.75 58.45 108.9 53.23 60.63
(190.4) (147.7) (187.9) (283.0) (194.8) (162.7)
Person value of energy subsidy 8.045 1.946 3.363 17.03 16.91 4.900
(65.82) (32.22) (44.28) (91.97) (93.80) (49.03)
Educational assistance (beyond HS) 138.7 87.01 140.1 108.8 49.04 1607.7
(1442.8) (992.2) (1383.5) (1089.5) (949.3) (5068.8)
Social security 2433.6 177.5 469.1 491.9 6635.8 172.1
(5763.4) (1791.6) (2807.4) (2742.4) (7856.4) (1353.1)
Unemployment benefits 158.7 174.9 122.4 2008.8 65.16 43.77
(1465.2) (1412.4) (1189.9) (5292.7) (999.4) (750.0)
Worker’s compensation 62.58 96.76 26.83 51.71 120.0 3.699
(1186.4) (1371.9) (721.2) (974.3) (1711.0) (176.7)
Veteran’s benefits 158.7 73.04 60.48 74.35 361.8 35.94
(2141.9) (1226.3) (1253.9) (1200.8) (3303.1) (980.2)
Disability benefits 115.6 37.08 22.23 40.72 305.1 32.28
(1888.4) (1280.7) (863.3) (1000.6) (3027.3) (986.5)
Survivor’s benefits 171.5 93.05 85.28 79.01 353.4 45.76
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(2775.0) (2455.6) (2390.8) (2129.6) (3472.6) (1574.2)
Private Income 35185.8 59204.0 48040.5 22264.9 11010.4 1996.9
(36770.9) (30709.1) (37984.6) (27150.8) (18588.8) (7061.0)
Alimony 19.07 12.25 19.46 7.355 21.97 6.196
(758.9) (471.5) (741.9) (427.4) (875.8) (413.5)
Non-farm business income 1727.6 135.0 3056.6 580.9 73.73 52.06
(14536.1) (3240.0) (19351.2) (7167.9) (2083.0) (2796.9)
Child support 123.1 152.4 155.9 150.3 64.51 32.67
(1248.6) (1361.0) (1382.9) (1276.5) (984.2) (489.5)
Dividends 365.4 229.6 326.7 85.30 511.1 31.18
(3206.1) (1967.1) (2965.8) (1214.7) (3965.3) (872.9)
Farm 131.2 19.23 232.2 16.56 6.020 0.435
(4176.1) (1400.1) (5563.9) (1175.8) (900.2) (66.06)
Interest 547.8 391.1 436.4 153.7 844.7 30.49
(3698.1) (2350.1) (3182.2) (1619.9) (4838.4) (474.8)
Income from other source not specified 42.91 29.05 26.43 45.32 76.65 5.187
(1191.5) (754.7) (910.9) (1004.9) (1660.1) (196.7)
Rent 282.1 220.2 280.6 117.2 331.1 34.19
(3800.4) (3459.2) (3828.0) (2586.4) (4031.6) (1177.6)
Retirement 1382.0 296.6 471.7 479.1 3361.8 8.916
(7197.0) (3251.5) (4399.5) (4560.3) (10827.6) (496.1)
Wage and salary income 27982.0 53706.1 41697.3 18012.0 1216.5 1447.8
(45139.8) (38910.9) (51473.8) (33011.8) (9732.1) (5643.9)
Assistance from friends/relatives not in HH 42.72 22.17 31.52 63.84 54.28 194.4
(999.2) (636.6) (801.7) (852.2) (1185.3) (2485.5)
Implied value of owner-occupied housing 4157.3 5003.6 4030.7 3292.0 4520.9 161.8
(5457.7) (5989.0) (5377.8) (5194.5) (5520.2) (1338.0)
Observations (individual-year) 486,964 38,039 268,564 12,544 158,628 9,189
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: Standard deviations presented in parentheses. All means are
weighted using sample weights and all dollar amounts are inflated to 2015 dollars.
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Table B.4: Main estimates without weights
Specification: 1 2 3
Outcome: net fiscal impact
1(union member) 1200.4⇤⇤⇤ 1208.2⇤⇤⇤ 571.8⇤⇤
(78.4) (120.5) (225.4)
Outcome: taxes paid
1(union member) 1013.8⇤⇤⇤ 1148.2⇤⇤⇤ 281.0
(72.9) (111.9) (187.1)
Outcome: public benefits received
1(union member) -186.6⇤⇤⇤ -60.1 -290.8⇤⇤
(29.9) (41.0) (125.3)
Outcome: private income earned
1(union member) 4268.7⇤⇤⇤ 4442.2⇤⇤⇤ 1468.4⇤⇤⇤
(185.7) (262.0) (516.2)
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes:
Coeﬃcient (within-individual, correlation-corrected SE). Signif-
icant at: *10 **5 ***1 percent level. 241,906 observations
of 120,953 individuals over 2 consecutive years each. Coeﬃ-
cient estimates on 1(union member) are presented for each {out-
come}x{specification} regression model. All dollar amounts are
inflated to 2015 dollars.
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Table B.5: Eﬀect of imputations on coeﬃcients
Panel A -
Specification: 1 2 3 1 2 3
Net fiscal impact Taxes paid
Main Sample (Drop all imputations)
1(union member) 1289.8⇤⇤⇤ 1264.3⇤⇤⇤ 540.0⇤⇤ 1108.6⇤⇤⇤ 1240.2⇤⇤⇤ 216.3
(91.6) (138.1) (254.4) (85.6) (129.7) (208.5)
N 241,906
Dropped N (%) 317,200 (56.73%)
Drop Imputed Union Status Only
1(union member) 949.0⇤⇤⇤ 1017.8⇤⇤⇤ 547.5 722.6⇤⇤⇤ 928.2⇤⇤⇤ 280.2
(105.0) (147.8) (506.1) (70.5) (89.8) (186.8)
N 526,954
Dropped N (%) 32,152 (5.75%)
Drop Imputed Income Only
1(union member) 1145.3⇤⇤⇤ 1155.9⇤⇤⇤ 369.2 991.4⇤⇤⇤ 1135.3⇤⇤⇤ 319.8
(82.8) (117.9) (252.5) (75.7) (107.5) (205.8)
N 305,750
Dropped N (%) 253,356 (45.31%)
Drop Full-Line Impute Only
1(union member) 990.8⇤⇤⇤ 1058.1⇤⇤⇤ 99.4 771.6⇤⇤⇤ 950.3⇤⇤⇤ 18.9
(90.5) (117.7) (340.9) (72.9) (92.8) (176.5)
N 478,544
Dropped N (%) 80,652 (14.43%)
Include All Imputations
1(union member) 919.6⇤⇤⇤ 996.5⇤⇤⇤ 43.0 717.2⇤⇤⇤ 898.6⇤⇤⇤ 155.3
(99.0) (136.5) (447.1) (67.4) (83.1) (174.1)
N 559,106
Dropped N (%) 0 (0%)
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Panel B -
Specification: 1 2 3 1 2 3
Benefits received Private income
Main Sample (Drop all imputations)
1(union member) -181.3⇤⇤⇤ -24.2 -323.7⇤⇤ 4661.6⇤⇤⇤ 4588.0⇤⇤⇤ 1614.0⇤⇤⇤
(35.0) (47.1) (144.9) (205.3) (302.4) (575.1)
N 241,906
Dropped N (%) 317,200 (56.73%)
Drop Imputed Union Status Only
1(union member) -226.4⇤⇤⇤ -89.6 -267.4 2834.6⇤⇤⇤ 3517.1⇤⇤⇤ 1119.2⇤⇤
(79.5) (119.2) (476.4) (180.2) (198.3) (528.9)
N 526,954
Dropped N (%) 32,152 (5.75%)
Drop Imputed Income Only
1(union member) -153.9⇤⇤⇤ -20.6 -49.4 3992.1⇤⇤⇤ 4111.0⇤⇤⇤ 1752.4⇤⇤⇤
(34.9) (52.1) (148.0) (188.1) (262.1) (580.3)
N 305,750
Dropped N (%) 253,356 (45.31%)
Drop Full-Line Impute Only
1(union member) -219.3⇤⇤⇤ -107.8 -80.5 3195.4⇤⇤⇤ 3808.9⇤⇤⇤ 433.3
(53.7) (73.2) (297.0) (180.2) (208.3) (500.3)
N 478,544
Dropped N (%) 80,652 (14.43%)
Include All Imputations
1(union member) -202.4⇤⇤⇤ -98.0 112.3 2786.8⇤⇤⇤ 3455.3⇤⇤⇤ 805.6
(74.7) (108.8) (417.5) (170.6) (186.4) (499.5)
N 559,106
Dropped N (%) 0 (0%)
Source: CPS-ASEC 1994-2015, CPS-ORG 1994-2015. Notes: Coeﬃcient (within-individual,
correlation-corrected SE). Significant at: *10 **5 ***1 percent level. Coeﬃcient estimates on 1(union
member) are presented for each {outcome}x{specification} regression model. All regressions are





Table C.1: Summary statistics for H.L.E. and Logical Edits, full sample
H.L.E. Logical Edits H.L.E. Logical Edits
Years in U.S. 14.1 10.3 Age 35.4 32.3
(8.7) (6.9) (8.8) (12.8)
% >5 years 83.3 70.4 % Female 43.1 44.7
(37.3) (45.6) (49.5) (49.7)
% Between 1 and 5 years 13.3 22.3 % Employed 71.0 69.7
(34.0) (41.6) (45.4) (45.9)
% Last year 3.4 7.3 % Unemployed 6.3 6.0
(18.0) (26.0) (24.2) (23.8)
% Mexico and Central Am. 100.0 68.4 % N.I.L.F. 22.7 24.3
(0.0) (46.5) (41.9) (42.9)
% Other North Am. 0.0 0.4 % White 58.4 49.9
(0.0) (6.5) (49.3) (50.0)
% Other Latin Am. 0.0 11.1 % African American 0.6 5.6
(0.0) (31.5) (7.4) (23.0)
% Europe 0.0 3.3 % Asian 0.1 13.2
(0.0) (17.9) (3.4) (33.9)
% Asia 0.0 13.8 % Other 40.2 30.7
(0.0) (34.5) (49.0) (46.1)
% Africa 0.0 2.8 % Married 57.5 45.0
(0.0) (16.4) (49.4) (49.8)
% Oceania 0.0 0.2 % Single 33.3 45.7
(0.0) (4.3) (47.1) (49.8)
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% Less than H.S. 69.1 52.1 % More than H.S. 0.0 12.0
(46.2) (50.0) (0.0) (32.5)
% H.S. or equiv. 30.9 23.3 % College or more 0.0 12.0
(46.2) (42.3) (0.0) (32.6)
Observations 545,209 842,786 Observations 545,209 842,786
Weighted N’s 78,010,809 127,813,114 Weighted N’s 78,010,809 127,813,114
Source: ACS 2005-2015. Note: Averages presented with standard deviations in parentheses. H.L.E. refers to the “Hispanics with Low
Education” proxy.
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Table C.2: Estimates of the impact of E-Verify mandates on probability of employment,
Basic Monthly CPS files
In Labor Force Population Full CPS
All Male Female All Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
H.L.E.
Universal 0.028⇤⇤ 0.033⇤⇤⇤ 0.046⇤ 0.035 0.007 0.062⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.007) (0.025) (0.021) (0.049) (0.029)
Observations 277,369 189,596 87,773 386,406 212,088 174,318
Naturalized
Hispanic
Universal 0.039 0.119⇤ -0.041 0.009 0.006 -0.024
(0.046) (0.063) (0.037) (0.046) (0.084) (0.020)
Observations 184,575 98,638 85,937 269,637 124,911 144,726
US-Born
non-Hispanic
Universal -0.010⇤⇤⇤ -0.017⇤⇤⇤ -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 8,708,946 4,492,400 4,216,546 13,562,270 6,461,583 7,100,687
Source: Basic Monthly CPS 2002-2014. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Notes: Controls include
gender (when applicable), race, age, marital status, number of children in household, educational
attainment, industry fixed eﬀects, state fixed eﬀects, time (year, month) fixed eﬀects, state specific
time trends, unemployment rates. Standard errors clustered at the state level. All regressions use
survey weights (wtsupp).
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Figure C.1: Comparing H.L.E. and Logical Edits - Characteristics of likely unauthorized

























2.2 million Mex. & Cen.Am.
0.05 million North America










Years in U.S.: 10
Notes: H.L.E. refers to the “Hispanics with Low Education” proxy. Estimates are weighted using ACS
person weights.
